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Available	   accounts	   on	   jurisdiction,	   effective	   control,	   and	   the	   reach	   of	   human	   rights	  
protections	   fail	   to	   provide	   a	   coherent	   construction	   that	   is	   principled	   and	   applicable	  
across	   the	  board,	  within	  and	  beyond	   territorial	  borders.	   The	   “functional	   jurisdiction”	  
model	   posited	   herein	   resolves	   these	   incongruities	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   normative	  
foundation	   of	   sovereign	   authority	   overall,	   predicated	   on	   an	   exercise	   of	   “public	  
powers”	   through	   which	   State	   functions	   are	   discharged,	   taking	   the	   form	   of	   policy	  
delivery	   and/or	  operational	   action,	  whether	   inland	  or	  offshore,	   and	  which	   translates	  
into	   “situational”	   control.	   Using	   the	   pending	   case	   of	   S.S.	   and	   Others	   v.	   Italy	   as	   an	  
illustration,	  the	  article	  focuses	  on	  the	  sovereign-­‐authority	  nexus	  that	  unites	  a	  specific	  
State	   with	   a	   specific	   individual	   in	   a	   specific	   situation,	   triggering	   human	   rights	  
obligations	   even	   through	  mechanisms	   of	   “contactless	   control”	   exercised	   via	   remote	  
management	   techniques	   and/or	   through	   a	   proxy	   third	   actor.	   The	   role	   of	  
extraterritorial	   operations,	   qua	   complex	  mechanisms	   of	   governance	   that	   implement	  
broader	  policies	  with	  a	  planning,	  rollout	  and	  post-­‐implementation	  phase,	  is	  central	  to	  
this	   re-­‐conceptualization,	   as	   is	   also	   the	   understanding	   that	   what	   makes	   control	  
“effective”	  is	  its	  capacity	  to	  determine	  the	  material	  course	  of	  events	  and	  the	  resulting	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A.	  Introduction	  
	  
Debates	   on	   the	   extraterritorial	   reach	   of	   human	   rights	   are	   often	   channeled	   through	  
debates	  on	  jurisdiction.	   In	  substance,	   it	   is	  the	  exercise	  of	   jurisdiction	  that	  determines	  
whether	   a	   state	   can	   be	   held	   accountable	   for	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   a	   specific	  
situation,	   hence	   the	   importance	   of	   defining	   the	   term	   and	   identifying	   the	   factors	  
through	   which	   it	   can	   be	   ascertained.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
European	   Convention	   on	  Human	   Rights	   (ECHR),1	  where	   the	   notion	   is	   construed	   as	   a	  
“threshold”	   criterion	   that	   determines	   its	   applicability	   in	   concrete	   cases,2	  but	   it	   is	   a	  
common	   feature	   across	   the	   field	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   instruments. 3	  
Ultimately,	  what	  these	  discussions	  reveal	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  competing	  conceptions	  
of	  the	  mission	  and	  rationale	  of	  human	  rights,	  whether	  seen	  as	  essentially	  underpinned	  
by	  an	  universalist	  vocation	  or	  as	  fundamentally	  constrained	  by	  national	  borders	  as	  key	  
delineators	  of	  state	  powers	  and	  state	  obligations.	  	  
	  
Adjudicators,	  particularly	  at	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  have	  reflected	  this	  
dialectic	   in	   their	   judgments,	   expanding	   the	   scope	   of	   human	   rights	   provisions	   to	  
situations	   outside	   national	   territory,	   but	   over	   which	   states	   exhibit	   high	   levels	   of	  
“effective	   control,”	   adapting	   the	   territorial	   model	   to	   extraterritorial	   settings.	   Their	  
findings,	   however,	   do	   not	   follow	   a	   straightforward,	   fundamental	   tenet,	   and	   have	  
generated	  confusion	  as	  for	  what	  constitutes	  “control”	  that	  can	  be	  deemed	  “effective”	  
and	   thus	   tantamount	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	   jurisdiction	   in	   the	   individual	   circumstances.	  
Rather	  than	  “apprais[ing]	  the	  facts	  against	  [a	  set	  of]	   immutable	  principles,”	  the	  Court	  
has	  been	   criticized	   for	   “fashioning	  doctrines	  which	   somehow	   seem	   to	   accommodate	  
the	  facts,”	  but	  reach	  conclusions	  in	  a	  piecemeal	  way.4	  
	  
To	   overcome	   this	   limitation,	   several	   authors	   have	   suggested	   alternative	   approaches.	  
Lawson,	  for	  instance,	  has	  done	  so	  by	  reference	  to	  relative	  control	  and	  the	  cause-­‐and-­‐
effect	   relationship	   between	   state	   action	   and	   foreign	   territory	   or	   persons	   abroad,	  
proposing	  that	  states	  be	  considered	  responsible	  for	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  conduct	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	   Freedoms,	  Nov.	  4	  1950,	  C.E.T.S.	   5	   [hereinafter	  
ECHR].	  	  
2	  Al-­‐Skeini	  and	  Others	  v.	  United	  Kingdom	  [GC]	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18,	  para.	  130	  (2011).	  See	  also	  Al-­‐Jedda	  v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  App.	  No.	  27021/08,	  para.	  74	  (July	  7,	  2011),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐105612.	  Speaking	  
of	  a	  “necessary	  condition”	   instead,	  see	  N.D.	  and	  N.T.	  v.	  Spain	  [GC],	  Apps.	  8675/15	  and	  8697/15,	  para.	  102	  
(Feb.	  13,	  2020),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐201353.	  
3	  For	   a	   thorough	   discussion	   and	   further	   references,	   see	   MARKO	  MILANOVIC,	   EXTRATERRITORIAL	   APPLICATION	   OF	  
HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  TREATIES	  (2011).	  See	  also	  Ralph	  Wilde,	  The	  Extraterritorial	  Application	  of	  International	  Human	  
Rights	  Law	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  in	  ROUTLEDGE	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  LAW	  635	  (Nigel	  
Rodley	   &	   Scott	   Sheeran	   eds.,	   2013);	   GLOBAL	   JUSTICE,	   STATE	   DUTIES:	   THE	   EXTRATERRITORIAL	   SCOPE	   OF	   ECONOMIC,	  
SOCIAL	  AND	  CULTURAL	  RIGHTS	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (Malcolm	  Langford	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2013);	  UNIVERSAL	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  
AND	   EXTRATERRITORIAL	  OBLIGATIONS	   (Mark	   Gibney	   &	   Sigrun	   Skogly	   eds.,	   2010);	   MICHAL	   GONDEK,	   THE	   REACH	   OF	  
HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  IN	  A	  GLOBALISING	  WORLD	  (2009).	  
4	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18,	  Concurring	  Opinion	  of	  Judge	  Bonello	  at	  para.	  8.	  
3 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  21	  No.	  03	  
wherever	  performed5—somewhat	  equating	   the	  ability	   to	  violate	   rights	  with	   the	  duty	  
not	   to	   violate	   them,	   without	   expounding	   how	   to	   avoid	   the	   conflation	   between	  
capability	   and	   obligation.	   Others,	   like	   Milanovic,	   rely	   on	   the	   nature	   and	   content	   of	  
obligations	   and	   whether	   they	   entail	   positive	   or	   negative	   duties,	   presuming	   that	   the	  
latter	   are	   easier	   to	   comply	   with	   offshore	   and	   should	   therefore	   be	   ubiquitously	  
respected—as	  if	  the	  distinction	  between	  positive	  and	  negative	  duties	  was	  warranted,	  
as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  or	  easy	  to	  operate,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  practice.6	  
	  
These	   propositions,	   as	   plausible	   as	   they	   may	   be,	   leave	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	  
unpredictability,	   which	   may	   lead	   to	   unsatisfactory	   outcomes.	   They	   fail	   to	   provide	   a	  
coherent	   construction	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   is	   applicable	   across	   the	   board,	   within	   and	  
beyond	  borders,	  and	  that	  is	  principled	  and	  non-­‐contingent	  on	  levels	  of	  physical	  control	  
or	  the	  legal	  characterization	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  obligations	  (as	  positive	  or	  negative).	  So,	  
contributing	  to	  this	  discussion,	  but	  offering	  an	  alternative	  reading,	  this	  article	  proposes	  
a	   new	   conceptualization,	   taking	   extraterritorial	   maritime	   migration	   multi-­‐actor	  
interventions	  as	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  
	  
Starting	  from	  pronouncements	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  courts	  and	  treaty	  bodies,	  
the	  goal	  is	  to	  distil	  a	  principled	  and	  workable	  concept	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  reconciles	  the	  
universal	   ethos	   of	   human	   rights	   with	   the	   existence	   of	   national	   borders	   in	   an	   inter-­‐
dependent,	   globalized	   world.	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   the	   objective	   is	   to	   unpack	   the	  
normative	   premise	   unifying	   the	   generally	   accepted	   models	   of	   extraterritorial	  
jurisdiction	  (that	  is,	  “control	  over	  an	  area,”	  or	  territorial,	  and	  “State	  agent	  authority,”	  
or	   personal)	   and,	   on	   that	   foundation,	   propose	   a	   paradigm	   that	   resolves	   the	   current	  
difficulties	  with	  the	  appraisal	  of	  extraterritorial	  action.	  
	  
This	   model,	   which	   I	   call	   “functional”—in	   a	   sense	   somewhat	   different	   from	   the	   one	  
implied	  by	  other	  authors,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Part	  D—aspires	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  intelligible	  
approach	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   extraterritorial	   jurisdiction,	   highlighting	   the	  
importance	   of	   the	   normative	   foundation	   of	   sovereign	   authority	   overall,	   whether	  
exercised	  territorially	  or	  abroad.	  It	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  public	  powers,	  such	  
as	   those	   ordinarily	   assumed	   by	   a	   territorial	   sovereign,7	  taking	   the	   form	   of	   policy	  
delivery	  and/or	  operational	  action	  translating	  into	  “situational	  control.”	  
	  
Against	  this	  background,	  I	  will	  assert	  that	  instances	  of	  “contactless”	  control	  by	  an	  ECHR	  
party,8	  exercised	  through	  remote	  management	  techniques	  and/or	  in	  cooperation	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Rick	  Lawson,	  Life	  after	  Bankovic:	  On	  the	  Extraterritorial	  Application	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights,	   in	   EXTRATERRITORIAL	  APPLICATION	  OF	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  TREATIES	   83	   (Fons	   Coomans	  &	  Menno	   T.	   Kamminga	  
eds.,	  2004).	  See	  also	  Applicants	  in	  Bankovic	  and	  Others	  v.	  Belgium	  and	  Others,	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  435	  (2001).	  
6	  Milanovic,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  210	  et	  seq.	  
7	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18,	  para.	  149.	  
8	  The	   argument	   will	   elaborate	   upon	   Violeta	   Moreno-­‐Lax	   &	   Mariagiulia	   Giuffré,	   The	   Rise	   of	   Consensual	  
Containment:	   From	   “Contactless	   Control”	   to	   “Contactless	   Responsibility”	   for	  Migratory	   Flows,	   in	   RESEARCH	  
HANDBOOK	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  REFUGEE	  LAW	  81	  (Satvinder	  S.	  Juss	  ed.,	  2019).	  For	  a	  similar	  argument	  on	  military	  
occupation	  but	  without	   “boots	  on	   the	   ground”,	   see	  Orna	  Ben-­‐Naftali	  &	  Yuval	   Shany,	  Living	   in	  Denial:	   The	  
Application	  of	  Human	  Rights	   in	  the	  Occupied	  Territories,	  37	   ISRAEL	  L.REV.	  17	  (2003–2004);	  Orna	  Ben-­‐Naftali,	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a	   local	   administration	   acting	   as	   a	   proxy,9	  may	   nonetheless	   amount	   to	   “effective”	  
control	   and	   engage	   Convention	   obligations—whether	   it	   be	   exercised	   over	   persons,	  
territory,	   or	   specific	   situations	  abroad.	   The	   role	  of	   knowledge	  and	   the	  extent	  of	  due	  
diligence	   owed	   to	   avoid	   prospective	   harm	   will	   be	   considered	   as	   well,	   in	   view	   of	  
conduct	   occurred	   “during	   the	   course	   of,	   or	   contiguous	   to,	   security	   [or	   equivalent]	  
operations”	   performed	   under	   state	   direction. 10 	  Such	   “operations,”	   qua	   complex	  
mechanisms	  of	  governance	   that	   implement	  broader	  policies,	  with	  a	  planning,	   rollout	  
and	  post-­‐implementation	  phase—rather	  than	  random,	  one-­‐off,	  haphazard	  encounters	  
between	   a	   state	   and	   its	   potential	   subjects11—are	   key	   to	   the	   conceptualization	   of	  
functional	  jurisdiction	  posited	  herein.	  
	  
The	  pending	  case	  of	  S.S.	  and	  Others	  v.	  Italy,	  lodged	  by	  the	  Global	  Legal	  Action	  Network	  
(GLAN),	   in	   collaboration	   with	   the	   Italian	   Association	   of	   Immigration	   Lawyers	   (ASGI),	  
where	   I	   act	   as	   lead	   counsel,	   will	   illustrate	   the	   argumentation.12	  I	   will	   claim	   that	   the	  
constellation	  of	  events	  of	  November	  6,	  2017,	  recounted	  in	  Part	  B	  and	  contextualized	  in	  
Part	  C,	   falls	  within	   Italy’s	  “jurisdiction”	  under	  Article	  1	  ECHR,	   in	  a	  way	  comparable	  to	  
the	   Hirsi	   case.13	  While	   in	   Hirsi	   a	   “push-­‐back”	   operation	   was	   conducted	   directly	   by	  
Italian	  forces,	  here	  the	  same	  underlying	  policy	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  proxy.14	  As	  Part	  E	  will	  
expound	   in	   detail,	   Italy	   exercised—though	   remotely 15 —a	   sufficient	   degree	   of	  
“effective	  control”	  over	   the	  applicants’	   fate,16	  reaching	   the	   jurisdictional	   threshold	  of	  
the	  Convention.	  
	  
This	  will	  serve	  to	  clarify	  the	  limits	  of	  multi-­‐actor	  cooperation	  that	  contributes,	  or	  leads,	  
to	   human	   rights	   violations	   through	   capacity	   building,	   financial	   transfers,	   and/or	  
intervention	   in	   the	   command	   and	   control	   structure	   of	   a	   partner	   State.	   It	   will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Aeyal	  Gross	  &	  Keren	  Michaeli,	   Illegal	  Occupation:	   Framing	   the	  Occupied	   Palestinian	   Territory,	   23	  BERKELEY	  
J.I.L.	  551	  (2005).	  
9	  Catan	   and	   Others	   v.	  Moldova	   and	   Russia,	   Apps.	   43370/04,	   8252/05,	   and	   18454/06,	   para.	   106	   (Oct.	   19,	  
2012),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐114082.	  
10	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  150.	  
11	  This	  has	  been	  discarded	   in	  Bankovic,	   supra	   note	  5,	  para.	  75.	   Further	  on	   these	  “encounters,”	  see	   ITAMAR	  
MANN,	  HUMANITY	  AT	  SEA:	  MARITIME	  MIGRATION	  AND	  THE	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (2016).	  
12 	  S.S.	   and	   Others	   v.	   Italy,	   App.	   No.	   21660/18,	   communicated	   on	   26	   June	   2019	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐194748.	  
13	  Hirsi	  Jamaa	  and	  Others	  v.	   Italy,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  (Feb.	  23,	  2012),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐
109231.	  
14	  On	  “pull-­‐backs”,	  see	  further	  Nora	  Markard,	  The	  Right	  to	  Leave	  by	  Sea:	  Legal	  Limits	  on	  EU	  Migration	  Control	  
by	  Third	  Countries,	  27	  E.J.I.L.	  591	  (2016).	  
15 	  Further	   on	   techniques	   of	   “remote	   control”,	   see	   David	   S.	   FitzGerald,	   Remote	   Control	   of	   Migration:	  
Theorising	  Territoriality,	  Shared	  Coercion	  and	  Deterrence,	   JOURNAL	  OF	  ETHNIC	  AND	  MIGRATION	  STUDIES	  (advance	  
access)	  (2019),	  https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1680115.	  
16 	  Ilaşcu	   v.	   Moldova	   and	   Russia,	   App.	   No.	   48787/99,	   para.	   392	   (July	   8,	   2004),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐61886.	  
5 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  21	  No.	  03	  
demonstrate	   that	   human	   rights	   responsibility	   can	   be	   engaged	   through	   consensual	  
measures	   of	   pre-­‐emption	   and	   containment	   of	   unwanted	   migration, 17 	  challenging	  
systems	  of	  “contactless	  control”	  of	  irregular	  flows,	  like	  the	  one	  built	  by	  Italy	  with	  Libya,	  
which	   impedes	   access	   to	   protection	   by	   refugees	   and	   others	   in	   need.	   Under	   the	  
functional	   approach,	   the	   elimination	   of	   direct	   physical	   contact	   with	   the	   individuals	  
concerned	   no	   longer	   amounts	   to	   the	   severance	   of	   a	   possible	   jurisdictional	   link	   that	  
may	   trigger	   human	   rights	   obligations.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   functional	   understanding	  
maintains	  that	  operational	  power	  projected	  and	  actioned	  abroad,	   like	  other	  methods	  
of	  territorial	  and/or	  personal	  control,	  amounts	  to	  an	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction.	  
	  
The	   wider	   ramifications	   of	   this	   model	   for	   armed	   conflict,	   peace	   building	   programs,	  
development	  policies,	  or	  democratization	  efforts,	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  migration	  by	  
sea	   terrain,	   should	   be	   duly	   considered	   and	   problematized	   in	   further	   research.	   It	   is	  
anticipated	   that	   this	  new	  understanding	  of	   jurisdiction—which	   I	  deem	   implicit	   in	   the	  
existing	  extraterritorial	  bases	  already	   recognized	   in	   international	  human	   rights	   law—
can	  have	  revolutionary	  implications	  and	  serve	  to	  close	  important	  accountability	  gaps,18	  
but	   it	   will	   also	   give	   rise	   to	   new	   questions	   around	   consolidating	   practices	   of	  
collaboration	  in	  the	  management	  of	  cross-­‐regional	  challenges,	  including	  disaster	  relief	  
or	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  climate	  crisis,	  with	  an	  impact	  throughout	  the	  legal	  sectors	  
implicated	   in	  states’	   international	  relations.	  The	   limits	  and	  possible	  objections	  to	  this	  
model	  will	  therefore	  be	  addressed	  in	  Part	  F.	  
	  
B.	  The	  Events	  of	  November	  6,	  2017	  
	  
The	   facts	   of	   S.S.	   have	   been	   reconstructed	   in	   detail	   by	   the	   research	   hub	   Forensic	  
Oceanography,19	  through	  evidence	  collected	  by	  the	  Search	  and	  Rescue	  Observatory	  for	  
the	  Mediterranean	   (SAROBMED),20	  on	   the	   basis	   of	  materials	   provided	   by	   the	   search	  
and	   rescue	   (SAR)	   NGO	   Sea	   Watch.	   The	   evidence	   includes	   video	   footage	   and	   audio	  
recordings	   of	   the	   event,	   survivors’	   testimonies,	   interviews	   with	   key	   actors,	   and	  
complementary	   documentation	   gathered	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   official	   sources.	   There	   is,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See,	  e.g.,	  Thomas	  Gammeltoft-­‐Hansen	  &	  James	  C.	  Hathaway,	  Non-­‐refoulement	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Cooperative	  
Deterrence,	  53	  COLUM.J.TRANSNAT’L	  LAW	  235	  (2015).	  
18 	  Cf.	   Itamar	   Mann,	   Maritime	   Legal	   Black	   Holes:	   Migration	   and	   Rightlessness	   in	   International	   Law,	   29	  
E.J.I.L.	  347	  (2018).	  
19	  See	  Charles	  Heller	  &	   Lorenzo	   Pezzani,	  Mare	   Clausum:	   Italy	   and	   the	   EU’s	  Undeclared	  Operation	   to	   Stem	  
Migration	   across	   the	   Mediterranean,	   FORENSIC	   OCEANOGRAPHY	   (May	   4,	   2018),	   https://content.forensic-­‐
architecture.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2019/05/2018-­‐05-­‐07-­‐FO-­‐Mare-­‐Clausum-­‐full-­‐EN.pdf	   [hereinafter	  Mare	  
Clausum	   Report];	   for	   the	   visual	  minute-­‐by-­‐minute	   reconstruction	   of	   events,	   see	  Charles	   Heller	  &	   Lorenzo	  
Pezzani,	  Mare	  Clausum:	   The	   Sea	  Watch	   v.	   Libyan	  Coast	  Guard	   Case,	   FORENSIC	  ARCHITECTURE	   (May	   4,	   2018),	  
https://forensic-­‐architecture.org/investigation/seawatch-­‐vs-­‐the-­‐libyan-­‐coastguard	   [hereinafter	   Mare	  
Clausum	  Video].	  
20 	  The	   Search	   and	   Rescue	   Observatory	   for	   the	   Mediterranean	   (SAROBMED)	   is	   an	   international,	   multi-­‐
disciplinary	  consortium	  of	   researchers,	  civil	   society	  groups,	  and	  other	  organisations	  working	   in	   the	   field	  of	  
cross-­‐border	   maritime	   migration,	   either	   on	   the	   ground,	   or	   through	   advocacy,	   research	   and/or	   strategic	  
litigation	  that	  records	  and	  documents	  human	  rights	  violations	  occurring	  at	  sea	  as	  a	  result,	  or	  in	  the	  course,	  
of	  rescue/interdiction	  operations	  and	  of	  which	  the	  current	  author	  is	  the	  coordinator,	  https://sarobmed.org/.	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however,	  no	  commonly	  agreed	  account	  of	  how	  the	  situation	  unfolded,	  since	  the	  Italian	  
Government	   is	   yet	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   applicants’	   allegations	   and	   the	   Court	   is	   still	   to	  
render	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  case.	  The	  description	  below,	  therefore,	  presents	  the	  facts	  as	  
they	  were	  communicated	  to	  Italy.21	  
	  
The	   case	   concerns	   the	   LYCG’s	   interception/rescue	   of	   a	   migrant	   dinghy	   on	   the	   high	  
seas,	   carrying	  around	  150	  persons,	   including	   the	  applicants,	  which	  had	  departed	   the	  
Tripoli	  area	  around	  midnight	  on	  November	  5,	  2017,	  and	  began	  to	  capsize	  soon	  after.	  
The	  Italian	  Maritime	  Rescue	  Coordination	  Centre	  (MRCC)	  located	  in	  Rome	  was	  first	  to	  
receive	   its	  distress	  signal,	  which	   it	  communicated	  to	  “all	  ships	  transiting	   in	  the	  area,”	  
including	  the	  Sea	  Watch	  3	  (SW3)	  and	  the	  Ras	  Al	  Jadar	  of	  the	  LYCG,	  requesting	  that	  the	  
dinghy	   be	   assisted.22	  MRCC	   Rome	   provided	   exact	   coordinates	   about	   an	   hour	   later.23	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  dinghy	  had	  started	  sinking.	  
	  
Survivors	   recall	   a	   Portuguese	   military	   aircraft—belonging	   to	   the	   EUNAVFORMED	  
Operation	   Sophia 24—overflying	   and	   circling	   them	   several	   times,	   throwing	   down	  
lifejackets.	   A	   French	   warship,	   Premier	   Maître	   l’Her,	   also	   under	   EUNAVFORMED	  
command,	  and	  an	   Italian	  navy	  helicopter,	  within	   the	   Italian	  Operation	  Mare	  Sicuro,25	  
were	   in	   close	   proximity.	   It	  was	   only	   about	   another	   hour	   later	   that	   the	   SW3	  and	   the	  
LYCG	  arrived	  on	  site.	  Apparently,	  the	  LYCG	  made	  it	  first,	  but	  did	  not	  assist	  immediately.	  
By	  contrast,	   the	  SW3	  crew	  started	   rescue	  procedures	   right	  away,	  assuming	  on-­‐scene	  
command	   (OSC),	   a	   role	   to	  which	   the	   LYCG	   objected—although	   the	   LYCG	   vessel	   was	  
initially	   unresponsive	   to	   radio	   communication	   and	   lacked	   the	   necessary	   equipment,	  
including	  rigid-­‐hulled	  inflatable	  boats	  (RHIBs).26	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 	  See	   (only	   in	   French)	   Requête	   no	   21660/18	   S.S.	   et	   autres	   contre	   l’Italie	   introduite	   le	   3	   mai	   2018,	  
Communiquée	  le	  26	  juin	  2019,	  Exposé	  des	  faits,	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐194748.	  
22	  See	  copy	  of	  Inmarsat	  distress	  signal	  received	  by	  the	  SW3,	  in	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  89.	  	  
23	  See	  copy	  of	  Hydrolant	  message	  received	  by	  the	  SW3,	  in	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  90.	  
24	  This	   is	   the	   EU	   maritime	   security	   mission	   tasked	   with	   the	   fight	   against	   human	   trafficking	   and	   migrant	  
smuggling	   from	  Libya,	   launched	   in	   2015.	   Council	  Decision	  2015/778/CFSP	  of	   18	  May	  2015	  on	  a	   European	  
Union	  Military	  Operation	   in	   the	  Southern	  Central	  Mediterranean	   (EUNAVFOR	  MED),	   2015	  O.J.	   (L	   122/31).	  
The	   unpublished	   EUNAVFORMED	   documents	   cited	   hereinafter	   have	   been	   leaked	   to	   the	   press	   and	   are	  
available	  via	  Zach	  Campbell,	  Europe’s	  Deadly	  Migration	  Strategy:	  Officials	  Knew	  EU	  Military	  Operation	  Made	  
Mediterranean	  Crossing	  More	  Dangerous,	  POLITICO	  (Feb.	  28,	  2019),	  https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-­‐
deadly-­‐migration-­‐strategy-­‐leaked-­‐documents/.	  
25	  This	   is	   the	   Italian	   maritime	   security	   operation	   launched	   in	   March	   2015,	   in	   replacement	   of	   the	   mixed	  
rescue-­‐security	  mission	  Mare	  Nostrum.	  See	  Ministero	  della	  Difesa,	  Operazione	  Mare	  Sicuro	  (June	  19,	  2015),	  
http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/NazionaliInCorso/MareSicuro/Pagine/default.aspx.	  
26	  It	  was	   latter	   claimed	  by	  a	   LYCG	  spokesman	   that	   the	   LYCG	  RHIBs	  are	  dysfunctional.	  See	  Steve	  Scherer	  &	  
Aidan	   Lewis,	   Exclusive:	   Italy	   Plans	   Big	   Handover	   of	   Sea	   Rescues	   to	   Libyan	   Coastguard,	   REUTERS	   (Dec.	   15,	  
2017),	   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­‐europe-­‐migrants-­‐libya-­‐exclusive/exclusive-­‐italy-­‐plans-­‐big-­‐
handover-­‐of-­‐sea-­‐rescues-­‐to-­‐libya-­‐coastguard-­‐idUSKBN1E91SG.	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The	   survivors	   recall	   the	   Ras	   Al	   Jadar	   did	   not	   help	   them.	   Instead,	   the	   crew	   “took	  
pictures	   and	   cursed.”27	  Its	   entry	   into	   the	   rescue	   theatre	   “created	   a	   big	  wave,	   which	  
made	  people	  sink	  and	  others	  drift	  away,”28	  including	  the	  child	  of	  one	  of	  the	  applicants.	  
The	   LYCG	   crew	   then	   “beat	   people	   with	   ropes	   who	   were	   in	   the	   water.”29	  They	   also	  
established	  contact	  with	  the	  SW3,	  “inviting	  her	  to	  stay	  away,”30	  and	  stating	  that	  “[w]e	  
are	   now	   responsible	   for	   this	   rescue.”31	  The	   SW3	   rejected	   the	   proposition,	   informing	  
the	  LYCG	  that	  “[w]e	  have	  orders	  from	  MRCC	  [to	  assist	  the	  dinghy	  in	  distress].”32	  
	  
It	  is	  unclear	  what	  the	  orders	  were.	  It	  appears	  that	  MRCC	  Rome	  had	  communicated	  by	  
phone	  with	   the	   LYCG	   Joint	  Operation	  Room	   (JOR)	   in	   Tripoli.33	  From	   the	   transcript	   of	  
the	   conversation,	   it	   transpires	   that	   MRCC	   Rome	   had	   directly	   asked	   the	   official	   in	  
charge	   to	   assume	   OSC	   and	   that	   he	   “confirmed	   ‘yes’	   the	   LYCG	   will	   conduct	   the	  
operation	  and	  assume	  OSC.”34	  Generally,	  as	  per	  the	  official’s	  account,	  the	  LYCG	  “are	  in	  
contact	   24/7	   with	   MRCC	   Rome.”	   It	   is	   MRCC	   Rome	   who	   “provide[s]	   all	   information	  
about	  SAR’,	   including	  “all	  distress	  signals”—which,	  as	   the	  next	  section	  expounds,	   the	  
LYCG	  has	  no	  infrastructure	  to	  systematically	  register	  and	  further	  disseminate.35	  
	  
While	  the	  LYCG	  vessel	  approached	  the	  dinghy,	  the	  SW3	  had	  lowered	  two	  of	  its	  RHIBs	  
to	   reach	   out	   to	   migrants	   scattered	   around	   at	   risk	   of	   being	   lost.	   The	   LYCG	   vessel	  
deployed	  a	  rope	  instead,	  only	  after	  several	  persons	  had	  already	  passed	  away,	  causing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Testimonies	  of	  survivors	  (on	  file).	  Confirming:	  U.N.	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Comm’r	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  Situation	  
of	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Libya,	   and	   the	   Effectiveness	   of	   Technical	   Assistance	   and	   Capacity-­‐Building	   Measures	  
Received	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Libya	  –	  Report	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  
U.N.	  Doc.	  A/HRC/37/46,	  para.	  46	  (Feb.	  21,	  2018).	  
28	  Testimonies	  of	  survivors	  (on	  file).	  
29	  Id.	   For	   similar	   practices	   in	   other	   incidents,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Bel	   Trew	   &	   Tom	   Kington,	   Video	   Shows	   Libyan	  
Coastguard	   Whipping	   Rescued	   Migrants,	   THE	   TIMES	   (Feb.	   14,	   2017),	  
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/video-­‐shows-­‐libyan-­‐coastguard-­‐whipping-­‐rescued-­‐migrants-­‐6d8g2jgz6.	  
30	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  Monitoring	  Mechanism	  Libyan	  Coast	  Guard	  and	  Navy,	  Monitoring	  Report	  October	  2017	  –	  
January	  2018	  [hereinafter	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report],	  Annex	  C,	  p.	  3	  (on	  file).	  
31	  Audio	  recording	  of	  the	  SW3’s	  bridge	  communications	  (Nov.	  6,	  2017)	  (on	  file).	  
32	  Id.	  
33	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  Annex	  C,	  at	  3.	  	  
34	  Transcript	  of	   interview	  with	  Brigadier	  Masoud	  Abdel	  Samad	   (Nov.	  10,	  2017)	   (on	   file),	  also	  cited	   in	  Mare	  
Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  94.	  
35	  Id.	  The	  information	  has	  been	  corroborated	  in	  a	  second	  interview,	  undertaken	  on	  Mar.	  23,	  2018	  (on	  file).	  
Confirming,	  see	  also	   EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  November	  2016	  –	  31	  May	  2017,	   at	  8	   (on	   file),	  
reporting	   how	   “MRCC	   [Rome]	  .	  .	  .	  requested	   the	   Libyan	   Coastguard	   to	   assume	   responsibility	   for	   the	  
coordination	  of	  the	  search	  and	  rescue	  operation”	  of	  May	  10,	  2017.	  See	  also	  U.N.	  Support	  Mission	  in	  Libya	  &	  
U.N.	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Comm’r	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  Desperate	  and	  Dangerous:	  Report	  on	  the	  Human	  Rights	  
Situation	   of	  Migrants	   and	   Refugees	   in	   Libya,	   at	   17	   (Dec.	   20,	   2018),	   reporting	   an	   interview	  where	   a	   LYCG	  
spokesperson	   confirmed	   that	   coordination	   of	   SAR	   operations	   takes	   place	   “with	   the	   support	   of	   the	  MCCR	  
[i.e.,	   Rome	   MRCC]”	   and	   that	   the	   distress	   calls	   they	   receive	   and	   respond	   to	   are	   “coming	   through	   Italy,”	  
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf.	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the	  dinghy	  to	  tip	  and	  others	  to	  fall	   into	  the	  water.36	  Amidst	  the	  chaos,	  some	  climbed	  
on	  board	  the	  Ras	  Al	  Jadar	  unaided,	  including	  several	  of	  the	  applicants.	  Others,	  fearing	  
for	   themselves,	   swam	   towards	   the	   SW3	   RHIBs.	   Video	   footage	   shows	   how	   the	   LYCG	  
shouted	  and	  threw	  objects	  at	   them,	  endangering	  rescue	  procedures.	  This	  caused	  the	  
SW3	  RHIBs	  to	  retreat,	  and	  several	  other	  persons	  to	  drift	  and	  drown.37	  Regarding	  those	  
on	  board	  the	  Ras	  Al	  Jadar,	  including	  some	  of	  the	  applicants,	  LYCG	  crewmembers	  used	  
a	  rope	  to	  tie	  them	  up	  and	  beat	  them,	  pointing	  firearms	  in	  their	  direction.38	  Unable	  to	  
establish	  order,	   the	  LYCG	  patrol	  speeded	  up	  abruptly	  to	   leave	  the	  scene,	   leaving	  one	  
person	  hanging	  on	  the	  flank	  of	  the	  ship,	  who	  was	  only	  recovered	  after	  repeated	  calls	  
by	  the	  Italian	  military	  helicopter.39	  
	  
In	  the	  interim,	  six	  of	  the	  applicants	  managed	  to	  jump	  overboard	  and	  regain	  the	  SW3,	  
which,	  in	  total,	  rescued	  59	  of	  all	  survivors	  and	  took	  them	  to	  Italy.	  The	  body	  of	  the	  child	  
of	  one	  of	  the	  applicants	  was	  retrieved	  too,	  making	  it	  the	  second	  infant	  known	  to	  have	  
been	  lost	  in	  the	  commotion.	  The	  remaining	  two	  applicants	  staying	  on	  the	  Ras	  Al	  Jadar	  
were	  taken	  to	  the	  Tajura	  camp	  in	  Libya,40	  where	  they	  were	  abused	  for	  over	  a	  month.41	  
From	  there,	  they	  were	  returned	  to	  Nigeria	  after	  agreeing	  to	  “voluntary	  repatriation,”	  
as	  the	  only	  alternative	  to	  indefinite	  detention	  they	  were	  offered.42	  Two	  witnesses,	  who	  
had	  been	  pulled	  back	  as	  well,	  were	  still	  in	  Libya	  at	  the	  time	  of	  filing	  of	  the	  complaint.43	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  See	   Charles	   Heller,	   Lorenzo	   Pezzani,	   Itamar	  Mann,	   Violeta	  Moreno-­‐Lax	  &	   Eyal	  Weizman,	   “It’s	   an	   Act	   of	  
Murder”:	   How	   Europe	   Outsources	   Suffering	   as	   Migrants	   Drown,	   NEW	   YORK	   TIMES	   (Dec.	   26,	   2018),	  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/26/opinion/europe-­‐migrant-­‐crisis-­‐mediterranean-­‐
libya.html.	  	  
37	  See	   Sea	   Watch,	   Update:	   Beweismaterial	   für	   unverantwortliches	   Verhalten	   der	   Libyschen	   Küstenwache,	  
undated,	  https://sea-­‐watch.org/update-­‐beweise-­‐libysche-­‐kuestenwache/.	  
38	  U.N.	   S.C.,	   Report	   of	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   on	   the	   United	   Nations	   Support	   Mission	   in	   Libya,	   U.N.	   Doc.	  
S/2018/140,	   para.	   49	   (Feb.	   12,	   2018),	   http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-­‐
documents/document/s2018140.php.	  
39	  Sea	  Watch,	   EXKLUSIVE	   [sic]:	   Full	   incident	   of	   06	   November	   2017	  with	   the	   Libyan	   Coast	   Guard	   (Nov.	   13,	  
2017),	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_phI-­‐f_yFXQ.	  
40	  U.N.	  High	  Comm’r	   for	  Refugees,	  Libya,	  Detention	  Centres	   (Jan.	   15,	   2017),	  https://www.refworld.org/cgi-­‐
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=58874a004&skip=0&query=Tajura&coi=LBY.	  
41	  On	  the	  treatment	  of	  detainees,	  see	  among	  many	  others	  U.N.	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Comm’r	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  
Detained	   and	  Dehumanised	   –	   Report	   on	  Human	  Rights	  Abuses	  Against	  Migrants	   in	   Libya	   (Dec.	   13,	   2016),	  
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf;	   Council	   of	   Europe	  
Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  (CoE	  CommHR),	  EU	  Agreements	  with	  Third	  Countries	  Must	  uphold	  Human	  
Rights	   (Feb.	   2,	   2017),	   https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-­‐/eu-­‐agreements-­‐with-­‐third-­‐countries-­‐
must-­‐uphold-­‐human-­‐rights;	   U.N.	   Secretary	   General,	   Report	   of	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   pursuant	   to	   Security	  
Council	  Resolution	  2312	   (2016),	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/2017/761	   (Sept.	  7,	  2017);	  U.N.	  Office	  of	   the	  High	  Comm’r	   for	  
Human	  Rights	  &	  U.N.	  Support	  Mission	  in	  Libya,	  Abuse	  Behind	  Bars:	  Arbitrary	  and	  Unlawful	  Detention	  in	  Libya	  
(Apr.	  2018),	  http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/AbuseBehindBarsArbitraryUnlawful_EN.pdf.	  
42	  Izza	  Leghtas,	  “Death	  Would	  Have	  Been	  Better”:	  Europe	  Continues	  to	  Fail	  Refugees	  and	  Migrants	  in	  Libya,	  
REFUGEES	   INTERNATIONAL	   FIELD	   REPORT,	   at	   14–19	   (Apr.	   2018),	  
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5ad3ceae03ce641bc8ac6eb5/15238
30448784/2018+Libya+Report+PDF.pdf.	  
43	  These	  two	  persons	  filed	  a	  separate	  application,	  once	  GLAN	  was	  able	  to	  collect	  their	  powers	  of	  attorney	  in	  
Libya.	  Their	  case	  reference	  is	  C.O.	  and	  A.J.	  v.	  Italy,	  Appl.	  40396/18	  (not	  yet	  communicated).	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C.	  The	  Bigger	  Picture	  of	  Italy–Libya	  Relations	  
	  
The	   involvement	   of	   the	   LYCG	   in	  S.S.	   is	   not	   an	   isolated	   event	   and	  must	   be	   appraised	  
against	   its	   wider	   context.	   It	   is	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   plan,	   in	   which	   Italian	   (and	   EU)	  
authorities	  have	  invested	  vastly,	  to	  establish	  a	  Libyan	  SAR	  and	  interdiction	  capacity	  so	  
they	   can	   assume	   responsibility	   for	   rescue	   (and	   disembarkation)	   and	   stymie	   irregular	  
migration	   across	   the	   Central	  Mediterranean.	   Efforts	   date	   back	   to	   the	   early	   2000s,44	  
with	   the	   2008	   Treaty	   of	   Friendship	   of	   the	   Berlusconi-­‐Gaddafi	   period	   marking	   a	  
particularly	  significant	   inflection	  point.45	  But	   they	  have	  continued	   in	   the	  post-­‐Gaddafi	  
era,	  with	  Italy	  providing	  key	  logistic,	  financial,	  political,	  and	  operative	  support.	  
	  
I.	  The	  Legal	  and	  Political	  Framework	  
	  
The	   2008	   Treaty	   of	   Friendship,	   as	   developed	   in	   the	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  
(MoU)	   of	   February	   2017,46	  is	   the	   pivotal	   agreement,	   providing	   legal	   coverage	   to	   the	  
Italian-­‐Libyan	  cooperation	   in	   the	   field	  of	   irregular	  migration.	   It	   specifically	  buttresses	  
the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  a	  Libyan	  Navy	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  (LN/LCG),	  with	  Italy	  assuming	  
“a	  leading	  role.”47	  
	  
The	  Treaty	  contains	  a	  provision,	  in	  Article	  19,	  calling	  on	  both	  parties	  to	  intensify	  their	  
collaboration	   in	   the	  establishment	  of	  an	   integrated	   system	  of	   frontier	   surveillance	   in	  
Libya,	  for	  the	  Italian	  actors	  with	  the	  requisite	  technological	  competence	  to	  administer,	  
committing	   Italy	   to	   pay	   half	   of	   the	   cost,	   with	   the	   EU	   bearing	   the	   other	   half.48	  The	  
provision	  also	  explicitly	  commits	  the	  parties	  to	  jointly	  define	  actions	  to	  “stem	  irregular	  
migration	   flows” 49 —with	   no	   mention	   of	   human	   rights	   obligations.	   While	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Treaty	  led	  to	  the	  joint	  push-­‐back	  campaign	  conducted	  in	  2009,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Listing	   the	   different	   documents	   and	   reconstructing	   the	   history	   of	   migration	   management	   cooperation	  
during	  this	  period,	  see	  Emanuela	  Paoletti,	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  Migration	  Policies	  in	  the	  Mediterranean:	  The	  
Case	  of	  Italy,	  Libya	  and	  the	  EU,	  RAMSES	  WORKING	  PAPER	  12/09,	  European	  Studies	  Centre,	  Oxford	  (Apr.	  2009).	  
For	   the	   book-­‐length	   elaboration,	   see	   EMANUELA	   PAOLETTI,	   THE	   MIGRATION	   OF	   POWER	   AND	   NORTH-­‐SOUTH	  
INEQUALITIES:	  THE	  CASE	  OF	  ITALY	  AND	  LIBYA	  (2010).	  
45	  Trattato	  di	  amicizia,	  partenariato	  e	  cooperazione	  tra	  la	  Repubblica	  italiana	  e	  la	  Grande	  Giamahiria	  araba	  
libica	   popolare	   socialista	   (Aug.	   30,	   2008),	   https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2009/02/18/009G0015/sg	  
[hereinafter	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship].	  
46	  Memorandum	  d'intesa	  sulla	  cooperazione	  nel	  campo	  dello	  sviluppo,	  del	  contrasto	  all’immigrazione	  illegale,	  
al	  traffico	  di	  esseri	  umani,	  al	  contrabbando	  e	  sul	  rafforzamento	  della	  sicurezza	  delle	  frontier	  tra	  lo	  Stato	  della	  
Libia	   e	   la	   Repubblica	   Italiana	   (Feb.	   2,	   2017),	   http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/it-­‐libya-­‐memo-­‐
immigration-­‐border-­‐security-­‐2-­‐2-­‐17.pdf	  [hereinafter	  MoU].	  
47 	  Ministero	   degli	   affari	   esteri,	   La	   Strategia	   Italiana	   Nel	   Mediterraneo,	   at	   21	   (Dec.	   2017),	  
https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2017/12/med-­‐maeci-­‐ita.pdf	  [hereinafter	  MAE	  Report].	  
48	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  art.	  19.	  
49	  Id.	  art.	  19(3).	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and	  for	  which	  Italy	  was	  condemned	  in	  Hirsi,50	  cooperation	  was	  halted	  during	  the	  civil	  
war	  period.	  
	  
The	  2017	  MoU	  has	  revived	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  by	  expanding	  on	  its	  Article	  19.51	  It	  
sets	   up,	   on	   that	   basis,	   specific	   structures	   of	   collaboration,	   including	   a	   “Joint	   [Italy-­‐
Libya]	   Commission”	   charged	   with	   the	   definition	   of	   priorities,	   funding	   needs,	  
implementation	   strategies,	   and	   monitoring	   actions.52	  The	   ultimate	   goal	   remains	   to	  
“stem	   irregular	  migrant	   flows”53—again,	  with	   no	   reference	   to	   human	   rights.	   To	   that	  
end,	   the	   division	   of	   labor	   foresees	   that	   Italy	   provide	   the	   financial,	   technical,	  
technological	   and	  other	  means,	   specifically	   to	   the	   LYCG.54	  The	   financing	  of	  detention	  
centers,	   the	   training	  of	   its	   personnel,	   and	  overall	   support	   to	   return	   and	   readmission	  
from	  Libya	   is	   also	  part	  of	   the	  agreement.55And	  Article	  4	   reiterates	   that	   it	   is	   for	   Italy,	  
including	  via	  EU	  funding,	  to	  cover	  the	  expense.56	  
	  
Regarding	   political	   support,	   Italy	   has	   not	   been	   alone	   in	   sustaining	   the	   LYCG	   and	   the	  
plan	  for	  comprehensive	  containment	  of	  unwanted	  flows	  departing	  from	  Libya.	  The	  EU,	  
besides	  providing	   significant	   financial	   and	   logistic	   assistance,	   has	   also	   celebrated	   the	  
Italian-­‐Libyan	  cooperation	  at	  the	  highest	  political	  level.	  Already	  in	  January	  2017,	  the	  EU	  
Commission	   and	   the	   EU	   High	   Representative	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs	   called	   for	   the	  
enhancement	  of	  support	  to	  Libya	  and	  the	  LYCG.57	  And,	  far	  from	  condemning	  the	  MoU,	  
the	  Malta	  Declaration,	  adopted	  by	  all	  EU	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government,	  “welcomes	  
and	  .	  .	  .	  support[s]	   Italy	   in	   its	   implementation,”	   pledging	   funds	   and	   capacity	   building,	  
with	   the	  explicit	  aim	  of	  “preventing	  departures	  and	  managing	  returns.”58	  Despite	   the	  
wealth	   of	   sources	   denouncing	   it,	   the	   situation	   facing	   migrants	   in	   Libya—known	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  This	  was	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  an	  (unpublished)	  Additional	  Protocol	  of	  February	  4,	  2009,	  cited	  in	  Hirsi,	  supra	  
note	  13,	  para.	  19.	  
51	  MoU,	  supra	  note	  46.	  
52	  Id.	  art.	  3.	  
53	  Id.	  art.	  1a.	  
54	  Id.	  arts.	  1b	  and	  1c.	  
55	  Id.	  art.	  2.	  
56	  Id.	   art.	   2.	   EUNAVFORMED	   has	   also	   delivered	   training	   to	   the	   LYCG	   upon	   extension	   of	   its	   mandate	   via	  
Council	  Decision	  (CFSP)	  2016/993	  of	  20	  June	  2016	  Amending	  Decision	  (CFSP)	  2015/778	  on	  a	  European	  Union	  
Military	  Operation	  in	  the	  Southern	  Central	  Mediterranean	  (EUNAVFOR	  MED	  operation	  SOPHIA),	  2016	  O.J.	  (L	  
162/18).	  	  
57	  Joint	   Communication	   on	  Migration	   on	   the	   Central	  Mediterranean	   Route:	  Managing	   Flows,	   Saving	   Lives,	  
JOIN(2017)	   4	   final	   (Jan.	   25,	   2017),	   https://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0004&from=en.	  	  
58 	  European	   Council,	   Malta	   Declaration,	   para.	   6(j)	   (Feb.	   3,	   2017),	  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-­‐releases/2017/02/03/malta-­‐declaration/.	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former	   Italian	   Minister	   of	   Interior,	   Minniti59	  and	   his	   fellow	   ministers	   of	   the	   other	  
Member	  States60	  —has	  been	  no	  impediment	  to	  the	  EU’s	  backing	  of	  this	  cooperation.	  	  
	  
II.	  Funding	  and	  Equipment	  
	  
Capacity-­‐building	  initiatives	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  the	  
MoU	  intensified	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2017,	  with	  Italy	  creating	  a	  dedicated	  “Africa	  Fund”	  
and	   allocating	   €2.5	  million	   for	   the	  maintenance	   of	   Libyan	   boats	   and	   the	   training	   of	  
their	   crews.61	  In	   parallel,	   Italy	   also	   secured	   EU	   funding	   in	   excess	   of	   €160	  million	   for	  
Libya.	   An	   EU	   project	   was	   awarded	   to	   the	   Italian	   Coast	   Guard,	   through	   which	   €46.3	  
million	  have	  been	  channeled	  to	  border	  management	  and	  migration	  control	  in	  Libya.62	  
The	   project	   specifically	   aims	   at	   “[s]trengthening	   the	   operational	   capacities	   of	   the	  
Libyan	   coastguards”,	   via	   “training,	   equipment	  .	  .	  .	  repair	   and	   maintenance	   of	   the	  
existing	  fleet,”	  so	  as	  to	  “strengthen	  the	  authorities’	  capacities	  in	  maritime	  surveillance	  
and	  rescuing	  at	  sea.”63	  The	  final	  goal	  is	  “to	  provide	  the	  Libyan	  coast	  guards	  with	  initial	  
capacity	  [absent	  hitherto]	  to	  better	  organise	  their	  control	  operations”	  and	  “coordinate	  
maritime	   interventions.”64	  This,	   the	   EU	   Commission	   has	   noted,	   “will	   involve	   the	   full	  
design	   of	   an	   Interagency	   National	   Coordination	   Centre	  .	  .	  .	  and	   a	   Maritime	   Rescue	  
Coordination	  Centre,”65	  which	  does	  not	  yet	  exist—its	  completion	  being	  “estimated	   in	  
2020”66—as	  well	   as	   “assistance	   to	   the	   authorities	   in	   defining	   and	   declaring	   a	   Libyan	  
Search	   and	  Rescue	  Region	   [SRR]”67—which	  was	   only	   recognized	   by	   the	   International	  
Maritime	  Organization	  (IMO)	  in	  June	  2018.68	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Migranti,	  Minniti:	   “Condizioni	  di	   chi	   è	   riportato	   in	   Libia	   sono	  mio	  assillo”,	  REPUBBLICA	  TV	   (Aug.	  15,	  2017),	  
https://video.repubblica.it/cronaca/migranti-­‐minniti-­‐condizioni-­‐di-­‐chi-­‐e-­‐riportato-­‐in-­‐libia-­‐sono-­‐mio-­‐
assillo/282714/283328.	  
60 	  Amnesty	   International,	   Libya’s	   Dark	   Web	   of	   Collusion:	   Abuses	   against	   Europe-­‐bound	   Refugees	   and	  
Migrants,	   56–59	   (Dec.	   11,	   2017),	   https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/7561/2017/en/,	  
counting	  over	  20	  reports	  from	  reliable	  monitors,	   including	  UN	  and	  EU	  sources.	  See	  further	  list	  of	  nearly	  50	  
reports	  by	  Amnesty	   International	   (AI)	   and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	   (HRW)	   spanning	   the	  period	  2013	   to	  2019	  
appended	   to	   their	   joint	   Third-­‐Party	   Intervention	   in	   S.S.,	  Human	   Rights	  Watch	   and	   Amnesty	   International	  
Submissions	   to	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   Annex	   (Nov.	   12,	   2019),	  
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/hrw_amnesty_international_submissions_ec
hr.pdf.	  	  
61	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Director	  General	  for	  Italians	  abroad	  and	  migration	  policies,	  Decree	  4110/47	  of	  
28	  August	  2017.	  
62	  EU	  Commission,	  EU	  Trust	  Fund	  for	  Africa	  Adopts	  €46	  Million	  Programme	  to	  Support	  Integrated	  Migration	  
and	  Border	  Management	  in	  Libya	  (July	  28,	  2017),	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐17-­‐2187_en.htm.	  
63	  Id.	  
64	  Id.	  (emphasis	  added).	  
65	  Id.	  
66	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2017,	  EEAS(2017)	  1612,	  at	  14	  (on	  file).	  
67	  EU	  Commission,	  Press	  Release,	  July	  28,	  2017,	  supra	  note	  62.	  
68 	  The	   coordinates	   were	   uploaded	   on	   June	   26,	   2018,	   on	   IMO’s	   Gisis	   database,	  
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/COMSAR/NationalAuthority.aspx.	  See	   the	   former	  Ambassador	  of	   Italy	   to	  Libya,	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In	  terms	  of	  equipment,	  Italy	  has	  donated	  ten	  fast	  patrol	  boats	  to	  the	  LN/LCG,69	  which	  
seem	   to	  be	   “the	  most	  effective	  and	   reliable	   ships	   [in	   the	   LYCG	   inventory].”	  The	  best	  
appears	   to	  be	  precisely	   the	  Ras	  Al	   Jadar,	  which	  performed	  “approximately	  half	  of	  all	  
sorties”	  between	  October	  2017	  and	  January	  2018,70	  including	  the	  one	  of	  November	  6,	  
2017.	   The	   vessels	  were	   gifted	  disregarding	   the	  widely	   publicized	  malpractices	   of	   the	  
LYCG—also	  witnessed	  in	  the	  S.S.	  events—and	  the	  series	  of	  violent	   incidents	  occurred	  
just	   a	   few	  days	   before	   the	   ceremony	   of	   award.71	  In	   one	   such	   incident	   the	   LYCG	  had	  
interrupted	  a	  rescue,	  intercepted	  migrants	  at	  gunpoint,	  and	  pulled	  them	  back	  to	  Libya	  
using	   perilous	   tactics. 72 	  Several	   actors,	   including	   the	   UN	   Secretary-­‐General,	   have	  
denounced	  similarly	  violent	  behavior	  by	   the	  LYCG73—of	  which	   the	   Italian	  Coastguard	  
was	   aware74—including	   the	   firing	   of	   live	   shots,75	  the	   intimidation	   of	   NGO	   rescue	  
boats,76	  and	  the	  use	  of	  force	  against	  migrants.77	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Giuseppe	  Perrone,	  congratulating	   the	  Libyan	  authorities	  via	  Twitter	   for	  completing	   the	  procedure	  on	   June	  
28,	   2018,	   https://twitter.com/Assafir_Perrone/status/1012235279141359616.	   For	   an	   elaboration	   on	   the	  
declaration	  process,	  see	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  50–52.	  For	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  
the	  process,	  see	  also	  Statement	  by	  Mr	  Leggeri,	  Frontex	  Executive	  Director	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  LIBE	  
Committee	   Meeting	   (Mar.	   27,	   2018):	   “Je	   ne	   considère	   pas	   comme	   acquise	   la	   zone	   SAR	   de	   la	   Lybie,”	  
http://web.ep.streamovations.be/index.php/event/stream/20180327-­‐0900-­‐committee-­‐libe.	   Cf.	  
Parliamentary	  Questions	   –	  Answer	   given	  by	  Mr	  Avramopoulos	  on	  behalf	   of	   the	   European	  Commission,	   P-­‐
003665/2018(ASW),	   Sept.	   4,	   2018,	   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-­‐8-­‐2018-­‐003665-­‐
ASW_EN.html.	  
69	  Italian	  Ministry	  of	   Interior,	  Contro	   il	   traffico	  dei	  migranti:	   consegnate	   le	   prime	  motovedette	  alla	  Marina	  
libica	   (Apr.	   21,	   2017),	   http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/contro-­‐traffico-­‐dei-­‐migranti-­‐consegnate-­‐prime-­‐
motovedette-­‐alla-­‐marina-­‐libica;	  Minniti	  in	  Libia:	  fronte	  comune	  control	  il	  traffico	  di	  migranti	  (May	  16,	  2017),	  
https://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/minniti-­‐libia-­‐fronte-­‐comune-­‐contro-­‐traffico-­‐migranti.	  
70	  EUNAVOFRMED,	   LYCG	  Monitoring	   Report,	   supra	   note	   30,	   at	   19,	   5,	   raising	   the	   number	   to	   “75%	   of	   [all]	  
LCG&N	   missions.”	   This	   continues	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   See	   EUNAVFORMED,	   Six-­‐Monthly	   Report	   1	   June	   –	   30	  
November	  2018,	  EEAS(2019)	  18,	  Part	  A,	  at	  13	  (on	  file).	  
71	  EUNAVFORMED	  has	  noted	  how	  migrants	  “rescued”	  by	  the	  LYCG,	  immediately	  “mak[e]	  attempts	  to	  escape	  
LCG&N	  vessels.”	  See	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  December	  2017	  –	  31	  May	  2018,	  EEAS(2018)	  710,	  
at	  6	  (on	  file).	  
72 	  Sea	   Watch,	   official	   Facebook	   account,	   (May	   10,	   2017),	  
https://www.facebook.com/seawatchprojekt/videos/1865822903635782/.	  
73	  UNSC,	  Report	  S/2018/140,	  supra	  note	  38,	  para.	  49.	  See	  also	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  57–
62;	  Dark	  Web	  of	  Collusion,	  supra	  note	  60,	  at	  35–37.	  
74	  See,	  e.g.,	  Andrew	  Rettman,	  Italy	  Backs	  Libya	  as	  NGOs	  Chased	  Out	  of	  Mediterranean,	  EU	  OBSERVER	  (Aug.	  14,	  
2017),	  https://euobserver.com/migration/138736,	   reporting	  how	  MSF	  had	  been	  “warned”	  by	  MRCC	  Rome	  
“about	   security	   risks	   associated	   with	   threats	   publicly	   issued	   by	   the	   Libyan	   Coast	   Guard	   against	  
humanitarian	  .	  .	  .	  vessels	  operating	  in	  international	  waters.”	  
75 	  Migranti.	   Guardia	   costiera	   libica	   spara	   contro	   motovedetta	   italiana,	   AVVENIRE	   (May	   26,	   2017),	  
https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/guardia-­‐costiera-­‐libica-­‐spara-­‐contro-­‐vedetta-­‐italiana.	  	  
76	  Steve	   Scherer,	  Rescue	   Ship	   Says	   Libyan	   Coast	  Guard	   Shot	   at	   and	   Boarded	   It,	   Seeking	  Migrants,	   REUTERS	  
(Sept.	   26,	   2017),	   https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­‐europe-­‐migrants-­‐libya-­‐ngo/rescue-­‐ship-­‐says-­‐libyan-­‐
coast-­‐guard-­‐shot-­‐at-­‐and-­‐boarded-­‐it-­‐seeking-­‐migrants-­‐idUKKCN1C12LJ.	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III.	  Operational	  Involvement	  
	  
For	  many	  years,	  and	  especially	  since	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  “the	  only	  country	  that	  provide[d]	  
SAR	   to	   the	  area	   sitting	  next	   to	   the	   territorial	  waters	  of	   Libya	   [was]	   Italy.”78	  After	   the	  
termination	  of	   the	  Mare	  Nostrum	   operation	   in	  2014,	   the	   Italian	  Government	   carried	  
on	  “coordinat[ing]	  virtually	  all	   rescue	  operations”	   in	   that	  area79—a	  fact	  corroborated	  
by	   EUNAVFORMED,	   confirming	   that	   the	   “Italian	   MRCC	  .	  .	  .	  continued	   to	   coordinate	  
rescue	  operations”	  throughout	  2016	  and	  2017.80	  In	  fact,	  LYCG	  coordination	  capabilities	  
peaked	  at	  a	  mere	  “54%	  of	  [all]	  SOLAS	  events”	  only	  in	  the	  second	  semester	  of	  201881—
long	  after	  the	  S.S.	  events.	  
	  
This	  situation	  of	  de	  facto	  Italian-­‐led	  Libyan	  interventions	  was	  consolidated	  in	  2017,	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  the	  MoU.	  Within	  that	  framework,	  not	  only	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  capable	  
coast	   guard,	   but	   also	   of	   a	   reliable	   Libyan	   MRCC	   became	   top	   priorities.	   The	  
aforementioned	   EU	   project	   awarded	   to	   the	   Italian	   Coast	   Guard	   supported	  
implementation.82	  Completion	  was	  planned	   in	  consecutive	  phases,	   including	  activities	  
such	  as	  “organiz[ing]	  [LYCG]	  SAR	  units”	  and	  “develop[ing]	  SAR	  SOPs.”83	  But	  the	  actual	  
creation	  of	  the	  Libyan	  MRCC	  only	  began	  in	  December	  2018,	  when	  the	  project	  entered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  See,	  e.g.,	  Bel	  Trew	  &	  Tom	  Kington,	  Video	  Shows	  Libyan	  Coastguard	  Whipping	  Rescued	  Migrants,	  THE	  TIMES	  
(Feb.	   14,	   2017),	   https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/video-­‐shows-­‐libyan-­‐coastguard-­‐whipping-­‐rescued-­‐
migrants-­‐6d8g2jgz6.	  And	  this	  is	  routine	  practice.	  A	  LYCG	  commander	  told	  HRW	  that	  the	  use	  of	  force	  against	  
migrants	  during	  rescues	  was	  “necessary	  to	  control	  the	  situation	  as	  you	  cannot	  communicate	  with	  them.”	  See	  
HRW,	   EU:	   Shifting	   Rescue	   to	   Libya	   Risks	   Lives,	   Italy	   Should	   Direct	   Safe	   Rescues	   (June	   2017),	  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/19/eu-­‐shifting-­‐rescue-­‐libya-­‐risks-­‐lives.	  
78	  Italian	  Coalition	  for	  Civil	  Liberties	  and	  Rights	  (CILD),	  Guidance	  on	  Rescue	  Operations	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  
at	  8	  (July	  2017),	  https://cild.eu/wp-­‐content/uploads/2017/07/KYR-­‐Protection-­‐and-­‐Maritime-­‐Safety_EN.pdf.	  
79 	  Shifting	   Rescue	   to	   Libya,	   supra	   note	   77.	   See	   also	   Amnesty	   International,	   Lives	   Adrift:	   Refugees	   and	  
Migrants	   in	   Peril	   in	   the	   Central	   Mediterranean	   (Sept.	   2014),	  
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/eur050062014en.pdf.	  
80	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  January	  –	  31	  October	  2016	  (on	  file),	  at	  11;	  and	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐
Monthly	  Report	  1	  November	  2016	  –	  31	  May	  2017,	  supra	  note	  35,	  at	  8.	  
81	  EUNAVFORMED,	   Six-­‐Monthly	   Report	   1	   June	   –	   30	  November	   2018,	   supra	  note	   70,	   Part	   B,	   at	   2.	   “SOLAS”	  
refers	   to	   the	   International	   Convention	   for	   the	   Safety	   of	   Life	   at	   Sea,	   Nov.	   1,	   1974,	   1184	   U.N.T.S.	   278	  
[hereinafter	  SOLAS	  Convention].	  
82	  EU	   Commission,	   Support	   to	   Integrated	   Border	   and	  Migration	  Management	   in	   Libya	   –	   First	   Phase	   (T05-­‐
EUTF-­‐NOA-­‐LY-­‐04)	  (July	  27,	  2017),	  https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-­‐eutf-­‐noa-­‐ly-­‐
04_fin.pdf.	  
83	  Italian	  Coastguard,	  LMRCC	  [Libyan	  MRCC]	  Project	  briefing,	  Shade	  Med	  Presentation,	  23–24	  November	  2017	  
(on	  file),	  mentioned	  in	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2017,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  
22,	  and	  reproduced	   in	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  11.	  “SOPs”	  stands	   for	  “standard	  operating	  
procedures.”	  
2020	   The	  Architecture	  of	  Functional	  Jurisdiction	   1 4 	  	  
its	  second	  phase,	  with	  the	  “development	  of	  the	  MRCC	  Communication	  network	  along	  
the	  coast.”84	  
	  
Meanwhile,	   an	   incipient	   LYCG—still	   “far	   from	   being	   fully	   operational”	   by	  
EUNAVFORMED’s	   own	   admission85—started	   operating	   with	   the	   support	   of	   a	   Joint	  
Operation	  Room	  (JOR),	  consisting	  of	  some	  “basic	  operational	  rooms	  in	  a	  joint	  building	  
in	   Tripoli”	   set	   up	   in	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	   project,86	  but	   “with	   limited	   [space]	   and	  
communication	   capabilities	   [and]	   relatively	   equipped	   to	   communicate	   with	   naval	  
assets	   at	   sea.”87	  The	   JOR,	   involved	   in	   the	   November	   6,	   2017,	   events,	   was	   and	   still	  
remains	  “in	  a	  critical	  infrastructural	  situation	  .	  .	  .	  [that]	  is	  further	  adversely	  conditioned	  
by	  a	  limited	  presence	  of	  personnel	  with	  insufficient	  language	  (English)	  skills	  and	  limited	  
software	   tools	  .	  .	  .	  knowledge.”88	  In	   fact,	   the	   JOR	   is	   incapable	   of	   operating	   at	   a	   “self-­‐
sustaining	   level,” 89 	  and	   its	   capacities	   “do[]	   not	   allow	   properly	   carrying	   out	   the	  
institutional	   tasks	  as	  MRCC,”90	  so	  that,	  as	  per	   the	  EUNAVFORMED’s	  assessment,	   they	  
“still	  need	  further	  sustainment	  .	  .	  .	  also	  in	  operational	  terms.”91	  
	  
Especially,	  the	  “lack	  of	  effective	  and	  reliable	  communication	  systems	  hampers	  Libyan	  
capacity	   for	   the	  minimum	   level	  of	  execution	  of	  command	  and	  control	   [C2],	   including	  
that	   necessary	   to	   coordinate	   SAR/SOLAS	   events,” 92 	  hence	   Italy	   has	   secured	   the	  
necessary	   functions.	  To	  this	  effect,	   in	  August	  2017,	   it	   launched	  Operation	  Nauras,	  an	  
extension	   into	   Libyan	   territorial	   and	   internal	   waters	   of	   the	   military	   mission	   Mare	  
Sicuro,93	  including	   “a	   factory	   vessel”	   sent	   to	   Tripoli	   with	   the	   task	   “to	   restore	   the	  
efficiency	   of	   other	   Libyan	   naval	   units,	   and	   coordinate	   patrol	   and	   sea	   rescue	  
operations.”94	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  EU	  Commission,	  Support	  to	  Integrated	  Border	  and	  Migration	  Management	  in	  Libya	  –	  Second	  Phase	  (T05-­‐
EUTF-­‐NOA-­‐LY-­‐07),	   at	   9–12	   (Dec.	   27,	   2018),	   https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-­‐
eutf-­‐noa-­‐ly-­‐07.pdf.	  
85	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2017,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  3.	  
86	  T05-­‐EUTF-­‐NOA-­‐LY-­‐04,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  2.	  
87	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  8.	  
88	  Id.	  at	  22.	  
89	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  November	  2016	  –	  31	  May	  2017,	  supra	  note	  35,	  at	  17.	  This	  level	  has	  
not	  yet	  been	  reached.	  See	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  December	  2017	  –	  31	  May	  2018,	  supra	  note	  
71,	  at	  10;	  and	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2018,	  supra	  note	  70,	  Part	  A,	  at	  13.	  
90	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  Annex	  C,	  at	  4.	  
91	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2018,	  supra	  note	  70,	  Part	  C,	  at	  12	  (emphasis	  
added).	  
92	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  26.	  
93	  Italian	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies,	  Deliberazione	  del	  consiglio	  dei	  ministri	  in	  merito	  alla	  partecipazione	  dell’Italia	  
alla	   missione	   internazionale	   in	   supporto	   alla	   guardia	   costiera	   Libica,	   Doc.	   CCL	   n.	   2	   (July	   28,	   2017),	  
www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamentari/IndiceETesti/250/002/INTERO.pdf.	  
94	  MAE	  Report,	  supra	  note	  47,	  at	  24	  (emphasis	  added).	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Operation	   Nauras	   consists	   of	   four	   ships,	   four	   helicopters,	   and	   600	   servicemen,	   of	  
which	  70	  per	  cent	  are	  deployed	  at	  sea,	  with	  the	  remaining	  30	  per	  cent	  staying	  in	  Tripoli	  
harbour.	  Their	   key	  mission	   is,	   specifically,	   to	   “establish	   [the]	  operational	   condition[s]	  
for	  LN/LNCG	  assets	  and	  develop	  C2	  capabilities.”95	  In	  the	  interim,	  their	  “naval	  asset	  in	  
Tripoli	   Harbour	   [is]	   acting	   as	   LNCC	   [i.e.,	   Libyan	   Navy	   Communication	   Centre]	   and	  
logistic	   assistance/support	   hub.”96	  This	   vessel	   is	   permanently	   “in	   contact	   with	   SAR	  
assets	  and	  ITCG	  [i.e.	  Italian	  Coast	  Guard]	  and	  MRCC	  Centres,”97	  thus	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  
a	   floating	   MRCC	   for	   Libya.	   Its	   function—also	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   S.S.	   events98—was	  
explicitly	  “the	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  of	  the	  joint	  activities	  of	  the	  Libyan	  Coast	  
Guard	  and	  Navy,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  carrying	  out	  their	  Command	  and	  Control	  (C2)	  tasks	  and	  
maintaining	  an	  adequate	  Maritime	  Situational	  Awareness	  to	  fight	  illegal	  migration.”99	  
	  
It	   is,	   therefore,	   via	   the	   Italian	   authorities,	   within	   the	   MRCC	   Rome	   and	   aboard	   the	  
Nauras	   warship	   in	   Tripoli,	   that	   the	   LYCG	   received	   distress	   calls.	   And,	   because,	   on	  
receipt,	  it	  lacked	  the	  means	  to	  further	  communicate	  with,	  let	  alone	  coordinate,	  assets	  
at	  sea,	  the	  LYCG	  systematically	  relied	  on	  Italian	  (and	  EUNAVFORMED100)	  infrastructure	  
to	   liaise	   with	   the	   relevant	   actors.	   A	   case	   of	   2019,	   documented	   by	   the	   SAR	   NGO	  
Mediterranea,	   discloses	   how,	   oftentimes,	   communication	   is	   even	   entirely	   done	   by	  
Italian	  officials	  supposedly	  “on	  behalf	  of”	  their	  absent	  LYCG	  counterparts,	  creating	  the	  
impression	  of	  autonomous	  Libyan	  action.101	  A	  usual	  mode	  of	  engagement—confirmed	  
by	   the	   EU	   Commission—involves	   the	   early	   detection	   via	   “sightings”	   performed	   by	  
Italian	   or	   EUNAVFORMED	   aerial	   assets,	   transmission	   of	   the	   information	   to	   the	   LYCG	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Marina	  Militare	   Italiana,	  Mare	  Sicuro	  Briefing,	  Shade	  Med	  Presentation,	  23–24	  November	  2017	   (on	   file),	  
mentioned	   in	   EUNAVFORMED,	   Six-­‐Monthly	   Report	   1	   June	   –	   30	   November	   2017,	   supra	   note	   66,	   at	   22,	  
reproduced	  in	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  10.	  
96	  Id.	  
97	  Id.	  See	  also	  T05-­‐EUTF-­‐NOA-­‐LY-­‐04,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  10.	  
98	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  26.	  
99	  Italian	   Chamber	   of	   Deputies,	  Relazione	   analitica	   sulle	  missioni	   internazionali	   in	   corso	   e	   sullo	   stato	   degli	  
interventi	  di	  cooperazione	  allo	  sviluppo	  a	  sostegno	  dei	  processi	  di	  pace	  e	  di	  stabilizzazione,	  Doc.	  CCL-­‐bis	  n.	  1,	  
at	  101	  (Dec.	  28,	  2017),	  http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1063681.pdf	  (emphasis	  added).	  
100	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2018,	  supra	  note	  70,	  Part	  A,	  at	  4.	  
101 	  Christin	   Cappelletti,	   La	   Libia	   abbandonò	   un	   barcone	   in	   mezzo	   al	   mare:	   ecco	   gli	   audio	   dell’ultimo	  
salvataggio	   della	   Mare	   Jonio,	   OPEN	   (Apr.	   18,	   2019),	   https://www.open.online/2019/04/18/la-­‐libia-­‐
abbandono-­‐un-­‐barcone-­‐in-­‐mezzo-­‐al-­‐mare-­‐ecco-­‐gli-­‐audio-­‐dell-­‐ultimo-­‐salvataggio-­‐della-­‐mare-­‐jonio/.	   See	   also	  
Marco	  Mensurati	  &	  Fabio	  Tonacci,	  Migranti,	   le	  carte	  false	  sui	  soccorsi:	  “I	   fax	  dei	   libici	  scritti	  dagli	   italiani”,	  
REPUBBLICA	   (Apr.	   17,	   2019),	  
https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/generale/2019/04/17/news/migranti_le_carte_false_sui_soccorsi_i_fax_dei_li
bici_scritti_dagli_italiani_-­‐224317594/.	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through	  the	  Nauras	  warship	  in	  Tripoli	  acting	  “as	  a	  “communication	  relay,”102	  and	  then	  
further	  action	  coordinated	  by	  Italy	  “on	  behalf	  of”	  the	  LYCG.103	  
	  
This	   pattern	   consolidated	   through	   sustained	   practice	   since	   August	   2017,104	  and	   has	  
been	   reinforced	   with	   Italy	   (and	   the	   EUNAVFORMED)	   introducing	   a	   post-­‐operation	  
evaluation	   of	   the	   LYCG’s	   conduct,	   precisely	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   November	   6,	  
2017,	   incident.	   The	   lack	   of	   “professional	   behaviour”	   of	   LYCG	   personnel	   was	   raised	  
through	  this	  channel	  on	  this	  occasion	  and	  a	  “basic	  ‘lessons	  learnt’	  process”	  introduced,	  
with	  disciplinary	  measures	  taken	  “in	  one	  specific	  case.”105	  Apparently,	  the	  monitoring	  
system	   in	   place	   entails	   an	   “advising	   role	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   accountability	   and	  
follow	  up,”106	  including	  “feedback	  and	  recommendations”	  to	  which	  the	  LYCG	  has	  been	  
“receptive”	  so	  far.107	  
	  
Accordingly,	   what	   the	   next	   sections	   will	   substantiate	   is	   that,	   from	   the	   launch	   of	  
Nauras,	   it	   has	   been	   Italy,	   both	   remotely	   through	   its	   MRCC	   and	   via	   direct	   military	  
presence	  in	  Libya,	  which	  has	  assumed	  the	  overall	  coordination	  of	  the	  LYCG	  operational	  
response	   in	   the	   Central	   Mediterranean	   in	   a	   way	   that	   amounts	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	  
extraterritorial	   jurisdiction.	   Italy’s	   pervasive	   political,	   financial,	   and	   operative	  
involvement	  equates	  “effective	  control.”	  
	  
D.	  Defining	  (Extraterritorial)	  Jurisdiction	  
	  
Before	  entering	  into	  a	  discussion	  on	  what	  constitutes	  “effective	  control”	  with	  a	  view	  to	  
ascertaining	  extraterritorial	  jurisdiction—as	  I	  claim	  Italy	  exercised	  in	  the	  S.S.	  case—it	  is	  
worth	  pausing	  to	  reflect	  on	  what	  jurisdiction	  itself	  amounts	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  human	  
rights.	  A	  main	  contribution	  this	  article	  attempts	  to	  make	  is	  precisely	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  See	   Letter	   of	   Ms	   Paraskevi	   Michou,	   Director-­‐General	   for	   Migration	   and	   Home	   Affairs,	   to	   Mr	   Fabrice	  
Leggeri,	   FRONTEX	   Executive	   Director,	   of	   18	   March	   2019,	   Ref.	   Ares(2019)1755075,	  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-­‐letter-­‐from-­‐frontex-­‐director-­‐ares-­‐2019)1362751%20Rev.pdf.	  
103	  For	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   this	   sequence	   and	   evidentiary	   material,	   see	   Charles	   Heller,	   The	   Nivin	   Case:	  
Migrants’	   Resistance	   to	   Italy’s	   Strategy	   of	   Privatized	   Push-­‐back,	   FORENSIC	   OCEANOGRAPHY,	   especially	   at	   64	  
(Dec.	   2019),	   https://content.forensic-­‐architecture.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2019/12/2019-­‐12-­‐18-­‐FO-­‐Nivin-­‐
Report.pdf.	   Confirming:	   EUNAVFORMED,	   Six-­‐Monthly	   Report	   1	   June	   –	   30	  November	   2018,	   supra	  note	   70,	  
Part	  A,	  at	  4.	  
104	  Mare	  Clausum	  Report,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  57–87.	  
105	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  Annex	  C,	  at	  4.	  
106	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  Six-­‐monthly	  Report	  1	  November	  2016	  –	  31	  May	  2017,	  supra	  note	  35,	  at	  18	   (emphasis	  
added).	  EUNAVFORMED	  monitoring	  competence	  is	  the	  result	  of	  Annex	  F,	  added	  to	  the	  bilateral	  MoU	  signed	  
with	   the	  LYCG	  on	  21	  August	  2017	  alongside	  Council	  Decision	   (CFSP)	  2017/1385	  of	  25	   July	  2017	  amending	  
Decision	   (CFSP)	  2015/778	  on	  a	  European	  Union	  military	  operation	   in	   the	  Southern	  Central	  Mediterranean	  
(EUNAVFOR	  MED	   operation	   SOPHIA),	   [2017]	   OJ	   L	   194/61.	   See	   EUNAVFORMED,	   LYCG	  Monitoring	   Report,	  
supra	  note	  30,	  at	  3.	  
107 	  EUNAVOFRMED,	   Six-­‐monthly	   Report	   1	   June	   –	   30	   November	   2017,	   supra	   note	   66,	   at	   4,	   14.	   Cf.	  
EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2018,	  supra	  note	  70,	  Part	  B,	  at	  8,	  claiming	  that	  
the	  monitoring	  function	  “does	  not	  entail	  any	  form	  of	  aid	  or	  assistance”	  nor	  “any	  form	  of	  direction	  or	  control	  
of	  the	  LCG&N.”	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identification	   of	   a	   common	   thread	   that	   runs	   through	   territorial	   and	   extraterritorial	  
configurations	  of	  the	  term,	  leading	  to	  principled	  inferences	  and	  predictable	  outcomes.	  
	  
I.	  Jurisdiction	  as	  Sovereign-­‐authority	  Nexus	  
	  
The	  definition	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  its	  specific	  role	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  has	  
long	   attracted	   doctrinal	   attention.	   But	   there	   is	   disagreement	   as	   to	   its	   utility	   and	   its	  
centrality	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   responsibility	   for	   human	   rights	   violations.	   Some	  
authors,	   like	   Scheinin,	   argue	   that	   “jurisdiction”	   does	   not	   add	   anything	   to	   the	   key	  
aspects	   of	   admissibility	   within	   the	   state	   responsibility	   framework	   and	   should,	  
therefore,	   be	   considered	   an	   empty	   notion	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   substantiating	   legal	  
accountability.	  For	  him,	   there	   is	  apparently	  no	  distinction	  between	  the	  attribution	  of	  
wrongful	  conduct	   to	   the	  state	  concerned	  and	   the	  determination	  of	  an	  exercise	  of	   its	  
jurisdiction.	  The	  two	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same.	  Adding	  an	  extra	  step	  that	   functions	  as	  a	  
threshold	   and	   precludes	   the	   establishment	   of	   responsibility	   is,	   therefore,	   seen	   as	  
unhelpful. 108 	  Another	   strand	   of	   the	   literature	   questions	   the	   appropriateness	   of	  
attempting	  a	  general	  synthesis	  of	  the	  concept,	   in	   light	  of	  the	  variety	  of	  human	  rights	  
duties	   and	   their	   different	   manifestations,	   which	   would	   require	   a	   more	   tailored	   and	  
nuanced	   approach.	   Only	   so	   can	   the	   complexities	   of	   (especially	   positive	   “facilitation”	  
and	   “fulfillment”)	   obligations,	   entailed	   in	   particular	   by	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	  
rights,	  be	  adequately	  reflected.109	  
	  
By	  contrast,	  other	  writers,	  such	  as	  Besson,	  consider	  jurisdiction	  to	  be	  fundamental	  to	  
the	   proper	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   that	   unites	   human	   rights	   holders	   and	  
duty	   bearers.110	  For	   her,	  without	   jurisdiction,	   the	   universality	   of	   human	   rights	  would	  
imply	   that	   any	   state	   would	   owe	   human	   rights	   duties	   to	   any	   human	   rights	   holder,	  
regardless	  of	  any	  specific	  political-­‐legal	  nexus	  between	  them.	  This	   is	  why	  jurisdiction,	  
in	   this	   relational	   sense,111	  has	   an	   essential	   role	   to	   play	   in	   arbitrating	   between	   duty,	  
capability,	   and	   desirability	   of	   compliance	   by	   any	   specific	   state	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   any	   specific	  
human	  rights	  holder.	  And	  this	  is	  also	  why	  jurisdiction	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  “all-­‐
or-­‐nothing”	   condition	   for	   the	   activation	   of	   human	   rights	   obligations,	   rather	   than	   as	  
gradual	  or	  incremental.112	  Either	  there	  is	  a	  jurisdictional	  link	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  Martin	   Scheinin,	   Just	   Another	  Word?	   Jurisdiction	   in	   the	   Roadmaps	   of	   State	   Responsibility	   and	   Human	  
Rights,	  in	  Langford	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  212.	  
109	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  “jurisdiction”	   in	  the	  Maastricht	  Principles,	  see	  Nienkie	  van	  der	  
Have,	  The	  Maastricht	   Principles	   on	   Extraterritorial	   Obligations	   in	   the	   area	   of	   ESC	   rights	   –	   Comments	   to	   a	  
Commentary	   (Feb.	   25,	   2013),	   http://www.sharesproject.nl/the-­‐maastricht-­‐principles-­‐on-­‐extraterritorial-­‐
obligations-­‐in-­‐the-­‐area-­‐of-­‐esc-­‐rights-­‐comments-­‐to-­‐a-­‐commentary/.	  
110	  Samantha	   Besson,	   The	   Extraterritoriality	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights:	   Why	   Human	  
Rights	  Depend	  on	  Jurisdiction	  and	  What	  Jurisdiction	  Amounts	  to,	  25	  L.J.I.L.	  857	  (2012).	  
111	  Highlighting	  this	  relational	  nature	  of	  jurisdiction,	  see	  U.N.	  Human	  Rights	  Comm.,	  Lopez	  Burgos	  v.	  Uruguay,	  
U.N.	  Doc.	  A/36/40	  176,	  para.	  12.1	  (July	  29,	  1981);	  Celiberti	  de	  Casariego	  v.	  Uruguay,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/36/40	  185,	  
para.	  10.3.	  (July	  29,	  1981).	  
112	  Cf.	  Argumentation	  by	  the	  applicants	  in	  Bankovic,	  supra	  note	  5,	  para.	  75.	  See	  also	  Maarten	  den	  Heijer	  and	  
Rick	  Lawson,	  Extraterritorial	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  “Jurisdiction”,	  in	  Langford	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  3,	  
at	  153.	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person	   concerned	   or	   there	   isn’t.	   What	   may,	   then,	   be	   “divided	   and	   tailored”	   in	   the	  
specific	   case,	   and	   be	   proportionate	   to	   the	   level	   of	   control	   applied,	   are	   the	   ensuing	  
obligations,	  but	  not	  jurisdiction	  per	  se.113	  
	  
From	  this	  perspective,	   the	   term	  should	  best	  be	  understood	  as	   the	   “de	   facto	  political	  
and	   legal	   authority”	   of	   the	   sovereign,	   amounting	   to	   more	   than	   mere	   coercion,114	  
including	   a	   normative	   dimension	   that	   demands	   compliance.	   It	   is	   not	   “facticity	   [that]	  
creates	   normativity.”115	  Normativity	   must	   precede	   and	   underpin	   the	   account	   of	   a	  
factual	  basis	  qua	   jurisdiction.	  It	   is	  the	  normative	  aspect	  of	  an	  exercise	  of	  state	  power	  
that	   makes	   its	   interaction	   with	   a	   particular	   individual	   human-­‐rights	   relevant.	   In	  
Besson’s	   view—which	   I	   espouse—jurisdiction	   refers	   to	   “some	   kind	   of	   normative	  
power”	  that	  the	  sovereign	  exercises	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  an	  individual	  “with	  a	  claim	  to	  legitimacy,”	  
and	   that	   serves	   to	   establish	   the	   human-­‐rights	   relevant	   link	   between	   them.	  Whether	  
the	  state	  concerned	  may	  have	  acted	  ultra	  vires	   in	   the	  specific	   situation	  constitutes	  a	  
separate	  question.	  A	  priori,	  to	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  jurisdiction,	  state	  actions/omissions	  
do	  not	  have	   to	  be	   lawful,	   but	  only	   stem	   from	  a	   “lawfully	  organized	   institutional	   and	  
constitutional	  order.”116	  What	  matters	   to	  characterize	  state	  conduct	  as	   jurisdiction	   in	  
the	  human	  rights	  sense	  is	  the	  underlying	  sovereign-­‐authority	  nexus	  that	  connects	  the	  
state	  to	  those	  within	  its	  might	  and	  the	  control	  it	  thereby	  purports	  to	  exercise,	  whether	  
de	  jure	  or	  de	  facto,	  rather	  than	  the	  legality	  of	  its	  conduct.	  In	  this	  sense—which	  seems	  
to	  be	  the	  one	  tacitly	  embraced	  by	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court—jurisdiction	  works	  as	  a	  trigger	  
of	  human	  rights	  obligations.117	  
	  
Without	   a	   (pre-­‐existing)	   jurisdictional	   link	   between	   a	   State	   party	   and	   a	   certain	  
individual,	  no	  human	  rights	  duties	  can	  be	  owed	  in	  specific	  circumstances.	  Potential	  or	  
hypothetical	   connections	   are	   hence	   irrelevant.	   Also	   claimed	   connections,	   which	   are	  
not	  effectuated	   in	  the	  real	  world,	  are	   immaterial.118	  Jurisdiction	  requires	  an	  “external	  
manifestation	   of	   the	   power	   of	   the	   State”119—whether	   having	   a	   legal	   or	   factual	  
dimension,	   or	   being	   constituted	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   both.	   So,	   for	   instance,	   simply	  
having	   the	   capacity	   to	   counter	   famine	   in	   a	   remote	   land	   to	   which	   there	   is	   no	   prior	  
public-­‐power	   relation	   does	   not	   suffice	   to	   entail	   responsibility.	   Unless	   there	   is	   an	  
underpinning	   basis	   of	   prescriptive,	   executive	   and/or	   adjudicative	   authority—with	   or	  
without	   legal	   title—through	   which	   actual	   state	   activity	   has	   taken	   place,	   the	  
jurisdictional	   link	   will	   not	   be	   established.	   If,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   there	   is	   a	   piece	   of	  
legislation	  enacted,	  a	  policy	  plan	  implemented,	  and/or	  a	  Court	  decision	  enforcing	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  supra	  note	  2,	  para.	  137.	  
114	  Cf.	  Milanovic,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  53,	  reducing	  jurisdiction	  to	  “a	  question	  of	  fact.”	  
115	  Cf.	  Martin	   Scheinin,	  Extraterritorial	   Effect	   of	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights,	   in	  
Coomans	  &	  Kaminga,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  73,	  81.	  
116	  Besson,	  supra	  note	  110,	  at	  864–865.	  
117	  Catan,	  supra	  note	  9,	  para.	  103.	  
118	  Besson,	  supra	  note	  110,	  at	  872.	  
119	  MARIA	  GAVOUNELLI,	  FUNCTIONAL	  JURISDICTION	  IN	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  THE	  SEA	  7	  (2007)	  (emphasis	  added).	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legislation	   or	   the	   policy	   plan	   in	   relation	   to	   said	   famine	   in	   said	   remote	   land,	   there	  
should	   be	   no	   obstacle	   to	   consider	   such	   action	   as	   one	   demonstrative	   of	   state	  
jurisdiction.	  Once	  the	  sovereign	  authority-­‐nexus	  has	  been	  ascertained,	  there	  seems	  to	  
be	  no	  principled	  reason	  justifying	  a	  distinction	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  locus	  of	  such	  activity	  
in	  deeming	   it	  a	  manifestation	  of	   jurisdiction,	  whether	   territorially	  or	  extraterritorially	  
exercised.	   It	  would	  be	  “unconscionable”	   to	  create	  a	  double	   standard	  on	   that	  ground	  
alone	   and,	   in	   consequence,	   “permit	   a	   State	  .	  .	  .	  to	   perpetrate	   violations	  .	  .	  .	  on	   the	  
territory	   of	   another	   State,	   which	   violations	   it	   could	   not	   perpetrate	   on	   its	   own	  
territory.”120	  
	  
To	   my	   mind,	   the	   role	   that	   territoriality	   plays	   within	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	  
concept—in	   line	  with	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  public	   international	   law121—is	  to	  generate	  a	  
(rebuttable)	  presumption	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   such	  a	   link	  within	   the	  national	  domain,	  
applying	   “throughout	   the	   State’s	   territory”. 122 	  What	   distinguishes	   extraterritorial	  
settings	   is	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   a	   presumption,	   given	   the	   principles	   of	   territorial	  
integrity	   and	   non-­‐interference	   in	   domestic	   affairs.	   But	   that	   does	   not	   alter	   the	  
fundamental	  premise	  on	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  jurisdiction	  rests.	  As	  soon	  as	  a	  concrete	  
public-­‐power	   relation	   has	   been	   established,	   a	   jurisdictional	   connection	   is	   activated,	  
triggering	   the	  application	  of	  human	  rights	  obligations.	  This,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  all	  human	  rights	  will	  be	  owed	  in	  all	  situations.	  For	  instance,	  a	  military	  surveillance	  
mission	  over	  non-­‐national	  territory	  will	  be	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  right	  to	  education	  of	  those	  
concerned,	   but	   it	   may	   engage	   responsibility	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   right	   to	  
privacy,	  if	  it	  entails	  the	  collection	  of	  personal	  data.123	  
	  
This	  approach,	  therefore,	  unifies	  the	  premise	  underpinning	  all	  forms	  of	  jurisdiction	  qua	  
normative	  power	  with	  a	  claim	  to	   legitimacy	  by	  a	  state	  that,	   if	  and	  when	  acted	  upon,	  
establishes	   a	   sovereign-­‐authority	   link	  with	   those	   concerned.	   It	   also	   “normalizes”	   the	  
possibility	  of	  extraterritorial	  manifestation—just	  like	  the	  Strasbourg	  organs	  did	  before	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Lopez	  Burgos	  v.	  Uruguay,	  supra	  note	  111;	  Celiberti	  de	  Casariego	  v.	  Uruguay,	  supra	  note	  111.	  See	  also	  Issa	  
and	  Others	  v.	  Turkey,	  App.	  No.	  31821/96	  (Nov.	  16,	  2004),	  para.	  71:	  “Article	  1	  of	  the	  Convention	  cannot	  be	  
interpreted	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  a	  State	  party	  to	  perpetrate	  violations	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  another	  
State,	  which	  it	  could	  not	  perpetrate	  on	  its	  own	  territory”.	  
121 	  THE	   OXFORD	   HANDBOOK	   OF	   JURISDICTION	   IN	   INTERNATIONAL	   LAW	   (Stephen	   Allen	   et	   al.	   eds.,	   2019);	   CEDRIC	  
RYNGAERT,	   JURISDICTION	   IN	   INTERNATIONAL	   LAW	   (2008);	   Vaughan	   Lowe,	   Jurisdiction,	   in	   INTERNATIONAL	   LAW	   335	  
(Malcolm	  Evans	  ed.,	  2006);	   IAN	  BROWNLIE,	  PRINCIPLES	  OF	  PUBLIC	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  106	  et	   seq.	   (6th	  ed.	  2003);	  
Rosalyn	   Higgins,	   The	   Legal	   Bases	   of	   Jurisdiction,	   in	   EXTRA-­‐TERRITORIAL	   APPLICATION	   OF	   LAWS	   AND	   RESPONSES	  
THERETO	  3	  (Cecil	  J.	  Olmstead	  ed.,	  1984);	  Prosper	  Weil,	  Towards	  Relative	  Normativity	  in	  International	  Law?,	  77	  
A.J.I.L.	  413	  (1983);	  FREDERICK	  A.	  MANN,	  THE	  DOCTRINE	  OF	  JURISDICTION	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (1964).	  
122	  N.D.	  and	  N.T.,	  supra	  note	  2,	  para.	  103.	  This	  presumption	  normally	  “precludes	  territorial	  exclusions”.	  See	  
N.D.	   and	  N.T.,	   supra	   note	   2,	   para.	   106.	   But	   can,	   however,	   be	   rebutted	   “in	   exceptional	   circumstances	   .	   .	   .	  
where	  a	  State	  is	  prevented	  from	  exercising	  its	  authority	  in	  part	  of	  its	  territory”.	  See	  N.D.	  and	  N.T.,	  supra	  note	  
2,	  para.	  103.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  such	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Longa	  v.	  The	  Netherlands,	  App.	  No.	  
33917/12	  (Oct.	  9,	  2012),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐114056,	  regarding	  the	  detention	  of	  a	  defence	  
witness	  in	  a	  trial	  before	  the	  ICC,	  within	  the	  ICC	  premises	  in	  The	  Hague,	  para.	  73:	  “The	  fact	  that	  the	  applicant	  
is	   deprived	  of	   his	   liberty	   on	  Netherlands	   soil	   does	  not	   of	   itself	   suffice	   to	  bring	  questions	   touching	  on	   the	  
lawfulness	  of	  his	  detention	  within	  the	  ‘jurisdiction’	  of	  the	  Netherlands.”	  
123	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  supra	  note	  2,	  para.	  137,	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  “divid[ing]	  and	  tailor[ing]”	  ensuing	  obligations.	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Bankovic.124	  Indeed,	   the	   now-­‐disappeared	   European	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	  
consistently	  held	  that	  the	  “High	  Contracting	  Parties	  are	  bound	  to	  secure	  the	  .	  .	  .	  rights	  
and	   freedoms	   [in	   the	   Convention]	   to	   all	   persons	   under	   their	   actual	   authority	   and	  
responsibility,	  not	  only	  when	  the	  authority	  is	  exercised	  within	  their	  own	  territory,	  but	  
also	   when	   it	   is	   exercised	   abroad.”125	  The	   Convention	   was	   supposed	   to	   govern	   the	  
actions	  and	  omissions	  of	  Contracting	  Parties	  wherever	  they	  exercised	  jurisdiction.	  And	  
jurisdiction,	  under	  Article	  1	  ECHR,	  was	  not	  deemed	  “equivalent	  .	  .	  .	  to	  or	  limited	  to	  the	  
national	   territory	  of	   the	  High	  Contracting	  Party	  concerned.”	  This	  was	  “clear	   from	  the	  
language	  .	  .	  .	  and	  the	  object	  of	  this	  Article,	  and	  from	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Convention	  as	  
a	   whole	  .	  .	  ..” 126 	  It	   has	   been	   in	   Bankovic	   that	   the	   Court	   “exceptionalized”	  
extraterritorial	   jurisdiction	   and	   conceptually	   decoupled	   it	   from	   its	   territorial	  
counterpart.	  
	  
II.	  The	  “Exceptionalization”	  of	  Extraterritorial	  Jurisdiction	  	  
	  
In	  Bankovic	  the	  Court	  likened	  the	  term	  “jurisdiction”	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  legal	  title	  under	  
international	   law,	   thus	   affirming	   that	   “the	   jurisdictional	   competence	   of	   a	   State	   is	  
primarily	   territorial.”127	  In	   fact,	   “a	   State	  may	  not	   actually	   exercise	   jurisdiction	  on	   the	  
territory	  of	  another	  without	  the	  latter’s	  consent,	  invitation	  or	  acquiescence,	  unless	  the	  
former	   is	  an	  occupying	  State	  .	  .	  ..”128	  There	  must,	  otherwise,	  be	  a	   legal	  basis	  allowing	  
the	  state	  to	  exercise	  its	  power	  extraterritorially,	  whether	  “nationality,	  flag,	  diplomatic	  
and	  consular	  relations,	  effect,	  protection,	  passive	  personality	  [or]	  universality.”129	  This	  
understanding,	  however,	  conflates	  jurisdiction	  under	  Article	  1	  ECHR	  with	  the	  existence	  
of	  a	   right	  or	  prerogative	  of	   the	  state	   to	  act,	  which	  a	  contrario	   leads	   to	   the	  absurdity	  
that	  states	  operating	  unlawfully	  abroad,	  without	  legal	  title	  conferred	  by	  international	  
law,	  can	  additionally	  be	  human	  rights	  exempt.	  
	  
Even	   in	  Bankovic	   did	   the	   Court	   avoid	   this	   conclusion	   and	   decided,	   instead,	   that	   the	  
implication	   of	   “the	   ‘ordinary	   meaning’	   of	   the	   relevant	   term	   in	   Article	   1	   of	   the	  
Convention”	   was	   that	   jurisdiction	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   “primarily	   territorial,”130	  
other	   bases	   “being	   exceptional	   and	   requiring	   special	   justification	   in	   the	   particular	  
circumstances	   of	   each	   case.” 131 	  While	   it	   delivered	   other	   controversial	   findings	  
regarding	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   “colonial	   clause”	   in	   Article	   56	   ECHR	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Bankovic,	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  435.	  
125	  See,	  among	  others,	  W	  v.	  Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  9360/81,	  5	  E.H.R.R.	  504,	  para.	  14	  (1983)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
126	  Cyprus	  v.	  Turkey,	  App.	  Nos.	  6780/74	  and	  6950/75,	  2	  Eur.	  Comm’n	  H.R.	  Dec&	  Rep.	  72,	  at	  136	  (1975).	  	  
127	  Bankovic,	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  435,	  para.	  59	  (emphasis	  added).	  
128	  Id.	  at	  para.	  60.	  
129	  Id.	  at	  para.	  59.	  
130	  Id.	  
131	  Id.	  at	  para.	  61.	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“espace	   juridique	   européen,”	   132 	  these	   have	   been	   subsequently	   overturned	   in	   Al-­‐
Skeini.133	  
	  
What	  Al-­‐Skeini	  has	  retained	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  extraterritorial	  jurisdiction	  is	  exceptional	  
and,	   as	   such,	   must	   be	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   specific	   instance134—an	   assertion	   I	   only	  
partly	   share:	   While	   I	   accept	   that	   jurisdiction	   should	   be	   “presumed	   to	   be	   exercised	  
normally	   throughout	   the	   State’s	   territory,”135	  over	  which	   the	   state	   is	   sovereign,	   that	  
alone	  does	  not	  render	  extraterritorial	  jurisdiction	  exceptional	  in	  the	  material	  sense,	  it	  
only	   requires	   that	   proof	   of	   an	   actual	   sovereign-­‐authority	   link	   be	   produced	   in	   the	  
individual	   situation.	   The	   presumption	   allocates	   the	   burden	  of	   that	   proof,	   but	   should	  
have	   no	   bearing	   on	   the	   substantive	   finding	   of	  whether	   jurisdiction	   has	   indeed	   been	  
exercised.	  It	  is	  also	  unclear	  what	  “exceptional”	  refers	  to	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Court:	  Does	  
it	   concern	   frequency	   or	   justifiability?	   The	   elimination	   of	   the	   presumption	   does	   not	  
make	   the	  occurrence	  of	  extraterritorial	   exercises	  of	   jurisdiction	  any	   less	   frequent,	  or	  
any	   less	   legitimate,	   per	   se.	   Questions	   on	   the	   lawfulness	   of	   jurisdictional	   action	   are	  
separate	  from	  whether	  such	  jurisdictional	  action	  obtains	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  
	  
	  In	   any	   event,	   this	   “exceptionalization”	   has	   led	   to	   a	   narrow	   understanding	   of	   the	  
material	   circumstances	   that	   can	   count	   as	   an	   exercise	   of	   extraterritorial	   jurisdiction.	  
Only	  two	  models	  have	  been	  accepted:	  The	  “State	  agent	  authority”	  or	  personal	  model	  
and	  the	  “control	  over	  an	  area”	  or	  territorial	  model.136	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  accent	   is	  put	  
on	   the	   factual	   dimension	   of	   jurisdiction,	   understood	   as	   equivalent	   to	   “effective	  
control,”	   but	   without	   defining	   the	   term	   or	   clarifying	   what	   “effective”	  means	   in	   this	  
framework.	  
	  
The	  territorial	  model	  refers	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  jurisdiction	  arises	  as	  a	  consequence	  
of	   state	   military	   action	   outside	   national	   territory,	   whether	   lawfully	   or	   unlawfully	  
engaged.137	  The	  obligation	  to	  secure	  Convention	  rights	  derives	  from	  “the	  fact	  of	  such	  
control,”	   whether	   exercised	   directly,	   by	   the	   state’s	   own	   army,	   or	   through	   a	  
subordinate	   local	   administration.138	  In	   the	   latter	   case,	   if	   the	   existence	   of	   “overall	  
control”	   can	   be	   established,	   then	   it	   becomes	   unnecessary	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
state	  exercises	  detailed	  control	  over	  each	  and	  every	  of	  the	  policies	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  
subordinate	  local	  administration.139	  And,	  again,	  determining	  whether	  effective	  control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Id.	  at	  para.	  80.	  Appearing	  to	  endorse	  a	  revival	  of	  these	  concepts,	  see	  Concurrent	  Opinion	  of	  Judge	  Pejchal	  
in	  N.D.	  and	  N.T.,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	  
133	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18,	  paras.	  140–142.	  
134	  Id.	  at	  para.	  131.	  
135	  Id.	  
136	  Id.	  at	  paras.	  133	  et	  seq.	  and	  138	  et	  seq.,	  respectively.	  
137	  Id.	  at	  para.	  138.	  
138	  Id.	  citing	  Loizidou	  v.	  Turkey	  (Preliminary	  Objections),	  310	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A.),	  para.	  62	  (1995);	  Loizidou	  v.	  
Turkey	  (Merits),	  23	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  513,	  para.	  52	  (1996);	  Cyprus	  v.	  Turkey,	  35	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  967,	  para.	  76	  (2001).	  	  
139	  Loizidou	  (Merits),	  23	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  513	  at	  para.	  56;	  Cyprus	  v.	  Turkey,	  35	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  967	  at	  para.	  77.	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exists	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  deemed	  a	  “question	  of	  fact,”	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  Court,	  
must	  be	  resolved	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  military	  deployment	  in	  the	  area	  
or	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   military,	   economic,	   and	   political	   support	   to	   the	   local	  
administration	  is	  “decisive”	  to	  influence	  its	  behavior.140	  
	  
“Overall	   control”	   is	   considered	   to	   involve	   a	  measure	  of	   constant	  dominium	  over	   the	  
foreign	  area	  at	  hand,	  to	  a	  point	  comparable	  to	  state	  sovereignty.	  In	  this	  sense,	  “overall	  
control”	   is	   the	  de	  facto	  counterpart	  of	   the	  de	   jure	   title	  entailed	  by	  state	  sovereignty,	  
thus	   justifying	   the	   (re-­‐)emergence	   of	   the	   presumption	   of	   jurisdictional	   authority	  
throughout	   the	   area	   concerned	   and	   its	   transposition	   to	   the	   extraterritorial	   context.	  
“Overall	   control”	   liability	   becomes	   equivalent	   to	   that	   of	   the	   de	   jure	   sovereign.	  
Therefore,	   within	   the	   area	   under	   its	   overall	   control,	   the	   controlling	   state	   has	   the	  
responsibility	   to	   secure	   “the	   entire	   range	   of	   substantive	   rights	   set	   out	   in	   the	  
Convention.”141	  Otherwise,	  discrete	  forms	  of	  geographical	  control	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  duty	  to	  
ensure	  only	  the	  rights	  that	  are	  relevant	  in	  the	  circumstances.142	  
	  
This	   is	  also	  what	  happens	  under	  the	  personal	  model,	  where	  effective	  control	  over	  an	  
individual	  also	  entails	  a	  duty	  to	  secure	  only	  the	  relevant	  protections—presumably	  on	  
consideration	  that,	  unlike	  in	  situations	  of	  overall	  territorial	  control,	  there	  has	  not	  been	  
a	  replacement	  of	  the	  territorial	  sovereign.	  Under	  this	  model,	  the	  Court	  operates	  under	  
the	   general	   rule	   that	   jurisdiction	   may	   extend	   to	   acts	   of	   state	   authorities	   “which	  
produce	  effects	  outside	  its	  own	  territory”143	  and	  distinguishes	  three	  cases.	  
	  
First,	   the	   acts	   of	   diplomatic	   and	   consular	   agents,	   “present	   on	   foreign	   territory	   in	  
accordance	   with	   provisions	   of	   international	   law,”	   may	   count	   as	   an	   exercise	   of	  
jurisdiction	  whenever	  they	  “exert	  authority	  and	  control	  over	  others.”144	  Second,	  state	  
acts	   that	   amount	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	   “public	   powers	   normally	   to	   be	   exercised	   by	   [a	  
national]	  Government”	  may	  also	  reach	  the	  threshold,	  if	  underpinned	  by	  “the	  consent,	  
invitation	   or	   acquiescence”	   of	   the	   territorial	   sovereign.	   If	   such	   is	   the	   case,	  
responsibility	  may	  be	  incurred	  by	  the	  ECHR	  party	  “as	   long	  as	  the	  acts	   in	  question	  are	  
attributable	  to	  it	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  territorial	  State.”145	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  139,	  citing	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  paras.	  387–394.	  See	  also	  Catan,	  
Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06	  at	  para.	  103	  et	  seq.	  
141	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  138,	  referring	  to	  Cyprus	  v.	  Turkey,	  35	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  967	  at	  para.	  76–77.	  
142	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  137.	  
143	  Id.	  at	  para.	  133,	  referring,	  among	  others,	  to	  Drozd	  &	  Janousek	  v.	  France	  and	  Spain,	  App.	  No.	  12747/87,	  
para.	   91	   (June	   26,	   1992),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐57774;	   Loizidou	   (Preliminary	   Objections),	  
supra	  note	  138,	  para.	  62;	  Loizidou	  (Merits),	  supra	  note	  138,	  para.	  52.	  
144	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  134,	  citing	  embassy	  decisions	  by	  the	  EComHR;	  X	  v.	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  
Germany,	  App.	  No.	  1611/62,	  1965	  Y.B.	   Eur.	  Conv.	  on	  H.R.	  8	   (Eur.	  Comm’n	  on	  H.R.);	   X	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  
App.	  No.	  7547/76	  (Dec.	  15,	  1977);	  W.M.	  v.	  Denmark,	  App.	  No.	  17392/90	  (Oct.	  14,	  1993).	  
145	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  135,	  citing,	  Gentilhomme	  v.	  France,	  App.	  Nos.	  48205/99,	  48207/99	  and	  
48209/99	   (May	   14,	   2002),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐60454;	   X	   and	   Y	   v.	   Switzerland,	   App.	   Nos.	  
7289/75	  and	  7349/76	  (July	  14,	  1977).	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These	   first	   two	   categories	   thus	   appear	   to	   attach	   importance	   to	   elements	   of	  de	   jure	  
jurisdiction,	  but	   the	  Court	  has	   failed	   to	  provide	  a	  detailed	  elaboration.	   In	  Hirsi,	   it	  did	  
suggest	   that	   legal	   bases	   under	   customary	   international	   law,	   and	   in	   particular	   “the	  
relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea,”	  are	  significant,	  so	  that	  “acts	  carried	  out	  on	  
board	   vessels	   flying	   a	   State’s	   flag”	   shall	   be	   considered	   “cases	   of	   extraterritorial	  
exercise	  of	  .	  .	  .	  jurisdiction.”146	  But	  it	  did	  not	  dwell	  on	  whether	  on	  that	  ground	  alone—
without	   additional	   elements	   of	   de	   facto	   control—Article	   1	   ECHR	   could	   have	   been	  
engaged.147	  
	  
The	   Court’s	   attention	   has	   rather	   focused	   on	   the	   third	   tier	   of	   the	   personal	   model,	  
concerning	   the	   use	   of	   force,	   under	   which	   it	   has	   concluded	   that	   what	   tends	   to	   be	  
“decisive”	   in	   this	   context	   is	   “the	  exercise	  of	  physical	  power”	  over	  persons	  abroad.148	  
The	   circumstances	   that	   have	   been	   considered	   to	   reach	   the	   threshold,	   and	   that	   the	  
Court	   invokes	   to	   illustrate	   its	   findings,	   are	   instances	   of	   arrest,	   detention,	   abduction,	  
and	  extradition,149	  thus	  highlighting	  forms	  of	  de	  facto	  control.	  And	  the	  same	  is	  true	  on	  
the	   high	   seas,	   where	   in	   most	   cases	   the	   Court	   has	   ascertained	   the	   existence	   of	  
jurisdiction	  on	  account	  of	   the	   “full	   and	  exclusive	   control”	   exercised	   “in	   a	   continuous	  
and	  uninterrupted	  manner”	  over	  a	   foreign	  vessel	  or	  persons	  apprehended	  aboard.150	  
This	  was	  the	  test	  applied	  in	  Hirsi,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  push-­‐back	  operation	  of	  migrants	  
to	  Libya	  carried	  out	  by	  Italy,	  where	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that,	  “in	  the	  period	  between	  
boarding	  the	  ships	  of	  the	  Italian	  armed	  forces”	  after	  rescue	  “and	  being	  handed	  over	  to	  
the	   Libyan	   authorities,”	   the	   applicants	   had	   been	   subjected	   to	   “the	   continuous	   and	  
exclusive	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  the	  Italian	  authorities.”151	  
	  
However,	   the	   Court	   has	   also	   made	   clear	   that	   direct	   physical	   contact	   is	   not	   always	  
necessary	   as	   long	   as	   the	   control	   thereby	   exerted	   is	   indeed	   effective.	   So,	   in	   a	   case	  
involving	   the	   maritime	   blockade	   of	   a	   Dutch	   vessel	   by	   the	   Portuguese	   authorities	  
impeding	   access	   to	   Portugal’s	   territorial	   waters,	   the	   jurisdictional	   link	   was	   not	  
contested.152	  In	   parallel,	   the	   rerouting	   of	   a	   foreign	   ship	   in	  Medvedyev,	   imposing	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  77.	  
147	  The	  Court	  concluded	  that	  “in	  the	  period	  between	  boarding	  the	  ships	  of	  the	  Italian	  armed	  forces	  and	  being	  
handed	  over	  to	  the	  Libyan	  authorities,	  the	  applicants	  were	  under	  the	  continuous	  and	  exclusive	  [both]	  de	  jure	  
and	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  the	  Italian	  authorities.”	  Hirsi,	  supra	  note	  13,	  para.	  81.	  For	  additional	  discussion,	  see	  
VIOLETA	  MORENO-­‐LAX,	  ACCESSING	  ASYLUM	  IN	  EUROPE	  280–281	  and	  320—333	  (2017).	  
148	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  136.	  
149 	  Öcalan	   v.	   Turkey,	   App.	   No.	   46221/99	   (May	   12,	   2005),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐69022	  
(abduction	   from	   Kenya);	   Al-­‐Saadoon	   and	  Mufdhi	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   App.	   No.	   61498/08	   (March	   2,	   2010)	  
(surrender	   to	   Iraqi	   authorities	   in	   Iraq);	   Medvedyev	   v.	   France,	   App.	   No.	   3394/03	   (Mar.	   29,	   2010),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐97979	  (arrest	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  and	  forcible	  rerouting	  to	  France).	  
150	  Medvedyev,	  App.	  No.	  3394/03	  at	  para.	  67.	  
151	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  81.	  
152	  Women	  on	  Waves	   v.	   Portugal,	  App.	  No.	   31276/05	   (Feb.	   3,	   2009),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐
91113.	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specific	   course,	   but	  without	   boarding	   it,	  was	   also	   deemed	   to	  meet	   the	   jurisdictional	  
test.	  Jurisdiction	  was	  exercised	  “from	  the	  stopping”	  of	  the	  boat,	  throughout	  the	  period	  
of	   enforced	   navigation.153	  This,	   as	   the	   next	   Part	   elaborates,	   opens	   up	   a	   range	   of	  
possible	  configurations	  in	  which	  instances	  of	  “contactless	  control”	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
expression	   of	   jurisdiction—particularly	   when	   exercised	   against	   a	   background	   of	  
existing	  legal	  competence	  in	  the	  relevant	  domain,	  lending	  a	  de	  jure	  basis	  for	  action.154	  
	  
E.	  The	  Functional	  Approach	  
	  
What	   ensues	   from	   the	   discussion	   so	   far	   is	   that	   the	  Court	   retains	   an	   “exceptionalist”	  
approach	  to	  extraterritorial	   jurisdiction;	   that	   it	  does	  not	  define	  what	   jurisdiction	  tout	  
court	  entails;	  and	  that	  the	  prevalent	  notion	  of	  “effective	  control”	  is	  one	  that	  attaches	  
importance	   to	   physical	   force,	   leaving	   the	   role	   of	   de	   jure	   factors	   uncertain.	   Perhaps,	  
aware	  of	  these	  limitations,	  the	  Court	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  delineate	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  
which	   is	   of	   particular	   importance	   to	   the	   S.S.	   events	   and	   tallies	  with	   the	   streamlined	  
notion	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  I	  endorse.	  
	  
In	   Al-­‐Skeini,	   relying	   on	   the	   second	   tier	   of	   the	   personal	   model	   of	   extraterritorial	  
jurisdiction,	   the	   Court	   concluded	   that	   the	   UK	   had	   exercised	   “authority	   and	   control”	  
over	   individuals	   killed	   during	   a	   security	   operation	   carried	   out	   by	   British	   soldiers	   in	  
Basra.	  Even	  the	  death	  of	  the	  third	  applicant’s	  spouse,	  killed	  during	  an	  exchange	  of	  fire	  
with	  a	  gang,	  was	  considered	   to	   fall	  within	  Article	  1	  ECHR.	  The	   fact	   that	   “it	   [was]	  not	  
known	  which	  side	  fired	  the	  fatal	  bullet”	  did	  not	  alter	  this	  conclusion.	  Instead,	  the	  Court	  
affirmed	  that,	  because	  the	  death	  occurred	  “in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  United	  Kingdom	  security	  
operation	  .	  .	  .	  there	   was	   a	   jurisdictional	   link	   between	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   this	  
deceased	   also.” 155 	  What	   mattered	   was	   the	   “functional”	   connection	   established	  
between	   the	   deceased	   and	   the	   British	   forces	   through	   the	   medium	   of	   the	   security	  
operation’s	   implementation.	   Also	   of	   relevance	  was	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   operation	   itself	  
entailed	   an	   assumption	   of	   “public	   powers,”	   “normally	  .	  .	  .	  exercised	   by	   a	   sovereign	  
government,”156	  which,	   in	   this	   case,	   had	   been	   sanctioned	   by	   UN	   Security	   Council	  
Resolutions	   and	   regulations	   of	   the	   Coalition	   Provisional	   Authority	   in	   Iraq.	   It	   was	  
arguably	   on	   that	   de	   jure	   basis	   that	   the	   UK	   was	   expected	   to	   carry	   out	   executive	  
(jurisdictional)	   “functions”	   on	   the	   territory	   of	   Iraq	   in	   line	   with	   human	   rights,	   thus	  
retaining	   ECHR	   responsibility	   for	   “as	   long	   as	   the	   acts	   [and	   omissions]	   in	   question	  
[were]	  attributable	  to	  it	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  territorial	  State”.157	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Medvedyev,	  App.	  No.	  3394/03,	  paras.	  62—67.	  
154	  On	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  legal	  competence	  to	  extradite	  under	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  
scheme	  as	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  a	  jurisdictional	  link	  between	  the	  child	  of	  an	  E.T.A.	  victim,	  present	  in	  Spain,	  
and	  Belgium,	  where	  the	  presumptive	  murderer	  had	  taken	  refuge,	  in	  light	  of	  Belgium’s	  duty	  to	  cooperate	  in	  
an	  art.	  2	  ECHR	  investigation,	  see	  Romeo	  Castaño	  v.	  Belgium,	  App.	  No.	  8351/17,	  paras.	  36–43	  (July	  9,	  2019),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐194618.	  
155	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  150	  (emphasis	  added).	  
156	  Id.	  at	  para.	  149.	  
157	  Id.	  at	  para.	  135.	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For	  some	  commentators,	  this	  creates	  a	  “sub-­‐heading”	  under	  the	  state	  agent	  authority	  
exception,	  which	  allows	  for	  inclusion	  of	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  factual	  profiles	  on	  account	  of	  
de	  jure	  elements.158	  For	  others,	  it	   is	  a	  distinct	  third	  model—or	  a	  “halfway	  house”159—
based	  on	  a	  mix	  of	   the	   territorial	  and	  personal	  paradigms,	  which	  may	  have	  a	  positive	  
impact	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	   extraterritorial	   jurisdiction. 160 	  Conversely,	   another	  
group	  of	  scholars	  thinks	  this	  approach	  can	  restrict	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  1	  ECHR,	  if	  the	  de	  
facto	   and	   de	   jure	   factors	   are	   taken	   to	   both	   be	   jointly	   necessary	   for	   jurisdiction	   to	  
exist.161	  Still	   others	   question	   the	   necessity	   of	   a	   legal	   basis	   in	   all	   cases	   for	   “public	  
powers”	  to	  be	  ascertained—for	  example,	  in	  anti-­‐terrorism	  and	  drone-­‐strike	  operations	  
undertaken	  without	  the	  territorial	  state’s	  authorization.162	  
	  
All	   these	   readings	   are	   plausible—and	  denote	   the	   strategic	   ambiguity	  with	  which	   the	  
Court	  formulates	  certain	  doctrines,	  allowing	  for	  adaptation	  to	  different	  scenarios	  over	  
time.	   Taken	   together,	   what	   they	   jointly	   come	   to	   display	   is	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	  
incipient	   functional	   conception	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   can	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	  
territorial	   and	   extraterritorial	   conceptualizations.	   The	   importance	   it	   attaches	   to	   the	  
exercise	  of	  “public	  power”	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  jurisdictional	  link	  follows	  the	  line	  
of	  argument	  advanced	  above,	  defining	  jurisdiction	  qua	  an	  exercise	  of	  normative	  power	  
by	  a	  state,	  with	  a	  claim	  to	  legitimacy,	  that	  establishes	  a	  sovereign-­‐authority	  nexus	  with	  
those	  concerned	  through	  factual	  or	  legal	  means,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  both.	  
	  
But	   my	   understanding	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   “functional”	   differs	   from	   interpretations	  
offered	   by	   other	   authors	   using	   the	   same	   term.	   For	   instance,	   Besson,	   examining	   the	  
specific	  role	  of	  Article	  1	  ECHR	  within	  the	  scheme	  of	  the	  Convention,	  uses	  the	  term	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  threshold	  function	  that	  it	  plays.	  She	  infers	  that	  what	  Article	  1	  ECHR	  does	  is	  
to	   “situate[]	   human	   rights	   within	   a	   relationship	   of	   jurisdiction	   and	   make[]	   them	  
dependent	   on	   it.”	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   criterion	   within	   the	   ECHR	   “is	   not	  
territorial	  .	  .	  .	  but	   functional,”	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   “it	   pertains	   to	   the	   function	   of	  
jurisdiction.”163	  Shany,	  in	  turn,	  employs	  the	  term	  in	  its	  capacious	  meaning,	  to	  designate	  
the	  faculty	  or	  “potential”	  to	  assume	  responsibility,	  requiring	  states	  to	  protect	  human	  
rights	   in	   situations	   where	   they	   can	   and	   may	   reasonably	   be	   expected	   to	   do	   so,	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  Conall	  Mallory,	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Al-­‐Skeini	  Judgment,	  61	  I.C.L.Q.	  301,	  311	  (2012).	  
159	  Anna	  Cowan,	  A	  New	  Watershed?	  Re-­‐evaluating	  Bankovic	  in	  Light	  of	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  1	  C.J.I.C.L.	  213,	  224	  (2012).	  
160	  CATHRYN	   COSTELLO,	   THE	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   OF	   MIGRANTS	   AND	   REFUGEES	   IN	   EUROPEAN	   LAW	   241	   (2015).	   See	   also	  
Cathryn	   Costello,	   Courting	   Access	   to	   Asylum	   in	   Europe:	   Recent	   Supranational	   Jurisprudence	   Explored,	   12	  
H.R.L.R.	  287	  (2012).	  
161	  Stefano	  P.	  Bondini,	  Fighting	  Maritime	  Piracy	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  22	  E.J.I.L.	  
829,	  847	  (2011).	  
162	  See,	  e.g.,	  Liam	  Halewood,	  Avoiding	  the	  Legal	  Black	  Hole:	  Re-­‐evaluating	  the	  Applicability	  of	  the	  European	  
Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   to	   the	   United	   Kingdom’s	   Targeted	   Killing	   Policy,	   9	   GO.J.I.L.	   301	   (2019).	   Cf.	  
Frederik	   Rosen,	   Extremely	   Stealthy	   and	   Incredibly	   Close:	   Drones,	   Control	   and	   Legal	   Responsibility,	   19	  
J.C.&S.L.	  113	  (2014).	  
163	  Besson,	  supra	  note	  110,	  at	  863.	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whenever	   they	  have	   the	  means	   to	  prevent	  harm.	  What	   renders	   such	  an	  expectation	  
reasonable,	  in	  his	  view,	  is	  the	  specific	  context	  and	  “the	  intensity	  of	  power	  relations”	  or	  
“special	   legal	   connections”	   that	   put	   the	   state	   in	   a	   unique	   position	   to	   afford	  
protection.164	  Finally,	   the	   ESCR	  Committee	  mentions	   “functional”	   in	   contradistinction	  
to	  “geographical	  .	  .	  .	  or	  personal”	  versions,	  as	  a	  third	  variation	  of	  jurisdiction.165	  
	  
My	   reading	   is	   closer	   to	   Gavounelli’s,	   who,	   in	   her	   discussion	   of	   the	   law	   of	   the	   sea,	  
describes	   it	   as	   a	   function	   of	   state	   sovereignty.166 	  In	   connection	   with	   this,	   I	   use	  
“functional”	  to	  literally	  denote	  the	  governmental	  “functions”	  through	  which	  the	  power	  
of	   the	   state	   finds	   concrete	   expression	   in	   a	   given	   case.167	  This	   agglutinates	   the	   tasks	  
normally	   conducted	   by	   its	   officials,	   including	   those	   they	   are	   legally	   obliged	   to	  
undertake.	   Jurisdiction,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   is	   therefore	   always	   functional	   and	  
expressed	   through	   legislative,	   executive,	   and/or	   adjudicative	   activity,	   by	   which	   the	  
state	  exercises	   its	  powers,	   combining	  personal	  and	  geographical	   aspects.	   Jurisdiction	  
through	  this	  prism	  is	  multifactorial	  and	  composite.	  
	  
The	  implication	  is	  that	  not	  only	  effective	  control	  over	  persons	  or	  territory	  matters	  for	  
the	   activation	   of	   ECHR	  obligations.	   Control	   over	   (general)	   policy	   areas	   or	  (individual)	  
tactical	  operations,	  performed	  or	  producing	  effects	  abroad,168	  matters	  as	  well.	   These	  
are	   the	  vehicles	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	   “public	  powers”	   that	  amounts	   to	   jurisdiction.	   It	   is	  
through	   policy	   measures	   and	   operational	   procedures	   that	   states	   exert	   personal	   or	  
spatial	  control—carried	  out	  as	  claiming	  legitimacy	  and	  expecting	  compliance	  by	  those	  
concerned.169	  In	   these	   situations,	   the	   jurisdictional	   nexus	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	  
individual	  exists	  prior	  to	  any	  potentially	  ensuing	  violations—through	  the	  planning	  and	  
execution	  of	  policy	  and/or	  operational	  conduct	  over	  which	  the	  state	  exerts	  effective	  (if	  
not	  exclusive)	  control.	  Policy	  implementation	  and	  operational	  action	  are	  no	  accidental	  
events.	  They	  manifest	  a	  degree	  of	  state	  deliberation	  and	  volition	  that,	  when	  actuated,	  
constitute	  a	  fundamental	  expression	  of	  its	  powers	  as	  sovereign.	  
	  
In	  Bankovic—leaving	  the	  question	  aside	  of	  whether	  the	  designation	  of	  a	  non-­‐military	  
objective	   respected	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   standards—if	   the	   Court	   had	  
considered	  the	  operational	  context	  within	  which	  the	  bombardment	  took	  place,	  rather	  
than	   examining	   the	   attack	   in	   isolation,	   the	   conclusion	   could	   not	   have	   been	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Yuval	   Shany,	   Taking	   Universality	   Seriously:	   A	   Functional	   Approach	   to	   Extraterritoriality	   in	   International	  
Human	  Rights	  Law,	  7	  LAW	  AND	  ETHICS	  OF	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  47,	  63,	  65	  et	  seq	  (2013).	  See	  also	  Bonello,	  supra	  note	  4.	  
165 	  U.N.	   Comm.	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   Concluding	   Observations	   on	   Israel,	   U.N.	   Doc.	  
E/C.12/1/Add.27,	  para.	  6	  (Dec.	  4,	  1998).	  
166	  Gavounelli,	   supra	  note	   19.	   See	   also	   Efthymios	   Papastavridis,	  Rescuing	  Migrants	   at	   Sea	   and	   the	   Law	   of	  
International	   Responsibility,	   in	   HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  AND	  THE	  DARK	  SIDE	  OF	  GLOBALISATION	   161	   (Thomas	  Gammeltoft-­‐
Hansen	  &	  Jens	  Vedsted-­‐Hansen	  eds.,	  2016).	  
167	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  supra	  note	  2,	  para.	  135.	  
168	  Id.	  at	  para.	  131;	  Bankovic,	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  435	  at	  para.	  67.	  	  
169	  Besson,	  supra	  note	  110,	  at	  864–865.	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same.170	  Of	   importance	   would	   have	   been	   the	   practical	   situation	   on	   the	   ground,	   in	  
terms	  of	  the	  operational	  powers	  which	  the	  defendant	  States	  were	  actually	  purporting	  
to	  exercise,	  and	  not	  the	  legality	  or	  legal	  basis	  of	  their	  operations.	  The	  air	  strike	  of	  the	  
radio-­‐television	   of	   Belgrade	   was	   the	   last	   point	   in	   an	   operational	   chain	   of	   action,	  
undertaken	   by	   a	   military	   aircraft	   within	   a	   NATO-­‐led	   mission.	   It	   was	   not	   a	   one-­‐off,	  
“instantaneous”	  actuation	  of	  state	  authority,171	  the	  immediate	  consequences	  of	  which	  
were	  unpredictable	  or	   irrelevant.	   It	  was	  part	   and	  parcel	   of	   a	   pre-­‐planned	  operation,	  
similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  Al-­‐Skeini	  or	  in	  any	  of	  the	  other	  extraterritorial	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  
Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  recognised	  there	  to	  be	  a	  jurisdictional	  link.172	  In	  virtually	  all	  cases,	  
including	   Loizidou,	   Öcalan,	   Hirsi,	   or	   Jaloud,	   the	   action	   considered	   jurisdictionally	  
relevant	  was	  integrated	  within	  a	  wider	  military,	  security,	  or	  rescue	  operation	  through	  
which	   the	   state	  exercised	   “effective	   control.”173	  So,	   the	   conclusion	  must	  be	   that	   it	   is	  
the	   “situational,”	   rather	   than	   the	   personal	   or	   spatial,	   control	   thereby	   exerted,	  
executed	   through	   operational	   or	   policy-­‐implementing	   action,	   what	   triggers	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	  
“Effective	  control,”	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  functional	  approach	  to	  jurisdiction,	  does	  not	  
readily	   amount	   to	   direct	   physical	   constraint.	   Control,	   in	   this	   framework,	   should	   be	  
deemed	  effective,	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  intensity	  or	  directness	  of	  the	  physical	  force	  it	  
may	  imply,	  but	  when	  it	  is	  determinative	  of	  the	  material	  course	  of	  events	  unlocked	  by	  
the	   exercise	   of	   jurisdiction,	   even	   when	   the	   relevant	   activity	   takes	   place	   from	   a	  
distance.174	  In	  Bankovic,	  the	  control	  the	  military	  mission	  exercised	  through	  the	  striking	  
aircraft	  over	  its	  pre-­‐determined	  operational	  target	  was	  effective,	  in	  that	  it	  was	  brought	  
within	   firing	   range	   and	   subjected	   to	   the	   destructive	   outcome	   programmed	   in	   the	  
operational	  plan	  of	  which	  the	  bombing	  was	  part.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  act	  of	  bombing	  alone	  that	  
brought	   the	  applicants	  within	   the	  “effective	  control”	  of	   the	  state	  concerned,	  but	   the	  
wider	   spectrum	  of	   operational	   action	  within	  which	   the	   bombing	  was	   inscribed—and	  
which	  should	  not	  have	  omitted	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  very	  predictable	  consequences	  
the	  bombing	  of	   a	   civilian	   target	  would	  entail.	   The	  effectiveness	  of	   control	   should	  be	  
judged	  against	  its	  influence	  on	  the	  resulting	  situation	  and	  the	  position	  in	  which	  those	  
affected	   by	   an	   exercise	   of	   public	   powers	   find	   themselves	   upon	   execution	   of	   the	  
measure	  concerned.	  This	  means	  that	  not	  only	  de	  facto	  elements	  of	  effective	  control,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Bankovic,	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  435.	  	  
171	  Using	  this	  vocabulary,	  see	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  73.	  
172	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18.	  	  
173	  Loizidou	  (Merits),	  23	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  513;	  Öcalan,	  App.	  No.	  46221/99;	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09;	  Jaloud	  v.	  The	  
Netherlands,	  App.	  No.	  47708/08	  (Nov.	  20,	  2014),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐148367.	  In	  the	  latter	  
case	   the	  manning	   of	   a	   checkpoint	   in	   Iraq,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   S.C.	   Res.	   1483,	  U.N.	  Doc.	   S/RES/1483	   (May	   22,	  
2003),	  was	  equated	  to	  an	  exercise	  of	  “elements	  of	  governmental	  authority”	  by	  the	  Netherlands,	  whereby	  its	  
art.	  1	  ECHR	  jurisdiction	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  engaged.	  
174	  Cf.	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  180.	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but	  also	  de	  jure	  factors	  (that	  may	  coalesce	  with	  them)	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  
the	  establishment	  of	  functional	  jurisdiction.175	  
	  
The	  Norstar	   decision	   illustrates	   this	   proposition.176	  The	   International	   Tribunal	   on	   the	  
Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (ITLOS)	  considered	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  decree	  of	  seizure	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   a	   foreign	   vessel	   on	   the	   high	   seas	   was	   sufficient	   to	   reach	   the	   jurisdictional	  
threshold,	  arguably	  not	  because	  it	  produced	  physical	  control	  on	  its	  own,	  but	  because	  it	  
generated	   the	   conditions	   for	   its	   actual	   enforcement. 177 	  Admittedly,	   it	   was	   the	  
combination	  of	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  decree	  by	  Italy	  and	  the	  accompanying	  request	  for	  
its	  enforcement	  addressed	  to	  Spain,	  which	  did	  subsequently	  enforce	  it,	  that	  generated	  
the	   jurisdictional	   link	   between	   the	   foreign	   vessel	   and	   the	   Italian	   State.178	  While	   the	  
decree	  alone	   could	  be	  understood	  as	   an	   instance	  of	  merely	   “claimed”	   jurisdiction,	   if	  
taken	   in	   isolation—particularly	   on	   consideration	   that	   it	   was	   secret	   and	   could	   have	  
remained	  unknown	  to	  those	  concerned179—no	  enforcement	  action	  would	  have	  taken	  
place	  without	  the	  related	  request	  for	  its	  execution,	  in	  turn	  based	  on	  the	  decree	  itself.	  
The	  decree	  is,	  therefore,	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  condition	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  (de	  jure	  and	  de	  
facto)	   events	   that	   established	   effective	   control;	   it	   is	   the	   “but	   for”	   element	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   which	   the	   jurisdictional	   chain	   could	   not	   be	   ascertained.	   A	   functional	  
reading,	   rather	   than	   splitting	   the	   chain,	   takes	   account	   of	   both:	   the	   prescriptive	   and	  
enforcement	  aspects	  of	  jurisdiction	  that,	   in	  combination,	  constitute	  the	  expression	  of	  
the	  constabulary	  functions	  of	  the	  Italian	  State	  in	  the	  particular	  case—exercised	  in	  part	  
directly,	  by	  its	  own	  authorities,	  and	  in	  part	  through	  recourse	  to	  Spain.	  
	  
There	  seems	  to	  be,	  a	  priori,	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  disaggregate	  or	  distinguish	  between	  the	  
different	  facets	  of	  jurisdiction.	  They	  constitute	  the	  often	  inseparable,	  composite	  ways	  
in	   which	   “public	   powers”	   may	   be	   expressed. 180 	  In	   fact,	   from	   the	   international	  
perspective,	  the	  adoption	  of	  domestic	  laws	  “express[es]	  the	  will	  and	  constitute[s]	  the	  
activities	   of	   States,	   in	   the	   same	   manner	   as	   do	   legal	   decisions	   or	   administrative	  
measures.”181	  So,	   instances	  of	   legislative,	  executive,	  and/or	   judicial	  activity	   should	  be	  
deemed	  equally	   relevant	   towards	   the	  establishment	  of	   (functional)	   jurisdiction.	  Their	  
occurrence	   in	   the	   specific	   case,	   whether	   jointly	   or	   in	   isolation,	   must	   be	   taken	   in	  
consideration.	   If	   this	   is	   true,	   functional	   jurisdiction	   as	   equivalent	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	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  See,	   e.g.	   Jaloud,	   App.	  No.	   47708/08	   at	   para.	   141:	   “For	   the	   purposes	   of	   establishing	   jurisdiction	  .	  .	  .	  the	  
Court	  takes	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  of	  the	  particular	  factual	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  and	  relevant	  rules	  of	  international	  law.”	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  M/V	   Norstar	   (Panama	   v.	   Italy),	   Case	   No.	   25,	   Judgment	   of	   Apr.	   10,	   2019,	   paras.	   222–226,	  
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.25/Judgment/C25_Judgment_10.04.pdf.	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  Cf.	  Efthymios	  Papastavridis,	  The	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Migration	  at	  Sea:	  Reading	  the	  
“jurisdictional	  threshold”	  of	  the	  Convention	  under	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Paradigm,	  21	  GERMAN	  L.J.	  XX,	  XX	  (2020).	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  Norstar,	  supra	  note	  176,	  para.	  226,	  last	  sentence.	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  Id.	  at	  para.	  206.	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  The	  Case	  of	  the	  S.S.	  “Lotus”	  (Fran.	  v.	  Turk.),	  1927	  P.C.I.J.	  (ser.	  A),	  No.	  10,	  at	  25	  (Sept.	  7).	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  Certain	  German	  Interests	  in	  Polish	  Upper	  Silesia	  (Germ.	  v.	  Pol.),	  Judgment,	  1926	  P.C.I.J.	  (ser.	  A)	  No.	  7,	  at	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  (May	  25).	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“public	  powers”	  can	  be	  manifested	  through	  different	   factors	  of	  policy-­‐related	  and/or	  
operational	   control,	   not	   all	   of	   which	   may	   always	   be	   required	   in	   the	   aggregate,	   but	  
which,	   as	   the	   next	   section	   will	   argue,	   are	   present	   in	   the	   S.S.	   case,	   so	   that	   they	  
cumulatively	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  Article	  1	  ECHR	  claim.	  	  
	  
F.	  A	  Functional	  Approach	  to	  S.S.	  
	  
S.S.	   offers	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	   the	  kind	  of	  policy	  and	  operational	   control	   that	  
portrays	   the	   functional	  approach	   to	   jurisdiction	  designed	  above.	   It	  entails	  a	   series	  of	  
elements	  characteristic	  of	  public	  powers	  that	  are	  exercised	  by	  the	  Italian	  State—both	  
territorially	  and	  extraterritorially;	  both	  directly	  and	  through	  the	  intermediation	  of	  the	  
LYCG—that	   taken	   together	  generate	  overall	   effective	   control.	   The	   so-­‐called	   “impact”	  
element,	   the	  “decisive	   influence”	  element,	  and	  the	  “operative	   involvement”	  element	  
considered	   below	   have	   already	   been	   recognized	   by	   international	   courts	   and	   Treaty	  
bodies,	   including	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court,	   to	   be	   generative	   of	   a	   jurisdictional	   link	   that	  
triggers	   the	   applicability	   of	   human	   rights	   obligations.	   They	   can	   each	   separately	   and	  
independently	   amount	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	   (functional)	   jurisdiction,	   lending	   combined	  
force	   to	   the	   activation	   of	   Article	   1	   ECHR	   in	   the	   S.S.	   case,	   where	   they	   occur	   in	  
conjunction.	  
	  
I.	  The	  Impact	  Element	  
	  
Very	   much	   in	   the	   line	   of	   the	   Norstar	   case, 182	  the	   impact	   element	   refers	   to	   the	  
“sufficiently	   proximate	   repercussions”	   of	   state	   action	   “on	   rights	   guaranteed	   by	   the	  
Convention”	  that	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  deemed	  pertinent	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  
jurisdiction,	   “even	   if	   those	   repercussions	  occur	  outside”	  national	   territory.183	  What	   is	  
of	   relevance	   is	   their	   origin	   in	   an	   exercise	   of	   public	   powers	   by	   the	   authorities	   of	   the	  
state	   concerned.	   Sovereign	   activity—arguably	   of	   whatever	   nature:	   legislative,	  
executive,	  or	   judicial184—with	  direct	  and	  predictable	  consequences	  beyond	  territorial	  
boundaries	  can	  thus	  engage	  Article	  1	  ECHR.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  in	  Andreou,	  the	  opening	  
of	  fire	  from	  within	  state	  territory	  on	  a	  crowd	  from	  close	  range	  was	  deemed	  to	  amount	  
to	   jurisdiction,	   “even	   though	   the	   applicant	   sustained	   her	   injuries	   in	   territory	   over	  
which	   Turkey	   exercised	   no	   control,”	   since	   the	   shooting	   by	   state	   officials	   was	   “the	  
direct	  and	  immediate	  cause	  of	  those	  injuries.”185	  
	  
The	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission,	   in	   a	   very	   similar	   case,	   concluded	   the	   same.	   In	  
Brothers	   to	   the	   Rescue,	   Cuba	   was	   considered	   to	   have	   exerted	   sufficient	   control	  
through	   the	   shooting	   down	   of	   two	   aircrafts	   outside	   its	   aerial	   space,	   because	   “the	  
victims	  died	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  direct	  actions	  of	  agents	  of	  the	  Cuban	  State”	  operating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  Norstar,	  supra	  note	  176.	  	  
183	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  para.	  317.	  	  
184	  Drozd	  &	  Janousek,	  App.	  No.	  12747/87	  at	  para.	  91.	  
185 	  Andreou	   v.	   Turkey,	   App.	   No.	   45653/99,	   Admissibility	   Decision	   (June	   3,	   2008),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐95295.	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within	  Cuban	  territory.186	  The	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  has	  followed	  suit	  and	  declared	  that	  
“a	  person	  is	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  State	  .	  .	  .	  if	  there	  is	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  
action	  that	  occurred	  within	  its	  territory	  and	  the	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  human	  rights	  
of	  persons	  outside	  its	  territory.”187	  So,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  impacted	  individuals	  are	  
situated	   outside	   national	   territory	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   engagement	   of	  
extraterritorial	  responsibilities.	  The	  jurisdictional	  link	  is	  established	  through	  the	  effects	  
of	  state	  conduct	  that	  is	  initiated	  within	  territorial	  domain.	  
	  
However,	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   state	   authorities	   exercising	  
jurisdiction	  within	  national	  territory	  has,	  subsequently,	  been	  downplayed.	  The	  Human	  
Rights	  Committee	  has	   inferred	   that	   the	  extraterritorial	   “impact,”	  which	   is	   the	  “direct	  
and	  reasonably	  foreseeable”	  result	  of	  state	  action,	  is	  relevant	  also	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  “individuals	  
who	  find	  themselves	   in	  a	  situation	  of	  distress	  at	  sea.”188	  Actually,	  the	  Committee	  had	  
already	   previously	   held	   that	   a	   State	   party	   could	   be	   considered	   responsible	   for	  
extraterritorial	  violations	  of	  the	  ICCPR,189	  where	  there	  was	  a	  “link	  in	  the	  causal	  chain”	  
that	  would	  make	  possible	  violations	  on	   the	   territory	  of	  another	   state—wherever	   the	  
location	   of	   state	   organs.190	  In	   such	   situations,	   the	   risk	   of	   an	   extraterritorial	   violation	  
must	   be	   a	   “necessary	   and	   foreseeable	   consequence,”	   judged	   on	   the	   knowledge	   the	  
state	   had	   at	   the	   time	   of	   events.191	  So,	   knowledge	   of	   the	   probable	   result	   becomes	   a	  
factor	   in	   the	   jurisdictional	   analysis,	  whereas	   the	   locus	   of	   the	   action	   is	   immaterial.	   In	  
Munaf,	   for	   instance,	   the	  Committee	  evaluated	   the	  conduct	  of	  diplomatic	   staff	   in	   the	  
Romanian	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  applying	  this	  paradigm,	  and	  implying	  that	  only	  remote	  
and	  unforeseeable	  consequences	  fail	  the	  jurisdictional	  test.192	  
	  
The	   Strasbourg	   Court	   has	   also	   endorsed	   this	   understanding.	   In	   Loizidou,	   it	   declared	  
that	  “the	  responsibility	  of	  Contracting	  Parties	  can	  be	  involved	  because	  of	  acts	  of	  their	  
authorities,	  whether	  performed	  within	  or	  outside	  national	  boundaries,	  which	  produce	  
effects	  outside	  their	  own	  territory.”193	  And	  more	  recently,	  in	  Al-­‐Saadoon,	  it	  applied	  the	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  v.	  Cuba,	  Case	  11.589,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Comm’n	  H.R.,	  Report	  No.	  86/99,	  OEA/Ser.L./V/II.	  106,	  doc.	  3	  
rev.	  (1999),	  paras.	  24–25	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  Brothers	  to	  the	  Rescue].	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  Environment	   and	  Human	  Rights,	   Advisory	  Opinion	  OC-­‐23/17,	   Inter-­‐Am.Ct.H.R.	   (ser.	  A)	  No.	   23,	   para.	   74	  
(Nov.	  15,	  2017).	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  U.N.	  Human	  Rights	  Comm.,	  General	  Comment	  No.	  36	  on	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  
and	  Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR),	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Life,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  CCPR/C/GC/36,	  para.	  63	  (Sept.	  3,	  2019)	  (emphasis	  
added).	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  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Dec.	  16,	  1966,	  999	  U.N.T.S.	  171	  [hereinafter	  ICCPR].	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  U.N.	  Human	  Rights	  Comm.,	  Mohammad	  Munaf	  v.	  Romania,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  CCPR/C/96/D1539/2006,	  para.	  14.2	  
(July	  30,	  2009).	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  See,	   e.g.,	   U.N.	   Human	   Rights	   Comm.,	   A.R.J.	   v.	   Australia,	   U.N.	   Doc.	   CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996	   (Aug.	   11,	  
1997);	   Judge	  v.	  Canada,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998	   (Aug.	  13,	  2003);	   Lichtensztejn	   v.	  Uruguay,	  U.N.	  
Doc.	   CCPR/C/OP/2/1990	   (Mar.	   31,	   1983);	   Alzery	   v.	   Sweden,	  U.N.	   Doc.	   CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005	   (Nov.	   10,	  
2006).	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  Munaf,	  supra	  note	  190,	  para.	  14.2.	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  Loizidou	  v.	  Turkey	  (Preliminary	  Objections),	  310	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A.)	  at	  para.	  62.	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so-­‐called	  Soering	  reasoning	  to	  an	  extraterritorial	  extradition	  by	  UK	  agents	  of	  a	  terrorist	  
suspect	   in	   Iraq. 194 	  Therefore,	   while	   pure	   causation	   is	   insufficient	   to	   establish	  
jurisdiction	   in	   relation	   to	   utterly	   accidental	   and	   unpredictable	   outcomes, 195 	  the	  
proximate	   and	   predictable	   results	   must	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   when	   planning	   and	  
executing	  state	  action,	  whatever	  the	  location	  of	  its	  agents	  and	  of	  the	  action	  itself.	  
	  
In	  the	  S.S.	  case,	  the	  coordination	  of	  the	  rescue/interdiction	  operation	  was	  undertaken	  
by	   MRCC	   Rome	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   prescriptive	   and	   executive	   action—with	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  likely	  outcome.	  The	  Italian	  Coast	  Guard	  acted	  territorially,	  within	  its	  
Headquarters,	   taking	   the	   decisions	   of	   launching	   the	   SAR	   response	   and	   delivering	  
instructions	  to	  all	  assets	  in	  the	  SAR	  theatre	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  This	  alone,	  amounting	  to	  
the	   “institution	   of	  .	  .	  .	  proceedings”	   extraterritorially	   by	   the	   authorities	   of	   an	   ECHR	  
party,	   has,	   in	   comparable	   cases,	   been	   considered	   to	   be	   “sufficient	   to	   establish	   a	  
jurisdictional	   link”	   by	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court.196	  Here,	   such	   action	   “produced	   effects	  
outside	   its	  own	   territory”	  with	  very	   significant	   consequences	   for	   those	   concerned,197	  
which	  Italy	  could	  and	  should	  have	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  planning	  and	  deploying	  its	  
intervention.	   The	   fact	   that	   Italy’s	   conduct	   “facilitated	   the	  whole	  process”	   that	   led	   to	  
the	   involvement	   of	   the	   LYCG	   and	   “created	   the	   conditions”	   for	   the	   several	   violations	  
complained	  of	   to	  materialize,198	  is	  a	   further	   indication	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   jurisdiction	  
under	  Article	  1	  ECHR.199	  
	  
This	   factual	   dimension	   of	   the	   jurisdictional	   constellation	   present	   in	   the	   S.S.	   case	   is	  
complemented	   by	   a	  de	   jure	   basis	   in	   international	   law.	   Indeed,	   the	   coordinating	   role	  
assumed	   by	   MRCC	   Rome	   could	   not	   have	   been	   ignored	   or	   avoided.	   It	   was	   legally	  
predetermined	   by	   the	   maritime	   conventions,	   which,	   rather	   than	   creating	   any	   new	  
sovereign	   entitlements	   in	   favor	   of	   coastal	   states,	   instead	   produce	   “area[s]	   of	  
responsibility”	  to	  be	  overseen	  (in	  good	  faith)	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  safety	  of	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Al-­‐Saadoon,	   App.	   No.	   61498/08.	   For	   commentary,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Cornelia	   Janik	   &	   Thomas	   Kleinlein,	  When	  
Soering	  went	   to	   Iraq	  .	  .	  .:	   Problems	  of	   Jurisdiction,	  Extraterritorial	   Effect	  and	  Norm	  Conflicts	   in	   Light	  of	   the	  
European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  Al-­‐Saadoon	  Case,	  3	  GO.J.I.L.	  459	  (2009).	  In	  Soering,	  an	  extradition	  case,	  the	  
Court	  first	  deduced	  a	  non-­‐refoulement	  obligation	  from	  the	  prohibition	  of	  inhuman	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  
in	  Article	  3	  ECHR;	  Soering	  v.	  U.K.,	  11	  E.H.R.R.	  439	  (1989).	  
195	  Cf.	  Bankovic,	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  435	  at	  para.	  75.	  
196 	  Güzelyurtlu	   and	   Others	   v.	   Cyprus	   and	   Turkey,	   App.	   No.	   36925/07,	   para.	   188	   (Jan.	   29,	   2019),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐189781.	  
197	  Drozd	  &	  Janousek,	  App.	  No.	  12747/87	  at	  para.	  91;	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  133.	  	  
198	  Al-­‐Nashiri	  v.	  Poland,	  App.	  No.	  28761/11,	  para.	  517	  (July	  24,	  2014),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐
146044.	  See	  similar	  extraordinary	  rendition	  cases,	  where	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  concluded	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  state	  
jurisdiction	  on	  account	  of	  the	  facilitating	  role	  played	  by	  the	  ECHR	  party	  in	  question,	  e.g.,	  El-­‐Masri	  v.	  FYROM,	  
App.	   No.	   39630/09,	   para.	   239	   (Dec.	   13,	   2012),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐115621;	   Husayn	   (Abu	  
Zubaydah)	   v.	   Poland,	   App.	   No.	   7511/13,	   para.	   512	   (July	   24,	   2014),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐
146047.	  
199	  This	  is	  the	  conclusion	  reached	  by	  the	  Tribunale	  di	  Trapani,	  resolving	  a	  similar	  SAR	  case,	  in	  its	  Judgment	  of	  
June	   3,	   2019,	   at	   27,	   https://www.asgi.it/wp-­‐
content/uploads/2019/06/2019_tribunale_trapani_vos_thalassa.pdf.	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life	  at	  sea.200	  These	  conventions	  stipulate	  that	  upon	  receipt	  of	  a	  distress	  call,	  the	  first	  
MRCC	   contacted	   becomes	   and	   remains	   responsible	   for	   the	   coordination	   of	   rescue	  
procedures	  until	  the	  MRCC	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  SAR	  region	  (SRR)	  within	  which	  the	  incident	  
occurs	  assumes	  responsibility.201	  Like	  Papastavridis	  argues	  in	  this	  Special	  Issue,	  it	  is	  the	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  distress	  that	  triggers	  the	  obligation	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  
sea,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  maritime	  conventions.	  Their	  objective	  is	  
to	  ensure	  cooperation	  in	  completing	  the	  rescue	  and	  disembarking	  survivors202—a	  duty	  
that	  would	  normally	  fall	  on	  to	  the	  MRCC	  in	  whose	  SRR	  the	  incident	  takes	  place.203	  
	  
However,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   officially	   declared	   SRR	   and	   a	   fully	   functioning	   Libyan	  
MRCC,	   that	   responsibility	   could	   not	   be	   validly	   transferred	   to	   the	   LYCG,	   and	   the	   first	  
MRCC	   receiving	   the	   distress	   call—and	   thus	  with	   knowledge	   of	   the	   event—remained	  
bound	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  effective	  coordination	  of	  the	  operation.	  This	  responsibility	  
includes	  making	  sure	   that	   the	   rescue	   is	  conducted	  safely	  and	   in	  compliance	  with	   the	  
relevant	   rules,	   bringing	   survivors	   to	   landfall	   in	   a	   place	   of	   safety204—which	   Libya	   is	  
not.205	  
	  
Any	   information,	   instructions,	  and	  guidance	  delivered	  by	  MRCC	  Rome	  must	  take	   into	  
account	   their	   likely	   repercussions—bearing	   in	   mind	   that	   reliance	   on	   law	   of	   the	   sea	  
norms	  does	  not	  release	  from	  parallel	  human	  rights	  obligations	  concurrently	  applying	  in	  
situations	   of	   distress.206	  In	   particular,	   an	   MRCC	   that	   coordinates	   a	   SAR	   operation	  
outside	  its	  own	  SRR	  “should	  refrain	  from	  giving	  directions	  or	  advice	  which	  it	  knows	  or	  
ought	   reasonably	   to	   know	  would	   have	   negative	   human	   rights	   implications	   for	   those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  U.N.	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	  of	   the	   Sea,	   art.	   98,	   Dec.	   10,	   1982,	   1833	  U.N.T.S.	   3	   [hereinafter	  UNCLOS];	  
SOLAS	   Convention,	   Annex,	   Ch	   V,	   Reg	   7(1);	   International	   Convention	   on	   Maritime	   Search	   and	   Rescue,	  
Preamble,	   Recitals	   1	   and	   3,	   and	   Annex,	   para.	   2.1.1,	   Apr.	   27,	   1979,	   1405	   U.N.T.S.	   119	   [hereinafter	   SAR	  
Convention]	  
201	  IMO,	  Maritime	   Safety	   Committee,	  Guidelines	   on	   the	   Treatment	   of	   Persons	   Rescued	   at	   Sea	   [hereinafter	  
IMO	   Guidelines],	   (2004)	   MSC.167(78),	   MSC	   78/26/Add.2	   (Annex	   34),	   para.	   6.7.	   IMO	   Guidelines	   are	   not	  
strictly	  binding,	   but	  must	   “be	   taken	   into	   account”	  by	   SAR	  and	  SOLAS	  Convention	  parties	   accepting	  of	   the	  
2004	   amendments,	   as	   is	   Italy’s	   case.	   See	   SAR	   Convention,	   Annex,	   para.	   3.1.9.	   See	   also	   the	   U.N.	   General	  
Assembly	   urging	   members	   to	   implement	   them	   in	   their	   domestic	   procedures	   in	   Res.	   61/222,	   U.N.	   Doc.	  
A/RES/61/222,	  para.	  70	  (Dec.	  20,	  2006).	  
202	  SAR	  Convention,	  Annex,	  para.	  3.1.9.	  
203	  Id.	  Annex,	  para.	  2.1	  and	  2.3;	  SOLAS	  Convention,	  Annex,	  Ch	  V,	  Reg	  7(1).	  
204	  SAR	  Convention,	  Annex,	  para.	  3.1.9	  and	  IMO	  Guidelines,	  paras.	  6.12,	  6.17,	  defining	  “place	  of	  safety”	  as	  “a	  
location	  where	   rescue	   operations	   are	   considered	   to	   terminate	  .	  .	  .	  where	   the	   survivors’	   safety	   of	   life	   is	   no	  
longer	   threatened	   and	  where	   their	   basic	   human	   needs	   (such	   as	   food,	   shelter	   and	  medical	   needs)	   can	   be	  
met	  .	  .	  .,”	  stressing	  “[t]he	  need	  to	  avoid	  disembarkation	  in	  territories	  where	  the	  lives	  and	  freedoms	  of	  those	  
alleging	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	  persecution	  would	  be	  threatened”	  (emphases	  added).	  
205	  This	  has	  been	  the	  explicit	  finding	  of	  the	  Tribunale	  di	  Trapani,	  supra	  note	  199,	  at	  32	  and	  46	  et	  seq.	  
206 	  Confirming:	   Hirsi,	   supra	   note	   13.	   For	   commentary,	   see	   Violeta	   Moreno-­‐Lax,	   Seeking	   Asylum	   in	   the	  
Mediterranean:	  Against	  a	  Fragmentary	  Reading	  of	  EU	  Member	  States’	  Obligations	  Accruing	  at	  Sea,	  23	  I.J.R.L.	  
174	  (2011).	  
33 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  21	  No.	  03	  
requiring	   assistance.” 207 	  This	   arguably	   includes	   the	   requisitioning	   of	   vessels	   from	  
actors,	   like	   the	   LYCG,	   which	   are	   known	   for	   their	   unsafe,	   threatening,	   and	   abusive	  
conduct	   towards	   survivors,	   invariably	   leading	   to	   their	   refoulement. 208 	  While	   “the	  
search	  and	  rescue	  service	  concerned	  .	  .	  .	  has	  the	  right	  to	  requisition	  ships	  [so	  that	  they]	  
render	   assistance,”209	  it	   has	   also	   the	   duty	   to	   exercise	   this	   power	   in	   line	  with	   “other	  
rules	   of	   international	   law.” 210 	  Arguably,	   this	   includes	   the	   prerogative	   to	   release	  
masters	  of	  ships	  that	  could	  potentially	  be	  requisitioned	  from	  their	  obligation	  to	  render	  
assistance,	  when	  they	  are	  unsuitable.211	  A	  shipmaster	  should	  only	  be	  asked	  to	  proceed	  
to	  the	  rescue	  “in	  so	  far	  as	  such	  action	  may	  be	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  of	  him.”212	  
	  
The	   Italian	  authorities	  knew	  or	  ought	   to	  have	  known	   that	   the	   LYCG	  was	   inadequate.	  
They	  knew	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  known	  that	  calling	  upon	   it	   to	   intervene	  would	  mean	  for	  
the	  survivors	  to	  be	  taken	  back	  to	  Libya,213	  to	  face	  “dismal	  circumstances”	  amounting	  to	  
“crimes	  against	  humanity,”	  as	  described	  in	  EUNAVFORMED	  documentation.214	  And	  this	  
foreseeability	  of	  the	  likely	  result	  of	  their	  actions	  was	  relevant	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
jurisdictional	  link	  with	  the	  S.S.	  applicants.	  
	  
Acting	   in	   the	   knowledge	   that	   the	   life	   and	   integrity	   of	   the	   persons	   in	   distress	  will	   be	  
threatened	  when	  delivered	   to	   the	  authorities	  of	   an	  unsafe	   country215	  amounts	   to	   an	  
exercise	   of	   jurisdiction	   under	   the	   impact	  model,	   which	   thus	   suffices	   to	   activate	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  U.N.	  High	  Comm’r	   for	  Refugees,	  General	   Legal	   Considerations:	   Search	  and	  Rescue	  Operations	   Involving	  
Refugees	  and	  Migrants	  at	  Sea,	  para.	  20	  (Nov.	  2017),	  https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a2e9efd4.html.	  See	  
also	  CoE	  CommHR,	  Lives	  Saved,	  Rights	  Protected:	  Bridging	  the	  Protection	  Gap	  for	  Refugees	  and	  Migrants	  in	  
the	  Mediterranean,	   at	   30,	   recommendation	  9	   (June	  2019),	   https://rm.coe.int/lives-­‐saved-­‐rights-­‐protected-­‐
bridging-­‐the-­‐protection-­‐gap-­‐for-­‐refugees-­‐/168094eb87.	  
208 	  CoE	   CommHR,	   Third	   Party	   Intervention	   in	   Application	   No.	   21660/18,	   S.S.	   and	   Others	   v.	   Italy,	  
CommDH(2019)29,	   para.	   30	   (Nov.	   15,	   2019),	   https://rm.coe.int/third-­‐party-­‐intervention-­‐before-­‐the-­‐
european-­‐court-­‐of-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐app/168098dd4d.	  	  
209	  SOLAS	   Convention,	   Annex,	   Ch	   V,	   Reg	   33(2)	   (emphasis	   added).	   See	   also	   SAR	   Convention,	   Annex,	   para.	  
5.3.3.5.	  
210	  UNCLOS	  arts.	  2(3)	  and	  87(1).	  
211	  SOLAS	  Convention,	  Annex,	  Ch	  V,	  Reg	  33(3)–(4).	  
212	  UNCLOS	  art.	  98(1).	  
213	  EUNAVFORMED	  has	   noted	   that	   “migrants	   doesn’t	   [sic]	  want	   to	   be	   rescued	   by	   the	   Libyan	   Coast	   Guard	  
because	  they	  obviously	  don’t	  want	  to	  go	  back	  in	  Libya.”	  See	  EUNAVFORMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  
note	  30,	  Annex	  C,	  at	  3	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
214	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  November	  2016	  –	  31	  May	  2017,	  supra	  note	  35,	  at	  2,	  5–6.	  
215	  That	  Libya	  was	  unsafe	  for	  returns	  has	  been	  well	  known	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  Since	  the	  2011	  upraising	  and	  civil	  
war,	  UNHCR’s	  views	  on	  the	  disembarkation	  of	   refugees	  and	  migrants	   in	  Libya	  have	  been	  unequivocal.	  See	  
U.N.	   High	   Comm’r	   for	   Refugees,	   UNHCR	   Position	   on	   Returns	   to	   Libya	   (Nov.	   12	   2014),	  
https://www.unhcr.org/jp/wp-­‐
content/uploads/sites/34/protect/Libya_position_on_returns_12_November_2014.pdf,	  updated	   in	  October	  
2015	   (Update	   I),	   https://www.refworld.org/docid/561cd8804.html	   and	   in	   September	   2018	   (Update	   II),	  
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b8d02314.html.	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positive,	   due	   diligence	   obligations	   attaching	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   persons	   directly	  
affected	  by	  the	  action	  concerned.216	  In	  the	  S.S.	  case,	  SAR	  duties	  intersect	  with	  human	  
rights	   responsibilities,	   which	   constrain	   state	   discretion	   and	   limit	   the	   options	   left	   for	  
choice	   of	   action. 217 	  Italy	   could,	   therefore,	   not	   legitimately	   indicate	   a	   transfer	   of	  
responsibility	   for	   the	   survivors	   to	   the	   LYCG,	   whether	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	   including	  
through	   the	   provisions	   regulating	   OSC,	   without	   thereby	   engaging	   its	   (functional)	  
jurisdiction	  and	  violating	   its	   international	  obligations.218	  MRCC	  Rome	  should,	   instead,	  
have	   avoided	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   LYCG,	   by	   not	   calling	   on	   the	  Ras	   Al	   Jadar,	   as	   a	  
measure	  “within	  the	  scope	  of	  [its]	  powers	  which,	  judged	  reasonably,	  might	  have	  been	  
expected	  to	  avoid	  [the]	  risk.”219	  Alternatively,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  should	  have	  refrained	  
from	  asking	  it	  to	  assume	  OSC,	  a	  task	  that	  MRCCs	  must	  allocate	  “taking	  into	  account	  the	  
apparent	   capabilities	  of	   the	  on-­‐scene	   co-­‐ordinator	  and	  operational	   requirements.”220	  
Rather,	   it	   should	  have	  preferred	   the	  better	   alternatives	  offered	  by	   the	   SW3	  and	   the	  
multiple	   units	   readily	   available	  within	   the	  Mare	   Sicuro	   and	   EUNAVFORMED	  missions	  
present	  in	  proximity,	  which	  could	  have	  completed	  the	  rescue	  safely.	  
	  
II.	  The	  Decisive	  Influence	  Element	  
	  
Besides	   the	   impact	   element,	   the	   decisive	   influence	   element	   regards	   the	   exercise	   of	  
functional	  jurisdiction	  through	  indirect	  means.	  “Public	  powers,”	  in	  this	  instance,	  rather	  
than	  being	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  authorities	  of	  the	  state	  concerned,	  are	  deployed	  through	  
the	   medium	   of	   a	   local	   administration	   in	   a	   third	   country—whether	   with	   its	   legal	  
consent,	   de	   facto	   connivance	   or	   none	   of	   them,	   as	   the	   situation	   was	   in	   Ilaşcu	   and	  
subsequent	  line	  of	  cases.221	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  M.S.S.	  v.	  Belgium	  and	  Greece	  [GC],	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  2,	  paras.	  258–259,	  263,	  358–359,	  and	  366–367	  (2011);	  and	  
Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  paras.	  118,	  123,	  125–126,	  156–157.	  	  
217	  See,	  e.g.,	  Leray	  v.	  France,	  App.	  No.	  44617/98,	  (Jan.	  16,	  2001),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐60010,	  
where	  the	  Strasbourg	  court	  concluded	  that	  SAR	  operations	  are	  susceptible	  of	  judicial	  review	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
right	  to	  life.	  For	  an	  elaboration,	  see	  Lisa-­‐Marie	  Komp,	  The	  Duty	  to	  Assist	  Persons	  in	  Distress:	  An	  Alternative	  
Source	   of	   Protection	   against	   the	   Return	   of	   Migrants	   and	   Asylum	   Seekers	   to	   the	   High	   Seas?,	   in	   “BOAT	  
REFUGEES”	   AND	   MIGRANTS	   AT	   SEA:	   A	   COMPREHENSIVE	   APPROACH	   236	   (Violeta	   Moreno-­‐Lax	   &	   Efthymios	  
Papastavridis	  eds.,	  2016).	  
218	  The	  CoE	  CommHR	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Italian	  authorities	  making	  clear	  that,	  in	  his	  view,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
Hirsi	   judgment,	  supra	  note	  13,	  “handing	  over	  individuals	  [in	  any	  way	  whatsoever]	  to	  the	  Libyan	  authorities	  
or	  other	  groups	  in	  Libya	  would	  expose	  them	  to	  a	  real	  risk	  of	  torture	  or	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  
punishment.”	  See	  Letter	  from	  Nils	  Muiznieks,	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  to	  the	  Italian	  Minister	  of	  the	  
Interior,	   Marco	   Minniti,	   CommHR/INM/sf	   0345-­‐2017	   (Sept.	   28,	   2017),	   https://rm.coe.int/letter-­‐to-­‐the-­‐
minister-­‐of-­‐interior-­‐of-­‐italy-­‐regarding-­‐government-­‐s-­‐res/168075baea.	   Expressing	   similar	   concerns,	   see	  U.N.	  
Comm.	  Against	  Torture,	  Concluding	  Observations	  on	  the	  Fifth	  and	  Sixth	  Periodic	  Reports	  of	  Italy,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  
CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-­‐6	  (Dec.	  17,	  2017).	  
219 	  Osman	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   App.	   No.	   87/1997,	   para.	   11	   (Oct.	   28,	   1998),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐58257.	  
220	  SAR	  Convention,	  Annex,	  para.	  4.7.2.	  
221	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99.	  See	  also	  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06;	  Ivantoc	  and	  Others	  v.	  
Moldova	   and	   Russia,	   App.	   No.	   23687/05	   (Nov.	   15,	   2011),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐107480;	  
Mozer	   v.	   Moldova	   and	   Russia,	   App.	   No.	   11138/10	   (Feb.	   23,	   2016),	   http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐
161055;	   Turturica	   and	   Casian	   v.	  Moldova	   and	  Russia,	   App.	  Nos.	   28648/06	   and	   18832/07	   (Aug.	   30,	   2016),	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The	  Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  maintained	  in	  this	  constant	  jurisprudence,	  regarding	  Russian	  
and	   Moldovan	   (co-­‐)responsibility	   for	   the	   violations	   perpetrated	   by	   the	   separatist	  
government	   of	   Transdniestria,	   that	   an	   ECHR	   party	   engages	   its	   jurisdiction	   for	   the	  
actions	  and	   (crucially	   also	   for	   the)	  omissions	  of	   a	   third	  actor,	  when	   the	   latter	   comes	  
under	   its	   “decisive	   influence.” 222 	  Such	   “decisive	   influence”	   can	   lead	   to	   the	  
establishment	  of	  functional	  jurisdiction	  on	  account	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  dependency	  of	  the	  
third	   actor	   in	   question	   on	   the	   support	   received	   by	   the	   ECHR	  party.	  Where	   the	   third	  
actor	  survives	  “by	  virtue	  of	  the	  military,	  economic,	  financial	  and	  political	  support	  given	  
to	  it”	  by	  the	  ECHR	  party,223	  this	  entails	  “that	  [same	  ECHR	  party’s]	  responsibility	  for	  its	  
policies	   and	   actions.”224	  The	   reason	   is	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   critical	   support	   engenders	   a	  
“continuous	   and	   uninterrupted	   link	   of	   responsibility	  .	  .	  .	  for	   the	   applicants”	   fate.”225	  
And	   this	   is	   true	   even	   when	   there	   may	   not	   be	   any	   “direct	   involvement”	   of	   the	  
influencing	  ECHR	  party	  in	  the	  specific	  human	  rights	  violations	  alleged.226	  What	  is	  more,	  
such	  a	  “continuous	  and	  uninterrupted	  link	  of	  responsibility”	  is	  considered	  to	  give	  rise	  
to	  positive	  obligations	  to	  prevent	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  the	  area	  controlled	  by	  the	  
dependent	  third	  actor	  over	  which	  the	  ECHR	  party	  exercises	  “decisive	  influence.”227	  
	  
Although	   the	   Court	   designed	   this	   paradigm	   with	   a	   geographical	   rather	   than	   a	  
functional	  area	  of	  control	   in	  mind,	   the	  parallels	  with	  S.S.	  are	  paramount,	  considering	  
the	   multiple	   ways	   in	   which	   Italy	   has	   influenced	   Libya’s	   policy	   and	   practice	   in	   the	  
Central	  Mediterranean,	  entailing	  control	  over	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  interdependent	  stakes,	  
as	   Part	   C	   demonstrates.	   In	   November	   2017,	   Libya	   lacked	   an	   SRR,	   an	   MRCC,	   and	   a	  
coastguard	   function	   capable	   of	   receiving	   and	   responding	   to	   distress	   calls	  
autonomously,	  which	  is	  why	  Italy’s	  input	  was	  essential.228	  
	  
In	   2016,	   the	   LYCG	   was	   barely	   functional,	   due	   to	   vital	   assets	   and	   equipment	   having	  
been	   destroyed	   by	   the	   NATO’s	   offensive	   during	   2011–12.229	  For	   the	   former	   Italian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐166480;	   Paduret	   v.	   the	   Republic	   of	   Moldova	   and	   Russia,	   App.	   No.	  
26626/11	  (May	  9,	  2017),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐173464;	  Cotofan	  v.	  Moldova	  and	  Russia,	  App.	  
No.	  5659/07	  (June	  18,	  2019),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐193871.	  
222	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  paras.	  392–394.	  
223	  Id.	  at	  para.	  392.	  
224	  See	   ECtHR,	   Guide	   on	   Article	   1	   of	   the	   ECHR,	   para.	   47	   and	   authorities	   cited	   therein	   (Aug.	   31,	   2019),	  
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_1_ENG.pdf	  (emphasis	  added).	  
225	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  para.	  392.	  
226	  See	  Mozer,	  App.	  No.	  11138/10	  at	  para.	  101,	  where	  the	  Court	  admits	  there	  is	  “no	  evidence	  of	  any	  direct	  
involvement	  of	  Russian	  agents	  in	  the	  applicant’s	  detention	  and	  treatment.”	  
227	  See	   Ivantoc,	  App.	  No.	  23687/05	  at	  para.	  119,	  where	  the	  Court	  condemns	  Russia	   for	  “continu[ing]	  to	  do	  
nothing	  .	  .	  .	  to	  prevent	  the	  violations	  of	  the	  Convention	  allegedly	  committed	  .	  .	  ..”	  
228	  Confirming,	  see	  T05-­‐EUTF-­‐NOA-­‐LY-­‐07,	  supra	  note	  84,	  at	  2.	  
229	  See,	  e.g.,	  Joint	  Task	  Force	  Odyssey	  Dawn	  Public	  Affairs,	  US	  Navy	  P-­‐3C,	  USAF	  A-­‐10	  and	  USS	  Barry	  Engage	  
Libyan	  Vessels,	  U.S.	  NAVY	   (March	  29,	  2011),	  https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=59406.	  See	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Minister	   of	   Interior,	  Minniti,	   prior	   to	   2017,	   “when	  we	   said	  we	   had	   to	   re-­‐launch	   the	  
Libyan	  coastguard,	  it	  seemed	  like	  a	  daydream.”230	  Plans	  to	  develop	  a	  system	  of	  border	  
surveillance	  in	  Libya,	  in	  general,	  and	  a	  functioning	  LN/LCG,	  in	  particular,	  as	  Part	  C	  has	  
shown,	  were	  entirely	  “dependent”	  on	  Italy’s	  (and	  EU’s)	  assistance.231	  It	  was	  only	  after	  
the	  MoU,	  and	   the	   related	   financial,	   logistic,	   and	  operative	   support	  provided	  by	   Italy,	  
that	  the	  LYCG	  performed	  19,452	  pullbacks	  in	  2017,232	  up	  from	  800	  in	  2015.233	  
	  
However,	   rather	   than	   contributing	   to	   diminishing	   the	   “horrific	   abuses”	   faced	   by	  
migrants,234	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  due	  diligence	  obligations	  attached	  to	  (an	  exercise	  
of	   functional	   jurisdiction	   taking	   the	   form	   of)	   decisive	   influence,235	  the	   Italian	   plan	  
deliberately	   led	   to	   their	   containment	   in	   Libya.	   Its	   interventions	   so	   far	   “have	   done	  
nothing	  .	  .	  .	  to	   reduce	   the	   level	   of	   ill-­‐treatment	   suffered	  by	  migrants”	   in	   the	   country.	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   UN	   monitoring	   “shows	   a	   fast	   deterioration	   of	   their	   situation,”236	  
including	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  LYCG	  and	  after	  being	  pulled	  back.237	  
	  
What	   is	   clear	   and	   the	   European	   authorities	   have	   recognized	   is	   that	   the	   “increased	  
performance	   of	   the	   Libyan	   Coast	   Guard	   [is	   a]	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	  
support	  .	  .	  .	  provided.”238	  “[T]here	   could	   not	   be	   a	   sufficient	   operational	   capability	   [of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also	  European	  External	  Action	  Service,	  EUBAM	  Libya	  Initial	  Mapping	  Report	  Executive	  Summary,	  EEAS(2017)	  
0109,	  at	  41	  (Jan.	  18,	  2017),	  https://statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-­‐eeas-­‐libya-­‐assessment-­‐5616-­‐17.pdf.	  
230 	  Giulia	   Paravicini,	   Italy’s	   Libyan	   “Vision”	   Pays	   off	   as	   Migrant	   Flows	   Drop,	   POLITICO	   (Aug.	   10,	   2017),	  
https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-­‐libya-­‐vision-­‐migrant-­‐flows-­‐drop-­‐mediterranean-­‐sea/.	  
231	  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	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  –	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  October	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  2015	  interdictions	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  Chief:	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Consultative	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   on	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   2019),	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https://frontex.europa.eu/media-­‐centre/news-­‐release/frontex-­‐consultative-­‐forum-­‐publishes-­‐annual-­‐report-­‐
MgLqPI.	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  International,	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  Sea:	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  and	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   2018),	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238 	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   Ares(2019)1755075,	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   102.	   This	   correlation	   has	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   been	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   by	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  in	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  1	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the	   LYCG]	   without	  .	  .	  .	  	   [the]	   training	   [and]	   equipment”	   delivered.239	  As	   the	   Italian	  
Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  acknowledged	  in	  a	  public	  report,	  it	  is	  their	  “partnership	  with	  
Tripoli	   which	  .	  .	  .	  has	  .	  .	  .	  produced	   [these]	   important	   results.” 240 	  It	   is	   “thanks”	   to	  
Italy,241	  rather	  than	  to	  Libya’s	  independent	  efforts,242	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  near	  90	  per	  
cent	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  arrivals	  at	  Italian	  shores	  by	  mid-­‐2018.243	  
	  
These	   results	   are	   not	   accidental,	   unforeseen	   or	   unintended.	   They	   are	   planned	   and	  
expected.	   They	   stem	   from	   the	  direct	   application	  of	   the	  Treaty	  of	   Friendship	   and	   the	  
2017	   MoU.	   They	   constitute	   the	   concrete	   realization	   of	   their	   object	   and	   purpose.	  
Indeed,	   Italy’s	  support	  has	  specifically	  been	  targeted	  at	  “reinforcing	  the	  autonomy	  of	  
[Libyan]	   operational	   capacities,” 244 	  with	   a	   view	   to	   transferring	   coordination	  
responsibilities	  for	  rescue	  and	  interdiction	  in	  what	  was	  to	  become	  the	  Libyan	  SRR.	  And	  
that	  investment	  in	  capacity	  building	  of	  the	  LYCG	  is	  not	  unconditional.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  
the	  EUNAVFORMED	  command,	  it	  is	  provided	  “in	  exchange	  for	  [Libyan]	  cooperation	  in	  
tackling	  the	  irregular	  migration	  issue.”245	  So,	  the	  support	  lent	  to	  the	  LYCG	  has	  explicitly	  
been	   understood	   as	   a	  quid	   pro	   quo,	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   exert	   influence	   over	   the	  manner	   in	  
which	  Libyan	  constabulary	   functions	  are	   implemented	  at	  sea,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  
desired	   outcome	   of	   foreclosing	  maritime	   crossings	   towards	   Italy.	   Accordingly,	   it	   has	  
only	   been	   “under	   pressure”	   from	   Italy	   (and	   the	   EU)	   that	   “Libyan	   authorities	   [have]	  
increased	  their	  efforts	  to	  address	  the	  irregular	  flow	  of	  migrants.”246	  
	  
The	   pressure	   has	   come	   from	   different	   directions,	   not	   only	   from	   the	   political	   and	  
operational	   spheres,	   but	   also	   from	   the	   dedicated	   Italian-­‐Libyan	   Joint	   Commission	  
created	   by	   the	   MoU.247	  In	   accordance	   with	   its	   mandate,	   the	   Joint	   Commission	   has	  
formulated	   the	   “strategic	   priorities”	   of	   the	   Italian-­‐Libyan	   collaboration	   pursuant	   to	  
which	  Italy	  has	  delivered	  funding,	  training,	  equipment,	  and	  the	  main	  patrol	  vessels	  in	  
the	   Libyan	   fleet.	   So,	   the	   definition	   of	   such	   “strategic	   priorities”	   and	   their	   practical	  
implementation	  are	  key	  towards	  the	  establishment	  and	  full	  capacitation	  of	  the	  LYCG.	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240	  MAE	  Report,	  supra	  note	  47,	  at	  21.	  
241	  EUNAVOFRMED,	  LYCG	  Monitoring	  Report,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  29.	  
242 	  In	   this	   sense,	   see	   Chiragov	   and	   Others	   v.	   Armenia,	   App.	   No.	   13216/05,	   para.	   178	   (June	   16,	   2015),	  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐155353.	  See	  also	  Sargsyan	  v.	  Azerbaijan,	  App.	  No.	  40167/06	  (June	  16,	  
2015),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐155662.	  
243	  EUNAVOFRMED,	   LYCG	  Monitoring	   Report,	   supra	  note	   30,	   at	   29.	   See	   also	   EUNAVFORMED,	   Six-­‐Monthly	  
Report	  1	  December	  2017	  –	  31	  May	  2018,	  supra	  note	  71,	  at	  4.	  
244	  Letter	  from	  Marco	  Minniti,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  of	  Italy,	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Commissioner	  for	  
Human	   Rights,	   Ref.	   0921	   (Oct.	   11	   2017),	   https://rm.coe.int/reply-­‐of-­‐the-­‐minister-­‐of-­‐interior-­‐to-­‐the-­‐
commissioner-­‐s-­‐letter-­‐regardi/168075dd2d.	  
245	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Sophia	  End	  of	  Month	  6	  Report	  –	  January–December	  2015,	  EEAS(2016)	  126,	  at	  3	  (on	  file).	  
246	  EUNAVFORMED,	  Six-­‐Monthly	  Report	  1	  June	  –	  30	  November	  2017,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  6.	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  art.	  3.	  
2020	   The	  Architecture	  of	  Functional	  Jurisdiction	   3 8 	  	  
They	  are,	  arguably,	  tantamount	  to	  “the	  formulation	  of	  essential	  policy,”	  as	  defined	  by	  
the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  in	  Jaloud,248	  further	  supporting	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Italy,	  although	  
not	  directly	   involved	   in	  each	  and	  every	   individual	  action	  of	   the	  LYCG,	  did	  not	  merely	  
exert	  pressure,	  but	   “decisive	   influence”	   in	   the	  overall	   implementation	  of	   the	  plan	   to	  
stem	  irregular	  migration	  across	  the	  Central	  Mediterranean.	  It	  is	  Italy’s	  comprehensive	  
investment	   that	   made	   pull-­‐backs	   a	   reality	   in	   the	   course	   of	   2017,	   thus	   providing	   “a	  
strong	  indication”	  that	  it	  exercised	  decisive	  influence	  over	  the	  LYCG	  in	  a	  way	  such	  as	  to	  
trigger	  Article	  1	  ECHR.249	  
	  
III.	  The	  Operative	  Involvement	  Element	  
	  
Beyond	  its	  implication	  from	  a	  distance,	  through	  the	  “impact”	  and	  “decisive	  influence”	  
elements	   identified	   in	   the	   previous	   Parts,	   Italy’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   operative	  
capacities	  of	  the	  LYCG,	  especially	   in	  the	  course	  of	  2017,	  has	  been	  very	  direct	  too—so	  
much	   so	   that	   it	   fits	   the	   “public	   powers”	   doctrine	   to	   the	   letter,	   as	   formulated	   in	  Al-­‐
Skeini.	   To	   be	   sure,	   not	   only	   did	   Italy	   assume	   state	   functions	   of	   those	   normally	  
pertaining	   to	   the	   territorial	   sovereign,	   but	   it	   did	   so	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   the	  MoU	  and	  
related	   decisions	   of	   the	   Joint	   Commission	   established	   by	   it—therefore,	   with	   “the	  
consent,	  invitation,	  or	  acquiescence	  of	  the	  state	  concerned.”250	  
	  
As	  elaborated	  upon	   in	  Part	  C,	  November	  6,	  2017,	  was	  not	  an	   isolated	  occurrence,	   in	  
terms	  of	  the	  overall	  functional	  authority	  undertaken	  by	  Italy	  in	  the	  coordination	  of	  SAR	  
in	   the	   waters	   off	   Libya.	   Although	   Libya	   had	   ratified	   the	   SAR	   Convention,	   it	   had	   not	  
officially	  declared	  an	  SRR	  according	  to	  the	  applicable	  formalities	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  S.S.	  
events.	   An	   information	   document	   submitted	   by	   Italy	   (not	   Libya)	   to	   the	   IMO	   in	  
December	  2017	  reveals	  that	  the	  process	  of	  “assist[ing]	  the	  relevant	  Libyan	  authorities	  
in	  identifying	  and	  declaring	  their	  SRR”	  was	  still	  ongoing.251	  
	  
Actually,	   for	   the	  declaration	  of	  an	  SRR	   to	  be	  valid,	   the	  SAR	  Convention	   foresees	   that	  
there	  be	  an	  agreement	  among	  the	  Parties	  concerned	  (usually	  including	  all	  neighboring	  
coastal	  states)	  to	  be	  notified	  to	  the	  IMO	  for	  dissemination,252	  and	  that	  SAR	  services	  be	  
fully	  operational	  within	  the	  SRR	  being	  declared,	  so	  that	  they	  “are	  able	  to	  give	  prompt	  
response	   to	   distress	   calls.” 253 	  That	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   functioning	   MRCC	   is	   “a	  
prerequisite	  for	  efficiently	  coordinate	  [sic]	  search	  and	  rescue	  within	  the	  Libyan	  search	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248	  Jaloud,	  App.	  No.	  47708/08	  at	  para.	  63.	  
249	  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06	  at	  paras.	  122–123;	  Chiragov,	  App.	  No.	  13216/05	  at	  para.	  
186.	  
250	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  149.	  See	  also	  Aliyeva	  and	  Aliyev	  v.	  Azerbaijan,	  App.	  No.	  35587/08,	  paras.	  
56–57	  (July	  31,	  2014),	  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-­‐145782.	  
251	  IMO	   Sub-­‐Committee	   on	   Navigation,	   Communications	   and	   Search	   and	   Rescue,	   Libyan	   MRCC	   Project	   –	  
Submitted	   by	   Italy,	   NCSR	   5/INF.17,	   at	   3	   (Dec.	   15,	   2017),	  
https://www.transportstyrelsen.se/contentassets/3aba2639739e4e53afd3c7eb22f82ed6/5-­‐inf17.pdf.	  
252	  SAR	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  2.1.6.	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and	  rescue	  zone,	  in	  line	  with	  international	  legislation,”	  has	  been	  jointly	  declared	  by	  the	  
EU	  Commission	  and	  the	  EU	  High	  Representative	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs.254	  
	  
The	  obligation	  on	  coastal	  states	   is	   to	  run	  “an	  adequate	  and	  effective”	  SAR	  service.255	  
To	  that	  end,	  parties	   responsible	   for	  an	  SRR	  normally	  undertake	  “overall	  coordination	  
of	   SAR	   operations,” 256 	  for	   which	   purpose	   they	   “shall	   make	   provision	   for	   the	  
coordination	  facilities	  required	  to	  provide	  SAR	  services	  round	  their	  coasts”	  and	  “shall	  
establish	  a	  national	  machinery	   for	   the	  overall	   coordination	  of	  SAR	  services,”257	  in	   the	  
form	  of	  rescue	  coordination	  centers.258	  Above	  all,	  MRCCs	  “shall	  have	  adequate	  means	  
for	  the	  receipt	  of	  distress	  communications”	  and	  “adequate	  means	  for	  communication	  
with	  its	  rescue	  units	  and	  with	  MRCCs	  in	  adjacent	  areas.”259	  And	  rescue	  units	  attached	  
to	   them	   must,	   in	   turn,	   be	   “suitably	  .	  .	  .	  equipped,”	   staffed	   and	   managed,	   with	  
appropriate	   “facilities	   and	  equipment”	   that	   allow	   for	   an	  effective	   response260—all	   of	  
which	  was,	  and	  still	  is,	  lacking	  in	  the	  Libyan	  case.	  
	  
As	   shown	   in	   Part	   C,	   Libyan	   MRCC	   functions	   have,	   instead,	   been	   secured	   by	   Italy,	  
arranging	   for	   the	   dispatch	   and	   coordination	   of	   resources	   within	   SAR	   missions,	  
ascertaining	  the	  movement	  and	  location	  of	  vessels	  in	  distress,	  developing	  rescue	  plans,	  
designating	  OSC,	  communicating	  with	   rescue	  assets	  at	   sea,	   coordinating	   their	  action,	  
and	   even	   arranging	   for	   briefing	   and	   debriefing	   of	   LYCG	   personnel.261	  Italy	   should,	  
therefore,	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  assumed	  “overall	  control,”	  in	  the	  functional	  sense,	  of	  
this	   Libyan	   competence,262	  which	   it	   exercises	   both	   “directly,	   through	   its	   [own	   naval]	  
forces”—deployed	   in	   Libya	   and	   at	   sea,	  within	  Operation	  Nauras,	   and	  within	   its	   own	  
Coastguard	   and	   MRCC—as	   well	   as	   “through	   a	   subordinate	   local	   administration”	  
embodied	  in	  the	  LYCG.263	  It	  is	  Italy	  (also	  with	  the	  EU’s	  input)	  that	  has	  put	  in	  place	  the	  
whole	  technical	  and	  material	  infrastructure	  (not	  only	  the	  ships	  and	  the	  equipment,	  but	  
also	  the	  whole	  detection	  and	  communication	  apparatus)	  that	  enables	  the	  interception	  
and	   return	   of	   migrants	   back	   to	   Libya.	   And	   it	   is	   Italy	   that	   has	   assumed	   “effective	  
authority”	  over	  individual	  SAR	  operations,264	  including	  the	  one	  it	  deployed	  in	  S.S.	  As	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  Joint	  Communication,	  supra	  note	  57.	  
255	  UNCLOS	  art.	  98(2).	  
256	  SAR	  Convention,	  Annex,	  para.	  2.1.9.	  	  
257	  Id.	  Annex,	  paras.	  2.2.1,	  2.2.2.	  	  
258	  Id.	  Annex,	  para.	  2.3.1.	  	  
259	  Id.	  Annex,	  para.	  2.3.3.	  	  
260	  Id.	  Annex,	  paras.	  2.4.1.1,	  2.5.	  	  
261 	  For	   the	   full	   list	   of	   MRCC	   responsibilities,	   see	   IMO,	   Amendments	   to	   International	   Aeronautical	   and	  
Maritime	  Search	  and	  Rescue	  (IAMSAR)	  Manual,	  MSC.1/Circ.1594	  (May	  25,	  2018),	  Annex,	  at	  169	  et	  seq.	  
262	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  paras.	  315–316.	  Cf.	  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06	  at	  para.	  
106,	  using	  the	  word	  “domination”	  instead.	  
263	  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  para.	  314.	  
264	  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06	  at	  para.	  111.	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result,	  Italy	  should	  be	  considered	  responsible	  to	  “secure,	  within	  the	  [policy]	  area	  under	  
its	  control,	  the	  entire	  range	  of	  substantive	  rights	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Convention”	  that	  arise	  
in	  SAR	  and	  interdiction	  situations.265	  
	  
The	  nature	  of	   the	   LYCG	  as	  a	   subrogate	   Italian	  proxy	   for	   interdiction	  and	  pull-­‐back	  at	  
sea	   has	   been	   confirmed	   by	   the	   Tribunal	   of	   Catania	   adjudicating	   on	   a	   related	   case	  
concerning	  the	  rescue	  ship	  Open	  Arms	  of	  the	  NGO	  Proactiva.	  In	  his	  decision,	  the	  judge	  
takes	   as	   proven	   the	   crucial	   role	   played	   by	   the	   Italian	   Nauras	   assets	   in	   detecting	  
migrant	  boats	  off	  the	  Libyan	  coast	  and	  in	  leading	  LYCG	  operations.266	  The	  judge	  goes	  as	  
far	  as	  to	  affirm	  that	  the	  interventions	  of	  Libyan	  patrol	  vessels	  happen	  “under	  the	  aegis	  
of	  the	  Italian	  navy”	  and	  that	  the	  coordination	  of	  SAR	  missions	  is	  “essentially	  entrusted	  
to	   the	   Italian	   Navy,	   with	   its	   own	   naval	   assets	   and	   with	   those	   provided	   to	   the	  
Libyans.”267	  The	  phone	  number	  of	  the	  LYCG,	  as	  provided	  in	  their	  official	  headed	  paper,	  
at	   least	   until	   the	   spring	   of	   2018,	   corresponded	   to	   the	   phone	   number	   of	   the	   Italian	  
Nauras	   vessel	   docked	   in	   Tripoli,268	  which	   further	   corroborates	   the	   “high	   degree	   of	  
integration”	  between	  the	  two.269	  Ayoub	  Qassem,	  a	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  LYCG	  Tripoli	  
sector,	   back	   in	   November	   2017,	   had	   already	   confirmed	   this	   modus	   operandi.	   He	  
explained	  how	  the	  LYCG	  uses	  “the	  information	  [delivered	  by	  Italy]	  to	  intercept	  people	  
and	   return	   them	   to	   Libya,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   apprehended	   [rather	   than	   rescued]	   in	  
international	  waters.”270	  
	  
Italy	   de	   facto	   commands	   the	   SAR	   and	   interdiction	   response	   of	   the	   LYCG.	   In	   these	  
circumstances,	   it	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  “evade	  its	  own	  responsibility	  by	  relying	  on	  its	  
obligations	   arising	   out	   of	   bilateral	   agreements	   with	   Libya.”271	  It	   should,	   instead,	   be	  
considered	  that	  the	  practice	  it	  promotes	  of	  refoulement	  by	  proxy,	  employing	  the	  LYCG	  
to	   that	   end,	   amounts	   to	   an	   “exercise	   of	   [Italy’s]	   sovereign	   authority,	   the	   effect	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	  Id.	  at	  para.	  106	  (emphasis	  added).	  
266	  Tribunale	  di	  Catania,	  Case	  No.	  3476/18	  R.G.N.R	  and	  Case	  No.	  2474/18	  R.G.GIP,	  at	  3–4	  (Mar.	  27,	  2018)	  on	  
the	   flow	   of	   communications	   between	   the	   Italian	   navy	   assets	   in	   Libya,	   MRCC	   Rome,	   and	   the	   LYCG,	  
https://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/apr/it-­‐open-­‐arms-­‐sequestration-­‐judicial-­‐order-­‐tribunale-­‐
catania.pdf.	  
267	  Id.	   at	   21–22.	   See	   also,	   Tribunale	   di	   Ragusa,	   Case	   No.	   1216	   –	   1282/18	   R.G.N.R.	   and	   Case	   No.	   1182/18	  
R.G.GIP	   (Apr.	   16,	   2018),	  
http://www.questionegiustizia.it/doc/decreto_rigetto_sequestro_preventivo_tribunale_Ragusa_gip.pdf.	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  Andrea	  di	  Palladino,	  Cercate	  i	  guardacoste	  libici?	  Telefonate	  a	  Roma:	  06/…,	  IL	  FATTO	  QUOTIDIANO,	  (Apr.	  28,	  
2018),	   https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/premium/articoli/cercate-­‐i-­‐guardacoste-­‐libici-­‐telefonate-­‐a-­‐roma-­‐
06/.	   Only	   recently	   have	   Libyan	   phone	   numbers	   been	   provided	   to	   the	   IMO	   and	   uploaded	   onto	   its	   Gisis	  
database,	   most	   of	   which	   are	   however	   inoperative	   or	   answered	   by	   non-­‐English	   speaking	   operators.	   See	  
Migranti,	  il	  telefono	  dei	  soccorsi	  libici	  squilla	  a	  vuoto:	  ecco	  cosa	  succede	  se	  si	  prova	  a	  chiamare,	  REPUBBLICA	  TV	  
(Jan.	  22,	  2019),	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJWlYn-­‐dTTs.	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  Chiragov,	  App.	  No.	  13216/05	  at	  paras.	  176,	  186.	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  Zach	  Campbell,	  Europe’s	  Plan	  to	  Close	  its	  Sea	  Borders	  Relies	  on	  Libya’s	  Coast	  Guard	  Doing	  Its	  Dirty	  Work,	  
Abusing	   Migrants,	   THE	   INTERCEPT	   (Nov.	   25,	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   https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/libya-­‐coast-­‐guard-­‐
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  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  129.	  
41 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  21	  No.	  03	  
which	   is	   to	   prevent	   migrants	   from	   reaching	   [its]	   borders,”	   thus	   engaging	   ECHR	  
responsibility.272	  
	  
On	  November	  6,	  2017,	   the	  measure	  of	  comprehensive	  dominium	  that	   Italy	  exercised	  
over	   Libya’s	   SAR	   and	   interdiction	   functions	   was	   similar	   to	   that	   recognized	   by	   the	  
Strasbourg	  Court	   in	   relation	   to	  occupied	  areas	  of	   territory	  of	   a	   foreign	   country	   in	   its	  
case	  law.273	  Against	  this	  background,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  necessary	  to	  determine	  whether	  
Italy	   exercised	   “detailed	   control”	   over	   every	   individual	   action	   of	   the	   LYCG.274	  Italy’s	  
significant	  naval	  presence,	  through	  its	  Nauras	  and	  Mare	  Sicuro	  missions,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  
all-­‐encompassing	   provision	   to	   the	   LYCG—which	   only	   “survives	   as	   a	   result	   of	   [that]	  
support”275—determine	   that	   it	   exercised	   “effective	   control”	   over	   the	   S.S.	   applicants	  
throughout	  the	  chain	  of	  events	  of	  November	  6,	  2017.	  This	  includes	  those	  who	  drown	  
or	  were	  injured	  at	  sea,	  alongside	  those	  who	  were	  maltreated	  by	  LYCG	  officers	  and/or	  
pulled	   back	   to	   Libya,	   “during	   the	   course	   of	   or	   contiguous	   to	   [SAR/interdiction]	  
operations”	  carried	  out	  under	  Italy’s	  direction.276	  
	  
F.	  Conclusions,	  Limits,	  and	  Implications	  of	  the	  Functional	  Model	  
	  
When	   jurisdiction	   is	   understood	   in	   a	   functional	   sense,	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   public	  
powers	   that	   may	   combine	   elements	   of	   legislative,	   executive	   and/or	   judicial	   action,	  
there	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   need	   for	   unjustified	   distinctions	   between	   territorial	   and	  
extraterritorial,	   or	   between	   personal	   and	   spatial	   manifestations.	   Ultimately,	   what	  
underpins	   the	   various	   jurisdictional	   models	   accepted	   by	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   and	  
other	  adjudicators	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  is	  the	  sovereign-­‐authority	  nexus	  
established	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   individual	   in	   a	   specific	   situation	   through	   an	  
exercise	  of	  “public	  powers.”	  And	  in	  extraterritorial	  settings,	  like	  in	  territorial	  locations,	  
this	  can	  be	  ascertained	  not	  only	  through	  the	  exertion	  of	  direct	  physical	  constraint,	  but	  
also	   through	   indirect	   forms	   of	   control.	   What	   makes	   control	   “effective”	   under	   the	  
functional	   reading	   of	   jurisdiction	   is	   its	   capacity	   to	   determine	   a	   change	   in	   the	   real	  
and/or	  legal	  position	  of	  those	  concerned	  with	  human	  rights-­‐relevant	  implications.	  The	  
isolation	  of	  particular	  segments	  of	  that	  control	  is	  not	  warranted,	  however.	  I	  posit	  that	  
the	   evaluation	   of	   a	   concrete	   situation	   requires	   that	   attention	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   entire	  
constellation	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  channels	  through	  which	  state	  functions	  are	  exercised,	  
be	   they	   factual,	   legal	   or	   both	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   Rather	   than	   insulating	   supposedly	  
prevalent	  de	   facto	   elements,	   the	   proposition	   is	   to	   appraise	   situations	   in	   toto,	   taking	  
account	  of	  de	  jure	  factors	  that	  may	  concur	  with	  exercises	  of	  physical	  force.	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  Id.	  at	  para.	  180.	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  Starting	  with	   the	   judgments	   in	   Loizidou,	   310	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A.),	   23	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   513,	   and	  Cyprus	   v.	  
Turkey,	  35	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  967.	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  Ilaşcu,	  App.	  No.	  48787/99	  at	  para.	  315.	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  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06	  at	  para.	  106.	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  para.	  150.	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This	  approach	  allows	   for	  contextualized	  applications	  and	  principled	  outcomes.	  Under	  
this	   paradigm,	   the	   very	   act	   of	   bombing	   taken	   in	   isolation	   or	   the	   absence	   of	  
comprehensive	  control	  over	  the	  air	  space	  above	  the	  TV	  station	  in	  Belgrade	  would	  not	  
have	  been	  the	  only	  elements	  considered	  to	  assess	  jurisdiction	  in	  Bankovic.	  The	  entire	  
operation	   of	  which	   the	   bombing	  was	   but	   one	  part	  would	   also	   have	   been	   taken	   into	  
account.	   It	  would	  not	  have	  been	  the	  power	   to	  kill	  or	   its	   random	  occurrence,	  but	   the	  
orchestration	   of	   a	   military	   mission	   with	   a	   specific	   target	   and	   its	   implementation	  
through	  deliberate	  recourse	  to	  lethal	  force	  that	  would	  have	  counted	  as	  an	  exercise	  of	  
jurisdiction.	   State	   operations—military	   or	   otherwise—are	   multi-­‐staged	   processes,	  
entailing	  elements	  of	  prescriptive	  and	  enforcement	  action,	  comprising	  a	  sequence	  of	  
planning,	  launching,	  and	  completion	  phases.	  Isolating	  one	  of	  them,	  or	  selecting	  a	  single	  
factor	  detaching	   it	   from	  the	   rest,	  misses	   the	  wider	   structure	   to	  which	   it	  belongs	  and	  
through	   which	   it	   articulates	   itself.	   It	   is	   arbitrary	   and—as	   in	   Bankovic—it	   leads	   to	  
arbitrary	  findings.	  
	  
If	  what	   is	   significant	   is	   not	   one	   part	   but	   the	  whole	   of	   the	   operation,	   its	   foreseeable	  
impact	   and	   the	   knowledge	  of	   likely	   consequences	   of	   operational	   action	   are	   relevant	  
and	   come	   to	   inform	   the	   jurisdictional	   analysis.	   Planning	   and	   deployment	   must	   be	  
considered	   together	   as	   part	   of	   the	   same	   continuum.	   They	   must	   take	   account	   of	  
predictable	   results	   and	   be	   undertaken	   in	   a	   human-­‐rights	   compliant	   fashion.	   This	  
applies	   both	  when	   state	   intervention	   is	   carried	   out	   directly,	   through	   its	   own	   organs	  
and	  agents	  acting	  or	  producing	  effects	  abroad,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  undertaken	  indirectly,	  by	  
a	  proxy	  third	  actor.	  
	  
Italy’s	   actions	   and	   those	   it	   orchestrated	   in	   Libya	   should,	   therefore,	   be	   taken	   as	   a	  
whole,	   rather	   than	   disaggregated.	   When	   taken	   as	   a	   whole,	   its	   sovereign	   decisions	  
(adopted	  territorially,	  but	  producing	  effects	  abroad)	  together	  with	  the	  comprehensive	  
support	   lent	   to	   the	   LN/LCG	   (including	   through	   direct	   involvement	   in	   their	   command	  
and	   control	   capabilities)	   create	   a	   system	  of	   contactless,	   yet	   effective,	   control	   of	   the	  
SAR	   and	   interdiction	   functions	   of	   Libya	   that	   amounts	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	   functional	  
jurisdiction.	   Taking	   together	   the	   “impact,”	   “decisive	   influence”	   and	   “operative	  
involvement”	   factors	   through	   which	   its	   public	   powers	   materialized,	   the	   conclusion	  
should	   be	   that,	   on	   November	   6,	   2017,	   Italy	   triggered	   Article	   1	   ECHR.	   Through	   its	  
pervasive	   investment	   in	   the	   LYCG,	   it	   created	   the	   fiction	  of	   Libya’s	   “ownership”	  of	   its	  
intervention	   at	   sea, 277 	  achieving,	   by	   proxy,	   the	   same	   result	   for	   which	   it	   was	  
condemned	  in	  Hirsi,	  accomplishing	  through	  another	  state	  what	  it	  was	  forbidden	  from	  
doing	   itself.278	  And,	   like	   in	   Hirsi,	   it	   should	   be	   condemned	   in	   S.S.	   as	   well,	   for	   its	  
“recourse	   to	   practices	   which	   are	   not	   compatible	   with	   [its]	   obligations	   under	   the	  
[European	  Human	  Rights]	  Convention.”279	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277	  The	   creation	   of	   such	   “ownership”	   is	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   bilateral	   efforts	   as	   well	   as	   efforts	   pursued	  
through	   the	   EUNAVFORMED.	   See	   EUNAVFORMED,	   Six-­‐Monthly	   Report	   1	   December	   2017	   –	   31	  May	   2018,	  
supra	  note	  71,	  at	  15,	  32.	  
278	  U.N.	   Int’l	   Law	   Comm.,	   Commentary	   to	   the	   Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	   Internationally	  
Wrongful	  Acts,	  Y.I.L.C.,	  Vol.	  II,	  Part	  2,	  Ch	  IV,	  at	  66,	  para.	  6	  (2001)	  [hereinafter	  ARSIWA	  Commentary].	  
279	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  179.	  
43 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  21	  No.	  03	  
	  
One	  of	   the	   implications	  of	   the	   functional	   jurisdiction	  model,	  as	  posited	  herein,	   is	   the	  
potential	   chilling	   effect	   it	  may	   have	   on	   joint	   efforts	   to	   administer	  migration,	   and	   on	  
international	   cooperation	   more	   broadly.	   Since	   it	   requires	   that	   the	   human	   rights	  
repercussions	   of	   state	   action	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   when	   planning	   and	   rolling	   out	  
operations,	   this	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   overburdening	   states	   and	   rendering	   collaborative	  
projects	  more	  difficult.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  difficulty	  is	  not	  tantamount	  to	  inapplicability.	  
Even	   in	   (extraterritorial)	   situations	   of	   armed	   conflict	   has	   the	   ICJ	   affirmed	   that	   the	  
application	   of	   human	   rights	   is	   not	   suspended, 280 	  also	   in	   the	   most	   atypical	   of	  
circumstances,	  when	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  is	  being	  contemplated.281	  
	  
This	  conclusion	  that	  human	  rights	  obligations	  continue	  to	  bind	  when	  states	  cooperate	  
with	  one	  another	  has	  been	  embraced	  within	  the	  ECHR	  domain.	  In	  several	  cases	  has	  the	  
Strasbourg	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  Convention	  imposes	  obligations	  on	  ECHR	  parties	  
that	  these	  cannot	  evade	  through	  collaboration	   inter	  se	  or	  with	  other	  entities.	  It	  is	  not	  
that	   the	   Convention	   prohibits	   international	   cooperation.	   It	   just	   conditions	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  international	  agreements	  (in	  whatever	  form),	  and	  any	  cooperation	  based	  
thereupon,	  on	  the	  continued	  observance	  of	  human	  rights	  commitments.282	  When	  this	  
is	  not	  possible,	  ECHR	  parties	  cannot	  see	  themselves	  as	  relieved	  from	  their	  obligations.	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   they	   become	   precluded	   from	   “enter[ing]	   into	   an	   agreement	   with	  
another	   state	   which	   conflicts	   with	   its	   obligations	   under	   the	   Convention,”	   with	   the	  
principle	   carrying	   “all	   the	   more	   force”	   in	   the	   case	   of	   absolute	   and	   non-­‐derogable	  
rights—such	  as	  those	  at	  stake	  in	  S.S.283	  
	  
Due	   diligence	   is	   required	   too,	   so	   that	   ECHR	   parties’	   conduct,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   such	  
agreements,	  does	  not	  contribute	  (directly	  or	  indirectly)	  to	  the	  perpetration	  of	  human	  
rights	  violations.	  What	  is	  more,	  faced	  with	  a	  risk	  of	  irreversible	  harm,	  the	  Convention	  
“places	  a	  number	  of	  positive	  obligations	  .	  .	  .	  designed	  to	  prevent	  and	  provide	  redress”	  
for	  any	  ill-­‐treatment	  that	  may	  eventually	  occur.284	  And	  in	  situations	  where	  a	  country—
like	   Libya—is	   perpetrating	   “a	   serious	   breach”	   of	   “an	   obligation	   arising	   under	   a	  
peremptory	   norm	   of	   general	   international	   law,” 285 	  a	   migration	   management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280	  Legal	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Construction	  of	  a	  Wall	  in	  the	  Occupied	  Palestinian	  Territory,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  
2004	   I.C.J.	   136	   (July	   9);	  Case	   Concerning	  Armed	  Activities	   on	   the	   Territory	   of	   the	   Congo	   (DRC	   v.	  Uganda),	  
[2005]	  ICJ	  Rep.	  116.	  For	  the	  interaction	  between	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  international	  humanitarian	  
law,	   and	   international	   refugee	   law,	   see	   Violeta	   Moreno-­‐Lax,	   Systematising	   Systemic	   Integration:	   “War	  
Refugees”,	  Regime	  Relations	  and	  A	  Proposal	   for	  a	  Cumulative	  Approach	  to	   International	  Commitments,	  12	  
J.I.C.J.	  907	  (2014).	  
281	  Legality	  of	  the	  Use	  by	  a	  State	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  in	  Armed	  Conflict,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1996	  I.C.J.	  66	  (July	  
8).	  
282	  Al-­‐Skeini,	  53	  E.H.R.R.	  18	  at	  para.	  138;	  Catan,	  Apps.	  43370/04,	  8252/05,	  and	  18454/06	  at	  para.	  106.	  
283	  Al-­‐Saadoon,	  App.	  No.	  61498/08	  at	  para.	  138;	  and	  Hirsi,	  App.	  No.	  27765/09	  at	  para.	  129.	  
284	  Id.	  
285	  U.N.	   Int’l	   Law	   Comm.,	  Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	   Internationally	  Wrongful	   Acts,	   UNGA	  
A/56/10	  and	  A/56/49(Vol.I)/Corr.4	  (2001)	  [hereinafter	  ARSIWA],	  arts.	  41(1)	  and	  41(2).	  These	  provisions	  are	  
considered	   to	   reflect	   the	   current	   state	   of	   customary	   law.	  See,	   e.g.,	   Application	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	  
2020	   The	  Architecture	  of	  Functional	  Jurisdiction	   4 4 	  	  
agreement,	  conflicting	  with	  jus	  cogens	  norms—like	  the	  prohibition	  of	  torture,	  slavery,	  
or	  arbitrary	  deprivation	  of	   life286—becomes	   invalid	  outright.287	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  
states	  must	   not	   only	   refrain	   from	   cooperation,	   but	  must	   also	   proactively	   engage	   in	  
collaboration	   with	   others	   “to	   bring	   an	   end	   [to	   the	   violations	   in	   question]	   through	  
lawful	  means.”288	  Italy,	  in	  a	  situation	  like	  the	  one	  in	  S.S.,	  rather	  than	  facilitating	  abuse	  
by	   the	   LYCG,	   is	   “required	   by	   its	   own	   international	   obligations	   to	   prevent	   certain	  
conduct	  by	  another	  state,	  or	  at	   least	  to	  prevent	  the	  harm	  that	  would	  flow	  from	  such	  
conduct,”289	  and	   to	   take	   the	   necessary	   steps	   to	   mitigate	   any	   related	   foreseeable	  
damage.	  
	  
I	   understand	   there	   can	   be	   a	   potential	   backlash,	   if	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   follows	   my	  
reasoning,	   embraces	   the	   functional	   conception	   of	   jurisdiction	   and	   the	   operational	  
model,	  and	  finds	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  S.S.	  applicants.290	  At	  the	  most	  extreme,	  countries	  could	  
menace	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  ECHR.291	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  ruling	  precipitates	  
a	   counter-­‐reaction	  by	  State	  parties	   that	   is	  worse	   than	   the	  pull-­‐back	  policy	   the	   ruling	  
may	  illegalize—like	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  US	  extraordinary	  rendition	  program,	  comprising	  
indefinite	   offshore	   detention	   and	   “enhanced”	   interrogation	   techniques	   in	  
Guantanamo,	  to	  targeted	  killings	  via	  drone	  strikes.292	  However,	  these	  shifts	  are	  already	  
taking	  place.293	  They	  will	  not	  be	  changes	  that	  S.S.	  might	  instigate.	  Blocking	  strategies	  of	  
potential	   migration	   flows	   are	   already	   happening	   further	   down	   the	   line,	   and	   ever	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Prevention	   and	   Punishment	   of	   the	   Crime	   of	  Genocide	   (Bosn.	  &	  Herz.	   v.	   Serb.	  &	  Montenegro),	   Judgment,	  
2007	  I.C.J.	  43,	  paras.	  173,	  385,	  388	  (Feb.	  26).	  
286	  The	  Tribunale	  di	  Trapani,	  supra	  note	  199,	  at	  32,	  has	  included	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement	  in	  this	  list.	  
287	  See	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties,	   May	   23,	   1969,	   1155	   U.N.T.S.	   331,	   art.	   53.	   See	   also	  
Tribunale	  di	  Trapani,	  supra	  note	  199,	  at	  38,	  declaring	  the	  2017	  MoU	  invalid	  on	  this	  ground.	  
288	  ARSIWA	  art.	  41(1).	  
289 	  ARSIWA	   Commentary	   at	   64,	   para.	   4	   (emphasis	   added).	   See	   also	   Corfu	   Channel,	   (U.K.	   v.	   Albania),	  
Judgment,	  1949	  I.C.J.	  4,	  at	  22	  (Apr.	  9).	  
290 	  Moritz	   Baumgärtel,	   High	   Risk,	   High	   Reward:	   Taking	   the	   Question	   of	   Italy’s	   Involvement	   in	   Libyan	  
“Pullback”	   Policies	   to	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   EJIL:TALK!	   (May	   14,	   2018),	  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/high-­‐risk-­‐high-­‐reward-­‐taking-­‐the-­‐question-­‐of-­‐italys-­‐involvement-­‐in-­‐libyan-­‐pullback-­‐
policies-­‐to-­‐the-­‐european-­‐court-­‐of-­‐human-­‐rights/.	  
291 	  Like	   U.K.	   Conservative	   governments	   have	   threatened	   to	   do	   at	   different	   points	   in	   time.	   See,	   e.g.,	  
Conservative	   Party	   in	   the	   Run	  Up	   to	   the	  May	   2015	  General	   Election,	  Protecting	  Human	  Rights	   in	   the	  UK,	  
undated,	   https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20files/human_rights.pdf.	   See	   also	  
Rob	   Merrick,	   Theresa	   May	   to	   Consider	   Axeing	   Human	   Rights	   Act	   after	   Brexit,	   Minister	   Reveals,	   THE	  
INDEPENDENT	   (Jan.	   18,	   2019),	   https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-­‐may-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐
act-­‐repeal-­‐brexit-­‐echr-­‐commons-­‐parliament-­‐conservatives-­‐a8734886.html.	  
292	  Alerting	  to	  this,	  see	  Ralph	  Wilde,	  The	  Unintended	  Consequences	  of	  Expanding	  Human	  Rights	  Protections,	  
AJIL	  UNBOUND	  (Mar.	  12,	  2018),	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  See,	  e.g.,	  U.N.	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  Extrajudicial,	  Summary	  or	  Arbitrary	  Executions,	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Refugees	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closer,	   if	   not	   directly	   within,	   countries	   of	   origin	   of	   potential	   refugees,	   like	   Sudan	   or	  
Afghanistan.294	  The	  apparatus	  of	  border	  coercion	  and	  extraterritorial	  containment	  has	  
deep	  roots	  and	  has	  been	  forming	  for	  decades	  now,	  containing	  the	  movement	  of	  those	  
most	  needing	  to	  move.295	  
	  
To	  my	  mind,	   there	   is	  more	   to	   gain	   than	   there	   is	   to	   lose	  with	  S.S.	   Just	   like	   a	  positive	  
decision	   in	   Al-­‐Skeini	   helped	   build	   the	   case	   in	  Hirsi,	   a	   positive	   finding	   in	   S.S.	   will,	   in	  
incremental	   fashion,	   provide	   tools	   to	   counter	   the	   changing	   means	   through	   which	  
states	  perpetrate	  violations	  offshore.	  S.S.	   can,	   therefore,	  make	  a	   crucial	   contribution	  
to	   close	   the	   gap	   between	   extraterritorial	   interventions	   and	   the	   traditional,	   and	   still	  
predominantly	   territorial,	   mechanisms	   of	   legal	   accountability,	   giving	   teeth	   to	   ECHR	  
guarantees,	  and	  bringing	  borders	  and	  globalization	  closer	  to	  human	  rights.	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  after	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  (Feb.	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  2017),	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  For	  analysis	  of	  the	  main	  measures	  in	  the	  EU,	  see	  Moreno-­‐Lax,	  supra	  note	  147,	  especially	  Part	  I,	  chs	  2	  to	  6.	  	  
